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PREFACE 
The life of Frederick Edwin Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead (1872-
1930), was fascinating but puzzling. The second Earl of Birkenhead has 
described his father as 11a brilliant failure, 11 a man of tremendous intel-
ligence and talent who failed to reach the pinnacle of success. Most 
historians have confirmed this assessment but have added a somewhat sinis-
ter element to Birkenhead's career. Birkenhead is generally depicted as 
a latter-day condottiere, reckless and unprincipled, who used his great 
gifts in any expedient or demagogic scheme that would advance his career. 
Birkenhead was rarely guided by moral or ethical considerations, 
and, like any other prominent individual in politics, he certainly had a 
healthy dose of ambition. However, in the coalition Government of 1919-
22, Birkenhead laid a double claim to the nebulous mantle of statesmanship. 
In his position as Lord Chancellor, he was responsible for progressive 
legislation that served as landmarks in the reform of the English legal 
system. Secondly, Birkenhead was instrumental in securing the Articles 
of Agreement in December 1921 which ended the conflict between British 
and Irish forces and granted self-government to Ireland. Birkenhead's 
achievement in bringing about this agreement was such that when he died 
nearly a decade later, The Times (October 1, 1930) declared that "the 
Irish Settlement was largely due to his patience and reason. . he 
frequently made further negotiations possible when it seemed that a 
deadlock could not be avoided. 11 
iii 
iv 
The incongruity between the historical interpretation of 
Birkenhead as selfish and unscrupulous and the disinterested role which 
he played in the Irish settlement was intriguing, and it prompted me to 
research this topic. The results of my research have, I believe, produced 
a substantially different assessment of Lord Birkenhead and his place in 
modern British history. 
This thesis is not a straightforward biography of Birkenhead but 
an account of the effect which the Irish problem had on British politics 
from 1912 to 1921 and Birkenhead's occasionally ambiguous contributions 
to the solution of that problem. Birkenhead's personal life and his 
achievements and activities outside of the Irish question are given only 
cursory treatment, although the first chapter gives a description of 
Birkenhead's life up to 1911--with particular emphasis on the constitutional 
crisis of 1909-11, the bitterness of which helped to .create the tense 
atmosphere of the Home Rule controversy in 1912-14--and the fourth chapter 
briefly outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition ministry 
of 1919-22, thus providing the background for the Irish negotiations in 
1921. Events in Ireland are described with some thoroughness in order to 
show the conditions in that island and the constant pressure which was 
placed on the British Government to devise a viable policy. For the sake 
of clarity and chronology, Birkenhead is referred to as "Smith" until he 
was raised to the peerage in 1919, after which time he is designated by 
his title. 
As will be explained more fully in the second chapter, the term 
"Unionist" was virtually synonomous with Conservative from 1895 until the 
1921 settlement. Conservatives and many Liberals joined forces in 1886 
to prevent Gladstone from giving Home Rule to Ireland and ending the union 
v 
of Ireland and Great Britain; these Conservatives and Liberals united to 
form the Unionist Party for the primary purpose of blocking any attempt 
to disrupt the United Kingdom. However, within the Unionist Party, a 
subtle distinction was made as to a person's affiliation before the Home 
Rule furor: Arthur Balfour, for example, was considered to be a 
Conservative while Joseph Chamberlain was considered to be a Liberal 
Unionist, but both men were members of the Unionist Party. "Tory" is, 
of course, the traditional nickname for a person who is associated with 
the Conservative philosophy or political organization. 
Unfortunately, some documents and personal papers are not avail-
able in this country, but a few references to the major sources that were 
used in the preparation of this thesis are, perhaps, in order. The 
t:otally free access to the University of Virginia archives in Charlottes-
ville was a godsend in providing material from the Parliamentary Debates, 
The Times of London, and contemporary publications, as well as from bio-
graphical and general background, books., The Library of Congress also 
contained invaluable material--most notably, the correspondence between 
David Lloyd George and Sir James Craig and Eamon de Valera in 1921. 
Among general works, Lord Pakenham's Peace ~Ordeal is still the 
definitive study of the negotiations in 1921; Frank Gallagher's book, The 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, which was edited and published posthumously, contained 
interesting details, but the reader should be forewarned that it was 
written from the Irish republican viewpoint. Thomas Jones' journal, 
Whitehall Diary, which was edited by Keith Middlemas, was highly informa-
tiv~, as was the gossipy diary that was kept by Lloyd George's mistress, 
Frances Stevenson. Lord Beaverbrook's brilliant study of the coalition 
Government, The Decline and Fall .£i..Lloyd George, gave very pungent informa-
vi 
tion about the politics of the era, as did Salvidge E.!. Liverpool, which 
was based on the diary of Birkenhead's political mentor. The Tory right-
wing found notable spokesmen in Leopold Amery, who produced remarkably 
literate memoirs, and in the startingly candid diaries of Sir Henry Wilson. 
Winston Churchill's observations in Great Contemporaries and, especially, 
The Aftermath were relied upon heavily, and Dorothy Macardle's monumental 
work, The Irish Republic, was also used extensively. 
In the realm of biography, Birkenhead's son wrote a comprehensive 
study of his life though one should balance this obeisant biography with 
the shorter but more cynical account of Birkenhead's career, The Glittering 
Prizes, by William Camp. Outstanding political biographies included 
Robert Blake's study of Bonar Law, The Unknown Prime Minister, and Roy 
Jenkins' Asquith. Houghton Mifflin's multi-volumed project, Winston~-
Churchill, started by Randolph Churchill and, after his death in 1968, 
continued by Martin Gilbert, was also outstanding. On the Irish side, 
the recent biography of Eamon de Valera by the Earl of Longford and 
Thomas O'Neill was easily the finest, although Denis Gwynn's The Life of 
John Redmond ran a distinguished second. Any discussion of biographical 
material would have to include Sir Harold Nicolson's classic biography 
of George V, which was particularly valuable in the pre-1914 phase of the 
Irish question. 
In the first chapter, which dealt with Birkenhead's early life, 
the two aforementioned biographies of him were extremely important, as 
was Salvidge of Liverpool. Among other material which proved to be useful, 
Barbara Tuchman's brilliant work, The Proud Tower, was excellent, and so 
too was Roy Jenkins' study of the constitutional crisis of 1909-11, 
Mr. Balfour's Poodle; in a lighter vein was J. B. Priestly's The 
vii 
Edwardians and Peter de Mendelssohn's The Age of Churchill, both enor-
mously entertaining and informative social histories. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. John L. Gordon, 
Jr., whose advice and suggestions were continually helpful. 
Richmond, Virginia 
April, 1973 
Robert A. Kester 
I 
TORY DEMAGOGUE 
(1) 
Frederick Edwin Smith was born at Birkenhead, Lancashire, on 
July 12, 1872, the day which had been celebrated for nearly two centuries 
in Ulster as the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, in which William 
of Orange defeated the Catholic forces of the deposed James II. This 
coincidence concerning Smith's birthday was insignificant except that it 
later entitled him to claim the status of an honorary Ulsterman when the 
Irish question again came to the fore of British politics. 1 
In later years, Smith enjoyed boasting of hi·s humble origins and 
exaggerating his success as a self-made man. When he was elevated to the 
peerage in 1919, Smith placed on his crest the inscription, Faber ~ 
2 Fortunae ("Smith of my fortune"). This impression of Smith rising from 
dire circumstances to worldly success, however, is misleading. Although 
he could count miners and pugilists among his forebears, his father was 
a respectable lawyer who became Mayor of Birkenhead, a town on the south 
bank of the Mersey River across from Liverpool. Smith's father died when 
1 . Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E.: 
Earl of Birkenhead (London, 1960), lJ. 
The Life of I· E. Smith, First 
2Ibid. 
1 
F. E. was sixteen years old, and, while he did not leave great wealth, 
there was enough money for the family to exist on a fairly comfortable 
middle-class level. 3 
2 
At an early age, F. E. was instilled with a "pathological deter-
mination to succeed," having listened to his father's constant exhorta-
tions to make a name for himself at the Bar and in politics. Indeed, his 
father had shown prophetic insight when he urged his young son to strive 
to become Prime Minister or Lord Chancellor. 4 Although young Smith was 
not able to attend Eton or Harrow, he did receive a public school education 
in Lancashire and, by means of a scholarship, advanced to Wadham College, 
5 Oxford, where he distinguished himself as a leading debater of the Oxford 
Union and took First Class Honors in 1895, and where he also developed 
expensive tastes which he never abandoned. 6 
Following graduation, Smith became a Vinerian Law Scholar at 
7 Oxford, being elected a Fellow of Merton College. He abandoned his 
academic career in 1899 in order to establish a law practice in Liverpool, 
where, within two years, he felt sufficiently secure to marry Margaret 
. 8 
Furneaux, the daughter of an Oxford don. In the early 1900 1 s, Smith's 
quick wits and genuine legal ability made him highly successful in 
Liverpool, but the rising young lawyer's extravagant mode of living 
3Ibid., 13, 16-17. 
4William Camp, The Glittering Prizes: A Biographical Study of 
F. E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead (London, 1960), 14-15~ 
52nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. !·• 22-23, 26-28. 
6 Ibid., 42.:..51, 55-56. 
7 . Ibid., 56-59. 
8 Ibid., 70, 77. 
3 
caused a chronic need for money. To supplement his legal income, Smith, 
whose religious background was nonconformist, became secretary of the 
Liverpool chapter of Lady Wimborne's League, an evangelical movement to 
prevent the use of imagery and ritualism in English churches. Smith 
decided to brighten the League's drab office with lithographs of the 
Virgin Mary--an act of irreverent humor which soon caused his dismissal. 9 
It was inevitable that a young, clever, ambitious lawyer with a 
flair for public speech would consider a career in politics. As early 
as 1894, Smith made his first political speech at a public meeting in 
Liverpool on the question of workmen's compensation and employer liability, 
and, at that time, he caught the attention of Archibald Salvidge, the 
leading Unionist power broker in the Liverpool area. Salvidge saw ,in 
Smith a potentially useful recruit to his stable of politicians and agreed 
to support Smith whenever he decided to plunge into active politics. 10 
In 1904, Smith made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the Liverpool 
Recordership, which was given instead to an individual who had been more 
involved in local politics; this was actually a blessing for Smith, as 
municipal government is not often the most propitious route to national 
prominence. Through Salvidge's efforts, Smith was chosen to be the 
Unionist candidate for the Scotland division of Liverpool whenever the 
next general election was held. Even though this district was considered 
Liberal due to its rather sizable Catholic population, Smith was eager 
for the chance to run for Parliarnent. 11 
9Ibid., 7'4-75. 
10 Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool: Behind the Political 
Scene, 1890-1928 (London, 1934), 18-19. 
11 Ibid., 62-63. 
4 
Aside from Salvidge's influential support, there were additional 
reasons why Smith entered the Unionist Party: Smith's father had been a 
Conservative, and, in 1903, when the debate over the "Imperial Preference" 
program of Unionist Joseph Chamberlain came to dominate politics, Smith 
found himself in agreement with Chamberlain's idea of tariff reform and 
Imperial unity, as opposed to the traditional policy of free trade. 12 
When Chamberlain had appeared in Liverpool that year to speak in behalf 
of tariff reform, Smith had been selected by Salvidge to follow Chamber-
lain's speech--not an easy task in an area where "Joe" Chamberlain was 
virtually a folk hero. Nevertheless, Smith proceeded to elicit from the 
audience an even warmer response than had been accorded Chamberlain. 
Instead of being irked at having an unknown fledgling upstage him, 
Chamberlain had asked Salvidge, "Who on earth is this?" When Salvidge 
explained that Smith was his most promising candidate and that he was 
trying to secure a safe seat for him, Chamberlain remarked, "He will go 
far." After the rally ended, Chamberlain encouragingly told Smith to 
contact him in London as soon as he had been elected to Parliament. 13 
That time was soon at hand because the Unionist majority in 
Parliament was rapidly disintegrating as a result of the feud between 
Chamberlain and Prime Minister Arthur Balfour over the tariff reform 
question, and as a result of public weariness with nearly two decades of 
Tory rule. In December 1905, Balfour resigned, and a Liberal "caretaker" 
12 .. 
Znd Earl of Birkenhead, f· !•, 109. 
13
salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, 54-55; Camp, The Glittering 
Prizes, 38-39. 
5 
ministry was formed while a general election was held. In order to give 
Smith every possible advantage, Salvidge switched Smith's prospective 
constituency, enabling him to run as the Unionist candidate for the more 
14 
secure Walton division of Liverpool. 
Liverpool, a large port city on the Irish Sea, had a political 
temperament more akin to Belfast or Londonderry than to a typical English 
city because of its considerable Irish population, which was mostly of 
Ulster Protestant, or "Orange," persuasion. Smith shrewdly guessed that 
Liverpool voters would be less affected by Liberal arguments for free 
trade and social reform than by more visceral issues. Therefore, he 
campaigned as a supporter of "Joe" Chamberlain and as a resolute opponent 
of Home Rule for Ireland. By appealing to Unionist and 11 jingo11 sentiments, 
Smith made a strong bid not only for the votes of the middle class but 
also of the Liverpool working class, where Orange sympathy was a powerful 
15 
force. When the votes were counted in January 1906, F. E. Smith was 
Walton 1 s new representative in Westminster. 
(2) 
The general election of January 1906 was a watershed in British 
history: The Liberal Party won a resounding victory and proceeded to lay 
the foundations of what has come to be termed the "welfare state." The 
F. E. Smith who sat on the decimated Unionist benches early in 1906 was 
. tall, dark, slender and a little overdressed. His 
eyes and hair were lustrous, the first from nature, the 
second fron too much oil. His mouth had always a slightly 
co,ntemptuol,is droop, his vofce was. a beautiful drawl. He 
14
salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, 63-64. 
152nd Earl of Birkenhead,!·~., 119-120. 
6 
had acquired ... the airs of a fox-hunting man who could 
swear elegantly in Greek. . 16 
The fact that Smith was one of the few new M. P.s on the Unionist 
benches, and one of the few Unionists at all to be victorious in the face 
of the Liberal tidal wave, gave him a unique opportunity to rise in the 
Party ranks, and, like Benjamin Disraeli before him, he saw that a career 
could be built on the ruins of a political party. Accordingly, he decided 
to stake his claim to future Unionist leadership with a spectacular maiden 
speech. Smith realized that it was a gamble in which he could achieve a 
magnificent triumph or suffer ignominious humiliation. "If I fail," he 
told his wife, "there will be nothing for me but to remain silent for 
three years until my disgrace is forgotten. 1117 Smith chose March 12, 1906, 
.as the occasion for his speech and asked Joseph Chamberlain to ensure a 
favorable time for it. I I Anxious to help Salvidge 1 s protege, Chamberlain 
arranged for Smith to be called on by the Speaker at 10 p.m., an hour 
when the benches and galleries of the Commons were usually filled. 18 On 
that evening, the issue under discussion was free trade. Smith was 
ostensibly to direct his remarks to the Liberal Government's tariff policy, 
but, in fact, he launched a full-scale attack on the Liberal Party program. 
The scene was afterwards described by Philip Snowden, a Labour M. P. who 
was also new to Parliament in 1906: 
. . • there arose from the Tory benches a young man, sleek 
and well-groomed, whose self-confidence immediately 
arrested the attention of the House. He delivered a 
maiden speech which is still spoken of as the most 
successful first effort made by any member of Parliament 
16 . . 
George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, .12.1.Q.-
(New York, 1961), 53-54. 
17 . 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. !·, 126. 
l8camp, The Glittering Prizes; 41. 
in [this] generation ..•• The speech was a masterpiece of 
destructive criticism, of irony and satire. It was fault-
lessly delivered, and every shaft went home. The Tories 
were sent into hysterical delight •.•• I cannot remember 
that I have 1 ~ince heard a speech quite like it in Parliament. 
Smith began his speech by declaring his preference for tariff 
7 
20 
reform, which led him to a criticism of the Government's fiscal policy 
which, in turn, led to a personal attack on one of the most conspicuous 
and radical Liberal leaders--David Lloyd George, President of the Board 
of Trade. Smith accused Lloyd George of using demagogic tactics in the 
recent campaign and of deceiving "ignorant men" in his Welsh constituency. 21 
When his reference to "ignorant men" brought hostile comments from the 
Liberals, Smith remarked sardonically: "In relation to the Right 
Honourable Gentleman [Lloyd George] they are ignorant. Is that disputed?1122 
To Smith's claim that Lloyd George had deliberately misled "simple 
rustics" by telling them that the Tories _would introduce Chinese slavery 
in the hills of Wales, Lloyd George angrily interjected, "I did not say· 
that!" Smith coolly replied: "Anticipating a temporary lapse of memory, 
I have in my hand the Manchester Guardian of January 16th," and, after 
reading the disputed passage, added, "I would rather accept the word of 
:its reporter than that of the Right Honourable Gentleman. 1123 
Smith then proceeded to challenge the assertion of the Liberals 
that they had a mandate to bring about sweeping reform; he stated that the 
14L . 
· 
19Philip, Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, I (London, 1934), 
20Parliamentary Debates, 1906, 4th Series, CLIII, 1015. 
21 . . . 
Ibid.,· 1017. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
8 
Liberals' majority in the House of Commons did not reflect their support 
in the country. He pointed out that the Unionist candidates polled a total 
of 2.5 million votes in the recent election, while the combined total of 
the Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist candidates was 3.3 million 
votes--a victory, but hardly an overwhelming endorsement of social revolu-
tion. 24 
His statements drew a jeering response from the Government benches. 
Smith asked disingenuously, 111 gather it is suggested that my figures are 
wrong? 11 Upon receiving a boisterously affirmative reply, Smith said, 
11They very probably are. I took them from the Liberal Magazine. 1125 Smith 
concluded his speech by warning the Liberal Government not to betray the 
ancient English traditions 11which our predecessors in this House vindicated 
for themselves at the point of the sword. 1126 
His forensic effort was an enormous success; when he sat down, Smith, 
in his son's words, had the House 11 in his pocket. 1127 The speech, without 
the benefit of Smith's delivery, may seem shallow in retrospect, lacking 
any depth or substance, but 
•. it was the instinct with which it seized the occasion 
and the gay audacity with which it charged the victorious 
enemy and put heart into his cowed and humbled colleagues 
that made it famous. 28 
Even Lloyd George, the target of many of Smith's barbs, saluted Smith 
for 11a very brilliant speech. 1129 Smith's triumph must have seemed com-
24rbid., 1022. 
25.!lli· 
26Ibid. , 102'3. 
27 2nd Earl of Birkenhead" .f. . .§.., 132. 
28A •. G. Gardiner, Portraits and Portents (London, 1926), 128. 
29Parliamentary Debates, 1906, 4th Series, CLIII, 1024. 
9 
plete when, several days later, King Edward VII specifically requested 
Smith's presence at a dinner party so that he might meet this young 
h f L. 1 30 p enomenon rom iverpoo • Thus, in a little less than one hour of 
speaking, F. E. Smith transformed himself from an obscure novice into a 
major political figure. 
(3) 
Smith's meteoric rise in politics naturally gave dramatic impetus 
to his legal career. He established a practice in London and, in 1908, 
"took Silk," becoming, as his son related, the "youngest King's Counsel 
31 
-in the country." Smith rapidly developed a considerable reputation as 
a barrister, winning both fame and income in the courtroom. In 1910, he 
became involved--as a lawyer--in the sensational "Dr. Crippen" case, one 
of those lurid murder/sex trials so beloved by the press and public. 
Smith defended Crippen's mistress, Ethel Le Neve, at the Old Bailey on a 
charge of being an accessory to murder after the fact. 
. 32 
She was acquited. 
Smith's reputation as an advocate was so formidable that two prominent 
Liberals, Sir Rufus Isaacs (later Lord Reading) and Herbert Samuel, retained 
Smith as their counsel in a libel suit when they were accused of being 
involved in the ''Marconi scandal" of 1912-13. This brought censure from 
some Unionists who complained that he was assisting the Liberals in 
escaping from a potentially embarrassing political situation. 33 
30 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. _E'..., 133. 
31 Ibid., 97. 
32 Ibid., 101-105. 
33· . 
Robert Blake,· The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times 
of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923 (London, 1955), 143-14-z;.:- -- --
10 
Meanwhile, Smith was being re lied upon by the Unionists to 
deliver the most slashing, partisan attacks on the Liberals. His l?.9.E! .!!!2!2. 
were savored by the Tories. For example, his clever comment on the 
Liberals' social reform policies: "The Socialists had better not cheer 
the name of Mr. [Winston] Churchill, for he will most likely steal their 
clothes when they go ba thing--if they do bathe, which I doubt. 1134 In 
regard to the Liberal attempt to disestablish the Anglican Church in 
Wales, Smith remarked, with calculated condescension, that Anglican 
ministers had proven to be very beneficial to Wales, for it was valuable 
for Welshmen "to have living in their midst a man of education and re-
finement, to whom they can turn for advice in times of difficulty and 
adversity. 1135 
Behind his facade of hubris, however, Smith was a thoughtful man. 
He was a member of the Unionist Social Questions Committee and realized 
that if the Tories had nothing to offer the working class, they would be 
condemning themselves to perpetual.minority status; indeed, had it not 
been for the votes of Liverpool workingmen, Smith would not have been in 
Parliament. Smith favored a Unionist policy modeled on the concept of 
11Tory democracy11 and was capable of making remarks more typical of Lloyd 
George or a Labour M. P. than of an aspiring Tory, such as his statement 
that England c6ntained 
• • • the most revolting slum~ in Christendom and hundreds 
and thousands of our fellow-su~jects live under conditions 
which render civilization a mo:Ckery and morality a name •• 36 
34Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World 
·Before the War, 1890-1914 (New York, 1966), 373. 
35colin Cross, The Liberals in Power, 1.2.Q2.-1914 (London, 1963), 
167. 
36camp, The Glittering Prizes, 38. 
11 
Similarly, Smith's insulting reference to Welsh.'Tlen had a modicum of 
philosophy as its basis. As noted above, Smith had been raised as a 
nonconformist, but insofar as he had any religious beliefs as an adult, 
Smith was an Erastian and, as such, supported the Church of England for 
political rather than religious reasons, as a necessary means of ensuring 
. 1 b·1· 37 soc1a sta 1 1ty. 
Yet Smith did not allow this reflective bent of mind to intrude 
on his public persona. Despite having a brilliant mind, remarkable for 
its powers of rational logic, and a rare command of the English language, 
Smith was not a great orator, but rather a stunningly effective debater. 
He seldom attempted to sway men's minds, preferring instead to score 
temporary tactical points against his opponents. 
These characteristics may make Smith seem inconsequential to 
. posterity, but they were the reason why he was such a gallery favorite 
in his own day. For he was the "Tory's Tory" who could always be expected 
38 ' 
to deliver, "with thrilling insolence," the instinctive Tory response 
to any stimuli--socialism, trade unionism, Home Rule for Ireland, 
39 
women's suffrage, attacks on the Anglican Church, reform of the House 
of Lords, etc.--and couch his arguments in such language as to give his 
position the trappings of common sense and make his adversaries appear 
ridiculous. One coll~ague characterized Smith's effectiveness in the 
f;ollowing terms: "For the everyday duel of debate, for hard hitting 
argument seasoned with barbed invective and arrogant sarcasm, F. E. 
·Smith was our outstanding gladiator. 1140 
37 2nd Earl of Birkenhead,!.·!·• 136. 
38 Tuchman, The Proud Tower, 373. 
39 . 
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1913, 5th Series, LII, 1984-
1994. 
12 
In these years before the First World War, Smith acquired a 
considerable popular following, particularly among women (in spite of his 
views on female suffrage), and, as his biographer wrote, his dark, hand-
some countenance made him "something of a 'pin-up'," with pictures of him 
41 being sold as if he was a matinee idol of the stage. Lloyd George's son 
later recorded his early impression of Smith as a "very dashing personality; 
witty (to the point of folly), engaging and tremendously charming. 1142 
Smith drove himself to the limit of endurance, both in work and play, and 
his indulgence in pleasures of the flesh was recognized by his good friend, 
Winston Churchill, who wrote laconically that Smith "burned all his 
43 
candles at both ends." 
Smith and Churchill developed an extremely close friendship, 
despite the fact that they were on opposite sides of the House before 
the First World War. These two young "men-on-the-make" were kindred 
spirits, and in 1907, the Tory backbencher and the Liberal Under-Secretary 
for the Colonies spent part of the summer touring France and Italy together, 
whereupon Smith presented Churchill with a copy of the Odes of Horace to 
correct his deplorable ignorance of the classics. 44 Smith and Churchill 
45 
were the godfathers of each other's only son, and, in his affectionate 
biographical sketch of Smith, Churchill wrote that Smith's friendship 
" f t . . 1146 was one o my mos precious possessions. 
40L. S. Amery, ~Political Life, Vol. I: England Before the 
~Storm, 1896-1914 (London, 1953), 388. 
; 
·41 c~p, The Glittering Prizes, 61. 
42 Earl Lloyd George, ~Father, Lloyd George (New York, 1960), 130. 
43w· . 11 C Y k 1937) 54 inston S. Churchi . , Great Contemporaries New or , , 1 • 
44 Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. II: Young 
Statesman, 1901-1914 (Boston, 1967), 215-Zl8. 
45 Ibid., 217. 
:,··· 
13 
A perceptive student of this era has suggested that Churchill was 
captivated by Smith because Smith reminded him of his idolized father, 
Lord Randolph Churchill. 47 Lord Eustace Percy, who knew both Smith and 
Churchill, was of the opinion that Smith was 11 in intellect and force of 
personality" the greater man.48 Churchill, perhaps inadvertently, 
indicated later that he was somewhat intimidated by Smith, writing that 
he was always careful to avoid making any foolish remark in Smith's 
presence lest he be cut down by his sharp tongue. 49 
Smith's capacity for arousing emotional attachments was evident 
even in the rather priggish Austen Chamberlain, whose personality was 
completely different from Smith's, but who panegyrized Smith lavishly: 
To the public, [Smith) sometimes showed himself cynical, 
flippant, and violent. To his colleagues in any time of 
difficulty or crisis, he was a tower of strength--the most 
loyal and uns~lfish of friends, careless for himself but 
careful for them; gay and light-hearted in moments of ease; 
serious, cool-headed and with nerves of steel in time of so . 
stress and danger •••• 
The qualities which made Smith loom so largely in the memories 
of his contemporaries are often lost to later generations. Smith was 
his own worst enemy in this respect, as he seemed to delight in striking 
a pose or an attitude which would shock people. For example, after the 
First World War, Smith, then Lord Birkenhead, offended many with the 
extreme Social Darwinism expressed in his Rectorial Address at Glasgow 
4PWinston Churchill, Great Contemporaries, 145. 
47Peter de Mendelssohn, The Age of Churchill: Heritage and 
Adventure,; 1874-1911 (Lo?don, 196+), 309.~311. 
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University in which he said that life offered "glittering prizes to those 
who have stout hearts and sharp swords," and that self-interest "not 
only is, 51 but must be and ought to be, the mainspring of human conduct." 
Hence, by such reckless comments, Smith allowed himself to be 
interpreted by later historians as an "adventurer," who would "fight his 
way up by intelligence, audacity, driving ambition, and sheer gall. 1152 
(4) 
The Liberal Party controlled the British Government from the 
1906 election until wartime exigencies caused a coalition Government to 
be formed in May 1915. The dividing line in this long Liberal rule was 
the constitutional crisis of 1909-11, which resulted in a greatly 
depleted Liberal majority--dependent on Irish support--and a much more 
aggressive, bitter, and vitriolic Unionist opposition. 
The constitutional crisis had its origins in the 1909 budget. Due 
to the steadily increasing Government expenditures for welfare programs, 
especially the National Insurance Act, and military/naval armaments, 
·Lloyd George, who was now Chancellor of the Exchequer, devised a budget 
which raised taxes to an unprecedented level. Lloyd George unveiled his 
startling financial measures on April 29, 1909: An increase in the 
income tax on a graduated scale and the imposition of a super tax on 
incomes over t3,000 ~ annum; a steep increase in the inheritance tax; 
the implementation of a progressive land tax; and the imposition of heavy 
luxury taxes on liquor, tobacco, "licensed premises," motor cars, 
Slbardiner~ Por:traits arid ·Portents, 126. 
52 . . 
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be in the Unionist camp, while only 88 members of the Lords were com-
mitted supporters of the Liberal Government. 58 Obviously, the Unionist 
peers had the power to reject the Finance bill, but the question was 
whether they should use that power. Many Unionists felt that the Lords 
should exercise the veto power in regard to the Finance bill; in addition 
to those who thought that the Lloyd George budget should be rejected as 
a novel and dangerously radical program, a number of people in the 
Conservative camp were committed to tariff reform and thought that Lloyd 
George's policies would raise the necessary revenue without protection, 
thereby making tariff reform obsolete. 59 
It was the opinion of F. E. Smith, however, that the Lords should 
pass the Finance bill. He felt that the Liberals wanted the Lords to 
reject the bill and, thus, give them the issue, "the Lords v. the People," 
in the next election. Smith realized that the Liberals were losing ground; 
if the budget was passed into law and proved to be unworkable and unpopu-
lar--which Smith was convinced that it would prove to be--it would eventu-
ally make the Liberals' position completely impossible. The aristocracy 
was virtually in complete opposition to the Liberal Government anyway; 
the property tax, inheritance tax, and escalated income tax would turn 
the gentry and the propertied middle class against the Liberals; and the 
taxes on liquor, tobacco and "pubs" would alienate the working class. 
According to Smith's reasoning, the Unionists would sweep to victory on 
57 . 
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just the pragmatic reason that the Lords did not have the power to turn 
out the Government which sponsored the measure. Therefore, to reject 
such a proposal without turning out the Government would result in a 
66 
stalemate. 
On December 2, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith announced in the 
Commons that the House of Lords had violated the constitution and that 
the Government would appeal to the public. 67 The following day, Parliament 
was dissolved, 68 and a general election followed, focusing on the issue 
of the Lords' rejection of the Finance bill. If the Liberals had expected 
another landslide victory, they were sorely disappointed, for the Unionists 
gained 116 seats as the Liberal majority shrank to two votes. The final 
results of the general election of January 1910 were as follows: 275 
Liberals, 273 Unionists, 82 Irish Nationalists, and 40 Labourites. 69 The 
election returns meant that the Liberals were now dependent on the Irish 
Nationalists, led by John Redmond, who would demand Home Rule for Ireland 
as the price for their support. The quid ~ quo arrangement made between 
Asquith and Redmond entailed Irish support for the Liberals in their 
battle with the Lords in return for a Liberal commitment to introduce a 
70 Home Rule bill after the Lords had lost their veto power. 
66 Tuchman, The Proud Tower, 387. 
67Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1909, XIII, 546-558. 
68 Ibid., 600. 
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The Parliamentary reform legislation which the Liberal Government 
devised initially contained provisions that prevented the Lords from 
rejecting or amending a financial bill, that made any other bill which 
passed three successive sessions of the Commons the law of the realm, and 
that limited the term of a Parliament to five years. 71 Asquith sought 
insurance for the passage of the legislation in the form of a royal pledge 
to create Liberal peers if the Lords rejected the Finance and Parliament 
bills. However, Edward VII did not regard the election as a mandate for 
reducing the Lords to impotence and refused to give such such a promise 
until another election had been held on the specific issue of reforming 
. 72 
the Lords. 
This situation was drastically altered on May 6, 1910, when 
Edward VII died. For all his defects, Edward VII was the possessor of 
a great deal of worldly wisdom and experience, while his son, George V, 
though nearly forty-five years of age, was very naive in many respects, 
and George proved to be more susceptible than his father to Asquith's 
browbeating. 
After the King died, the party leaders, in order to spare the new 
monarch, attempted to reach a compromise on the constitutional question. 
Asquith, Lloyd George, the Earl of Crewe (Liberal leader in the Lords), 
and the Irish Secretary, Augustine Birrell, represented the Government in 
the interparty conference, while Balfour, Lansdowne, and Austen Chamberlain 
wcr: the most prominent Unionists present. The first meeting was on 
71 Oxford and Asquith, Fifty Years of British Parliament, II, 96. 
72 . 
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June 17, 1910, and the conference dragged on throughout the summer and 
fall. 73 
By August, Lloyd George was advocating that a coalition Government 
be formed, in order that "the statesmen, freed from dependence on their 
party extremists" could deal with the various problems which Britain 
faced, not only the constitutional crisis, but the problems of Ireland, 
74 
military defense, social reform, etc. Lloyd George used Churchill as 
a contact with the rank-and-file Unionists because of his friendship 
with Smith. 75 Both Churchill and Smith favored a coalition. 76 Smith 
felt that a coalition would strengthen the Right at the expense of the 
Left. He stated the case for coalition to Chamberlain, arguing that if 
a coalition Government was formed, Lloyd George might prove initially 
difficult, but 
••• where is he and where are we? He is done and has 
sold the pass •. We should still be a united party with 
the exception of our Orangemen; and they can't stay out 
long. What allies can they find? .•• a sigh of relief 
would go up over the whole of business England if a 
strong and stable Government were formed .••. Further, 
such a Government could •.• say to Redmond: Thus far 
and no further, which Asquith standing alone cannot ••.• 77 
Smith "looked at political groupings with all the unprejudiced 
realism of a Talleyrand considering possible alliances, rr78 but, despite 
73rbid., 147-148. 
74Nicolson, George the Fifth, 130. 
75Jenkins, Asquith, 216. 
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the ulterior motives, he showed in this situation a trait which was 
characteristic of him throughout his career: A desire for rational 
compromise which belied the arrogant, caustic image that he presented to 
the public. Furthermore, as a leading historian has pointed out, the 
very men who favored coalition in 1910--Lloyd George, Churchill, Smith, 
Chamberlain--were later the bulwarks of the coalition Government of 
1919-22. 79 
The 1910 coalition discussions went so far as to include proposals 
for a new Cabinet: Asquith would remain Prime Minister but would go to 
the Lords, Balfour would lead the Commons and serve as chairman of the 
Committee for Imperial Defence, Lansdowne would become Foreign Secretary, 
Lloyd George would stay at the Exchequer, Churchill would go to the War 
Office, and Austen Chamberlain would go to the Admiralty. 80 It should be 
noted that no position was mentioned for Smith--it probably did not occur 
to him that he would be considered,' at this time, one of the "party 
extremists" to be excluded from the proposed coalition Government. 
At any rate, Balfour frowned upon the idea of coalition. Balfour 
believed that the two-party concept was fundamental to the Parliamentary 
system and that a national Government should be utilized only in case of 
dire emergency. 81 In addition, he was afraid of dividing the Tories and 
becoming another Robert Peel. Balfour's position alienated many Unionists, 
including Smith. 82 It is doubtful that any compromise could have been 
79Ibid., 169-170. 
SOibid., 166. 
81 Tuchman, The Proud Tower, 391-392. 
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worked out on the Irish question, due to Lansdowne 1 s adamant opposition 
to Home Rule, and it was Lansdowne's obstinacy, coupled with Balfour's 
pessimism, which determined the collapse of the conference in November 
1910. 83 The failure to reach a compromise solution made a new election 
inevitable. 
Before calling another election, Asquith was determined to secure 
a guarantee from the Crown for the creation of Liberal peers as a last 
resort in dealing with the Lords. Asquith was under a great deal of 
pressure from the Irish leader, Redmond, to seek "advance pledges from 
the Crown, 1184 and Asquith himself felt obligated to seek guarantees from 
the monarch before asking his supporters to undertake another campaign 
effort. 85 Asquith told the King of his intention to call a new election 
and asked for a pledge from George V that, if the Liberals won another 
victory, and if the Lords still proved to be unyielding on the Parliament 
bill, he would exercise his Royal Prerogative by creating.new Liberal 
86 peers to insure Parliamentary reform. The Finance bill, which had 
originally caused the uproar, had passed the Lords in 1910 with little 
ado. 87 
The King, however, was extremely reluctant to give such a 
11 contingent 11 guarantee because it would put him in the position of 
83J k" en ins, Mr. Balfour's Poodle, 159-160. 
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seemingly being partisan to the Liberals, 88 but Asquith forced the King's 
hand by threatening to resign. 89 Had the Liberals resigned, the King 
would have been obliged to send for the opposition leader, Balfour, and 
ask him to form a Government, which would have been immediately outvoted 
in the Commons and forced to call an election. If the Liberals had won 
this hypothetical election, George V would have been compelled to send 
for Asquith and ask him to form another Liberal Government, tremendously 
strengthening Asquith's position and humbling the monarchy. The Crown 
would thus have been in the same humiliating status as in the 1831-32 
political crisis when William IV was forced to send for Lord Grey and the 
Whigs after he had caused them to resign and no other Government could be 
formed. The determination to avoid this humiliation led George V, on 
90 November 16, to give Asquith the guarantee that he wanted. 
91 . . On November 28, 1910, Parliament was dissolved and a general 
election was held for the second time in less than a year. The December 
1910 election was marked by such public apathy to the c~nstitutional 
issue that more than one million fewer votes were cast than in the 
. 1 . 92 previous e ection. The results of the election were virtually identical 
to the previous one. The Liberals and Unionists had the same number of 
93 
seats, 272, and the Irish and Labour delegations picked up two seats each. 
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More than ever, the Liberals were dependent on Irish support to stay in 
office. 
The Parliament bill was introduced in the new Parliament in 
94 February 1911, and, in the following May, the Commons passed the bill, 
sending it to the Lords. 95 The question was now whether the Unionist 
Lords would use their majority to kill the bill or would accept the 
Liberals' superior political position and pass it. This dilemma caused 
an acute crisis of leadership within Unionist ranks. Balfour thought 
that the Lords should pass the bill, as he regarded it as preferable to 
96 having ·the upper chamber flooded with Liberal peers, and in any event, 
was probably weary of the entire dispute. Balfour advised the King to 
adhere to the Government's wishes, but Lansdowne, on the other hand, felt 
that resistance to the bill was feasible. 97 Many Unionists saw the situa-
tion in the same light as Lansdowne and favored resistance. 
Those who wanted to fight the bill saw the House of Lords as the 
"last check upon the advance of the besieging classes," a bastion of 
98 tradition which must be preserved. F. E. Smith also advocated resistance, 
not because of any sentimental reverie about the Lords, but because he 
thought that the Government was bluffing, that it did not have the courage 
to pressure the King into "packing" the Lords (the King's November pledge 
94Parliarnentary Debates, Commons, 1_911, 5th Series, XXI, 1742-1752. 
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to Asquith was not known to the public). 99 The constitutional question 
thus deteriorated into a prolonged shouting match, with the Tories 
accusing the Liberals of destroying the constitution as part of a sordid 
deal with Redmond, and the Liberals accusing the Tories of ignoring the 
will of the people.lOO 
Asquith had assumed all along that he would never be forced to 
ask the King to fulfill his pledge; the Prime Minister thought that if 
the Liberals lost the election, the pledge would obviously be useless, 
and if they won, the Tories would accept the decision of the electorate, 
but he "over-estimated the ability of Lansdowne to see ahead and to map 
out a firm course, and he under-estimated Balfour's growing weariness with 
emotional or stupid followers. 11101 As the virulent hostility of many 
Tories to Parliamentary reform increased, it became apparent to Asquith 
that he would have to use the King's guarantee. 
Behind the resistance of the Tory "die-hards," there could be 
detected a distinct animosity towards Balfour's leadership. Balfour had 
spH t the Party on the tariff issue, ending nearly two decades of Unionist 
hegemony in British politics, he had led the Unionists to three successive 
defeats at the polls while the Liberals brought about sweeping social 
reform, and his lackadaisical leadership in the constitutional crisis was 
causing the emasculation of the Lords, which would lead inevitably to 
the ultimate b~te noire of the Unionists--Home Rule for Ireland. The 
99Jenkins, Mr. Balfour's Poodle, 237. 
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conclusion which many Unionists reached was that incompetent leadership 
was responsible for all of their problems. By accusing the "die-hards" 
of being "theatrical" and of appealing to the "music hall" mentality, 
B lf . 1 d'd . h' d' h u . . 102 a our certain y i not improve is stan ing among t ose nion1sts. 
Smith was one of the Unionists who were becoming increasingly 
estranged from Balfour. He was opposed to Balfour partly because he 
felt that Balfour was lacking in vision--as in the coalition discussions 
in 1910--and that his performance as a political leader had been inadequate. 
To a large extent, though, Smith's political hostility to Balfour was an 
outgrowth of personal hostility, for Smith had been the recipient of an 
incredible series of snubs and rebuffs from Balfour. 
Balfour, for his part, "detested" Smith as an upstart adventurer 
and an unprincipled opportunist. 103 He said privately that Smith "contra-
dicts himself once a week. 11104 Balfour may well have resented the fact 
that the young Tory backbenchers, as Leopold Amery testified, looked to 
Smith as their spokesman. Perhaps, Balfour merely had the patrician's 
instinctive loathing of a brash parvenu. Whatever the reason, Balfour's 
dislike for Smith was strikingly obvious. 
In 1911, the Liberal Government offered Privy Councillor honors 
to two Unionist backbenchers, F. E. Smith and Andrew Bonar Law, which was 
in keeping with the tradition of granting all-party honors at coronation 
t . 105 ime. 
58. 
Balfour wrote to Asquith protesting the decision to give Smith 
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a Privy Councillorship and asking him to reconsider. 106 When the Prime 
Minister refused, Balfour then wrote to Smith, requesting that he turn 
down the honor because of his youth and lack of experience. Needless to 
say, Smith ignored Balfour's advice. 107 After Smith accepted the honor, 
Balfour "suggested" that he refrain from sitting on the Unionist front 
108 bench. Balfour's efforts aroused deep anger among Smith's friends, 
including a Liberal Cabinet member, Winston Churchill, who wrote to his 
wife that Balfour's motive was to hold Smith down. He observed that 
Balfour "would rather inflict any amount of injury upon the Tory party 
than share power with any man of provincial origin. 11109 
Smith's own bitterness over Balfour's treatment was reflected in 
a letter which he wrote to Asquith thanking him for the Privy Councillor 
honors: 
I ~an only say that it is a paradoxical and singular 
circumstance that those against whom I have been fighting 
for fifteen years have paid me the greatest compliment I 
have ever had in my life; while those on whose behalf I 
have been fighting did their best to prevent it.110 
It is ironic that Balfour .had earlier expressed a determination 
not to be another Robert.Peel, for his handling of Smith was a virtual 
repetition of Peel's treatment of Disraeli. Like Peel, Balfour allowed 
his personal feelings to color his political judgment, and, again like 
Peel, Balfour allowed a brilliant and ambitious young talent to lounge 
sullenly· on the backbenches--all to his ultimate regret. Had Balfour 
l06Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, II, 342. 
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shown Smith some favor, Smith undoubtedly would have been an ardent 
champion of his when Balfour's leadership was challenged. 
In the summer of 1911, the Constitutional crisis reached a head. 
Asquith, who was convinced that the Lords meant to block the Parliament 
bill, asked the King on July 14 to honor his pledge of the previous 
November. On July 18, Lloyd George told Balfour in a private conversation 
that the Government had a pledge from the King to use his prerogative, and 
that the Government would implement that pledge to swamp the Lords with 
Liberals if the Parliament bill was not passed. Lloyd George's statement 
111 
was confirmed by the Prime Minister two days later in a letter to Balfour. 
These new developments shook Lansdowne and brought him around to 
Balfour's viewpoint. Two overriding considerations faced the Unionist 
leaders: (1) the King had agreed to the creation of Liberal peers, 
making any attempt by the Lords to veto the Parliament bill useless, and 
(2) there was no indication that yet another general election would 
d U . . . 112 pro uce a nionist victory. Consequently, on July 21, Lansdowne told 
an assembly of approximately two hundred Unionist peers that any further 
resistance was futile, that the only viable course was either to vote for 
h b ·11 b . 113 t e 1 or a stain. 
The capitulation of the Unionist leaders outraged the "die-hards. 11 
The "die-hards" included Viscount Milner and the Marquis of Salisbury 
in the Lords, Austen Chamberlain and Sir Edward Carson in the Commons. 
F. E. Smith was numbered among the "die-hards," but his aim now was to 
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use the constitutional issue not so much against the Liberal Government 
as against Balfour. 114 
"Die-hard" anger reached its peak on July 24, 1911, when a large 
number of Unionist M. P.s prevented the Prime Minister from speaking in 
the Commons. For more than thirty minutes, Asquith vainly attempted to 
express the Government's position but was met with a constant, over-
whelming din of chanting and shouted insults from the Unionist benches. 
The most conspicuous participant in this disgraceful episode was Lord 
Hugh Cecil, a cousin of Balfour's, who was described as being "white 
with anger. 11115 This display of impotent fury by the "die-hards" finally 
caused Asquith to sit down, saying that he would not degrade himself 
further. 116 
Balfour, in reply, expressed regret for the deplorable incident. 
and then attacked the Government's Parliament bill. 117 He was answered 
by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, who grimly stated that if the 
Prime Minister would not be granted a hearing by the opposition, then no 
other Cabinet minister would speak further. 118 It was recorded in the 
Parliamentary Debates that F. E. Smith rose to answer Grey "but was met 
with continued interruption for five minutes"; 119 the members of the 
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Liberal benches who had more or less tolerated Balfour's speech, refused 
to listen to Smith, whom they regarded as the ringleader of the distur-
bances, and they subjected him to the same treatment which Asquith had 
120 
received. Finally, the Speaker adjourned the House due to "grave 
disorder. 11121 
This July 24 spectacle in the Commons was directed at Balfour as 
well as Asquith; 122 after the commotion, Smith was found in an ebullient 
mood, feeling that Balfour had been placed in an untenable position. 123 
Meanwhile, many "die-hards" still hoped that the bill could be beaten 
and the sanctity of the House of Lords preserved. They refused to believe 
that the King had given a "secret" guarantee to Asquith, regarding such 
an idea as a Machiavellian Liberal plot to trick the Lords. Their illu-
sions were shattered on the very day of the vote on the bill, August lOJ 
1911, when, in a statement to Viscount Morley, George V publicly affirmed 
the controversial pledge and his intention to honor it. 124 This statement 
crippled the resistance efforts, and the Parliament bill passed the Lords 
by a 131-114 vote, with many Unionists abstaining. 125 
Although the general public remained apparently oblivious to the 
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constitutional question,126 the controversy had a great impact on the 
political situation. After the Lords passed the bill, Balfour went on 
an extended vacation, and, in his absence, a movement to remove him from 
Party leadership was undertaken with the slogan, "B. M. G. 11-- 11 Balfour 
127 Must Go. 11 The "B. M. G. 11 drive picked up momentum in the fall of 1911, 
and Smith was considered to be in the vanguard of the anti-Balfour in-
128 
surgents. 
Balfour, declining to battle for the leadership, resigned 
suddenly in November 1911, scornfully denying his detractors the satis-
faction of ousting him. The most prominent candidates to succeed Balfour 
were Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long, a Party workhorse who was unknown 
to the public. Although Smith favored Chamberlain, it was a "darkhorse, 11 
compromise candidate, the Canadian-born Scot, Bonar Law, who became the 
·new Unionist leader. 129 The drab, colorless Law certainly lacked the 
stature of the elegant, intellectual Balfour, but, as a political leader, 
Law was far superior. Law, unlike Balfour, was very attentive to the 
mechanics of Party politics and was more concerned with his standing in 
· the Party than his reputation outside of it. The new Unionist leader 
did not make the mistake his predecessor had made in regard to Smith--he 
126Jenkins, Mr. Balfour's Poodle, 267. 
127Ibid. 
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immediately extended to Smith an invitation to sit on the opposition 
front bench and serve in the "shadow" cabinet. 130 
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F. E. Smith, at the age of thirty-nine and with less than a half-
dozen years in Parliament, had come far and fast in British politics. 
130 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. ~., 170-171; Blake, The Unknown 
Prime Minister, 103. 
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THE ORANGE CARD 
(1) 
The Parliament bill of 1911 opened the door for controversial 
legislation which the House of Lords could no longer veto but only delay 
for three sessions. Foremost among the new legislation prepared by the 
Liberal Government was a Home Rule bill for Ireland; John Redmond's Irish 
Nationalists had given indispensable support to the Liberals during the 
constitutional crisis of 1909-11, and Redmond now expected payment for 
services rendered. 
The problem of Ireland had plagued England for centuries, and 
the pages of English history are filled with men whose careers or lives 
were ruined by the "Irish question." Desire for territorial acquisition 
was, no doubt, an important factor in England's involvement with Ireland, 
but an even more important factor was security. The specter of a hostile 
country obtaining control of or domination over Ireland was very real to 
many Englishmen who were aware of the earlier Spanish and French attempts 
··to strike at England through Ireland, in the hope of using' Ireland as a 
'base from which to invade England or attack English naval power. It was 
• 
a fact of life that England's danger was Ireland's opportunity, and, as 
Britain's relations with Germany grew increasingly acrimonious after the 
turn of the twentieth century, many Britons expected Germany, in the event 
of war, to foment an Irish uprising. This traditional attitude towards 
33 
34 
Ireland was expressed succinctly by Winston Churchill, who wrote that 
11 the independence of a hostile Ireland menaced the life of Britain. Every 
policy, every shift, every oppression used by the stronger island arose 
1 from this primordial fact." 
In 1911, Ireland was governed by the Act of Union of 1801 which 
incorporated her into the United Kingdom in a manner similar to Wales or 
Scotland. For hundreds of years the Irish had been allowed an ineffectual 
Parliament in Dublin which was totally subservient to Westminster; however, 
in 1782, the disastrous American War gave the Irish the opportunity to 
demand more local autonomy from the embattled British--an arrangement 
known as "Grattan's Parliament." The Act of Union, which ended the 1782 
system, was prompted by a serious Irish revolt in the late 1790 1 s, a 
particularly low point in Britain's protracted war with France. William 
Pitt devised the Act of Union to correct the endemic Irish discontent by 
drawing Ireland closer to Britain. In the 1801 Act, the Irish Parliament 
was abolished, and the Irish were given direct representation in the 
Imperial Parliament, with twice as many representatives as Scotland. 
The Lord Lieutenant was appointed by London to act as the official Crown 
representative in Ireland, but policy and administration were largely 
determined by the Chief Secretary for Ireland, a position created with 
Cabinet rank though technically subordinate to the Lord Lieutenant. The 
Chief Secretary divided his time between London, where he attended Cabinet 
meetings and answered question~ in Parliament, and Dublin, wpere he s,uper-
~; :. 
··vised the administrative l:im;em,lcracy ·'.at Dublin Castle. 
1Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath: The World Crisis, 1918-
1928 (New York, 1929), 290. 
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Parliament tried to make the union more palatable to the Irish 
by grudgingly passing the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829, which ended 
civil restrictions against the Catholic majority and allowed Catholics to 
participate in the political process. This failed to stem Irish hatred 
of British rule, and the terrible famine of the 1840 1 s only intensified 
such feelings. No substantial reassessment of Britain's Irish policy 
was undertaken until the first ministry of William E. Gladstone, who 
thought that Irish discontent with the union was based on two factors: 
Religion and land tenure. Accordingly, he brought about the disestablish-
ment of the Anglican Church in Ireland and instituted a policy enabling 
Irish tenant farmers to buy their holdings from their landlords. This 
land purchase principle was expanded and pursued more successfully by the 
later Tory ministries of Salisbury and Balfour. 
Even this was not enough. The 1870 1 s and 1880 1 s saw the rise of 
Charles Stewart Parnell and his Home Rule movement. Parnell wanted the 
restoration of the Dublin Parliament with autonomy over purely Irish 
affairs. In essence, Parnell sought a government for Ireland that was 
equivalent to the Dominion self-rule of Canada, and, in the pursuit of 
this goal, Parnell welded a large majority of the Irish M. P.s into a 
cohesive voting bloc and employed unparalleled tactics of obstruction in 
Westminster to bring Parliament's attention to Irish grievances. Parnell's 
task was made easier by the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1885, which eliminated 
property qualifications for male voters, and by the introduction of the 
secret ballot in 1872. Boycotts, rent strikes, and other. ac:ts of civil 
disobedience against the established.order marked Irish lif~ at this time, 
~ ; ; . . . . ' ~ ., . . . . . . ' . . 
coupled with sporadic violence by terrorists, which culminated in the 
brutal 1882 murder of the Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish, in 
Dublin's Phoenix Park. 
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In the winter of 1885-86, Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule 
convulsed British politics and shattered the Liberal Party for a genera-
tion. A significant segment of Liberals, led by Lord Hartington (later 
the Duke of Devonshire) and Joseph Chamberlain, voted against Gladstone's 
Home Rule bill and, acting with the Conservatives, was able to defeat 
Gladstone and Parnell. The Home Rule movement suffered a tremendous blow 
when a scandal in Parnell's personal life discredited him as a leader, 
but in 1893, Gladstone was able to pilot a new Home Rule bill through 
the Commons only to have it vetoed by the Lords. The Liberal Unionists 
finally united with the Conservatives to form the Unionist Party, an 
alliance based on the preservation of the union and, thus, opposition 
to Irish Home Rule. The Unionists used a "carrot and stick" approach to 
Ireland, offering land purchase and public works programs on the one hand 
and tough coercion bills on the other. 
The Irish situation remained the same until 1910, when the Liberals 
were forced to come to terms with Redmond in order to stay in office. 
Curiously, the Liberals had shown no sense of urgency in regard to Ireland 
when they had a substantial majority during the 1906-09 period. Neverthe-
less, with the triumph of the Parliament bill in August 1911, the Liberals 
began to draft a new Home Rule bill that would inevitably become law. 
The Liberals were encouraged in their task by the knowledge that virtually 
all of the Dominion leaders--in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New 
Zealand--favored some form of self-rule for Ireland. The Dominions 
contended that local autonomy had proven to be beneficial to their 
2 
countries and had, in fact, increased their loyalty to the British Crown. 
2 . 
. J. G. Swift MacNeill, "Home Rule and Imperial Unity," The 
Contemporary Review, CIII (May, 1913), 641-642. 
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A note of caution was added, however, by the former Unionist leader, 
Arthur Balfour, who privately advised Prime Minister Asquith that it 
would be best to seek a mandate from the country before proceeding with 
3 
such an explosive issue as Home Rule. 
Asquith politely pooh-poohed Balfour's warning and on April 11, 
1912, introduced the Government's Home Rule bill in the Commons. The 
bill was closely modeled on Gladstone's 1893 proposal, retaining for 
Westminster control of foreign affairs, military defense, international 
trade, coinage and currency, and taxation. The Irish Parliament to be 
established in Dublin was provided with an upper house, the Senate, and 
a more representative lower house, the House of Commons. The King would 
remain Ireland's head of state and the Lord Lieutenant, to be appointed 
by London, would remain his official representative. However, the 
prerogatives of the Lord Lieutenant would be greatly restricted, and, 
most importantly, the post of Chief Secretary for Ireland was to be 
abolished and, with it, the hated Dublin Castle administration. 
The Irish Parliament would have control over purely domestic 
affairs, though Westminster would have the power to alter or veto any 
legislation by Dublin which the British felt had exceeded its authority. 
Ireland's representation in the Imperial Parliament was to be reduced to 
forty-two M. P.s, who would have the right to participate in debates 
and voting which concerned Ireland's interests. Finally, as a sop to the 
Protestant minority, the Parliament in Dublin was expressly forbidden to 
pass.any law granting preferential status to any particular religion. 4 
1426. 
·
3Young, Arthur James Balfour, 334. 
4 . Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1912, 5th Series, XXXVI, 1399-
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This Home Rule bill seems, in retrospect, very mild and more 
likely to anger the Irish Nationalists by its many restrictions than to 
alarm British Imperialists. This seemingly innocuous measure was never-
theless to arouse from the Unionists a response which raised the threat 
of civil war. 
(2) 
Apart from Unionist opposition, Home Rule was faced with the 
additional problem of being opposed by a vitally important section in 
Ireland. The majority of Irishmen favored Home Rule, but the very idea 
of a Parliament in Dublin was anathema to the northern section of Ireland, 
commonly known as Ulster. 
The foremost distinction between Ulster and the rest of Ireland 
was religion, as Ulster was predominantly Protestant and the rest of 
Ireland was predominantly Catholic. This religious distinction was not 
merely academic, for in treland, and especially in Ulster, the intensity 
of the religious conflicts of earlier ages, which had been exhausted in 
the rest of Europe, was still virulently alive. The Reformation had 
never touched Catholic Ireland until the seventeenth century, when 
Scottish Calvinists and English nonconformists immigrated to Ulster, 
settled there, and, in many instances, drove the Irish Catholics from the 
land. The hatred and scorn between Protestants and Catholics was 
perpetuated from generation to generation. It is impossible to discuss 
.. Ulster. politics.--even in the .twentieth century--without referring to an 
event which occurred in 1690. On July 12 of that year, the Protestant 
forces·of William of Orange routed James II's army of Frenchmen and 
Irish Catholics on the banks of the Boyne River in Ulster, thereby 
securing the Protestant succession to the English throne and the Protestant 
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religion in Ulster. The Battle of the Boyne undoubtedly remained the 
most relevant factor in the life of Ulster during the centuries which 
followed it. Each year after 1690, Ulster Protestants celebrated 
July 12 as "Boyne Day" and "Orange Day," with orange banners and Union 
Jacks flying everywhere and the solemn pounding of drums commemorating 
the victory over the Catholics. On that particular day of the year, 
Catholics in Ulster were well-advised to remain in their homes. 
During the Home Rule crisis of 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill, 
the rising meteor in the Tory firmament, had given Ulster its battle cry: 
"Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right! 115 One perceptive student 
of Irish history has suggested that the Ulster Protestant was motivated 
not so much by a desire to persecute Catholics as by the fear of being 
. 6 
persecuted himself. This persecution to which the historian referred was 
not only religious but also involved the more mundane matter of taxation. 
Ulster was more industrial and commercial than the rest of Ireland, and 
the prospect of Ulster Protestants being taxed disproportionally by a 
Papist Parliament in Dublin was a nightmare to most Ulstermen. It was 
useless to point out that the Home Rule bills reserved taxation for 
Westminster because, if Canada and the other Dominions were examples of 
self-government, the very principle of Home Rule logically implied the 
gradual extension of local governmental powers. Hence, sooner or later, 
Dublin would have the power to tax Ulster. As soon as the Parliament bill 
of 1911 became law, Ulstermen were apprehensive about the new Home Rule-
bill which they knew would" be forthcoming, and,: at this critical mom~nt; 
5. 
Mary C. Bromage, Churchill and Ireland (Notre Dame, Ind., 1967), 6. 
6 Anthony T. Q. Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 1967), 43. 
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the massive figure of Sir Edward Carson came to the fore. 
Sir Edward Carson was a Unionist M. P. who had very little pre-
vious contact with Ulster--he was a Protestant from the southern part of 
Ireland and had spent his entire Parliamentary career representing Dublin 
University. Carson's reputation had been built not on his career in 
Parliament but at the Bar, for he was the leading advocate of his age. 
F. E. Smith possessed a considerable reputation as an advocate, but Smith 
was a stiletto to Carson's sledge hammer. Carson had become nationally 
prominent in the most notorious case of the era, the 1895 libel suit 
involving Oscar Wilde, in which Carson, in a merciless cross-examination, 
virtually terrified Wilde into making his fatal admission and left him a 
pathetic, babbling ruin in the witness box. A most formidable proponent 
of a cause, Carson adopted the cause of the Ulster Protestants as his own 
and, by his personal efforts, brought the Irish question into the forefront 
of British politics. 
In September 1911, Carson journeyed to Ulster at the invitation 
of Captain James Craig, a Unionist M. P., and at Craigavon, Craig's 
estate near Belfast, Carson addressed a huge rally of Ulster Unionists, 
. immediately catching the mood of the gathering when he described Home 
Rule as "a tyranny to which we never can and never will submit." He 
said that Ulster desired only to remain part of the United Kingdom and 
to have 
. . • the same rights from the same Government as every 
-. other. part of the Uni.ted ·Kingdom. We ask nothing more; 
we will t;ake nothing·'.ie{>S~ 'It is' our inalienable right 
as citizens of the Briti~h Empire, and Heaven help the 
men who try to take it. from us •.•. 7 
7The Times (London), September 25, 1911, 5; Ian Colvin, Carson 
the Statesman (New York, 1935), 78. 
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This address made Carson the leader of the Ulster movement, and 
Ulster's Protestants, most of whom had never heard his name before, came 
to regard him as a demigod. Two days later, the Ulster leaders announced 
in Belfast that they were organizing a "provisional" government for 
Ulster, which would assume authority when or if Home Rule for Ireland 
8 became law. Although Carson became the personification of Ulster to 
most of the world, the person who was largely responsible for the Ulster 
revolt was James Craig. Craig organized the various Unionist associations 
and Orange clubs into a potent political ~orce and organized Ulster's 
provisional government, and it was Craig who drew up the Solemn League 
and Covenant, Ulster's declaration of defiance against the Liberal 
Government. Carson captured the headlines, but Craig was the real driving 
9 force behind Ulster's resistance to Home Rule. 
After the Home Rule bill was introduced in April 1912, signs and 
banners were hung all over Ulster reading, "We Will Not Have Home Rule," 
10 
or, more simply, "We Won't Have It. 11 Despite Craig's organizational 
ability and Carson's forensic efforts, Ulstermen could not hope to resist 
Home Rule successfully without support from the Unionists, their tradi-
tional ally. Although the Unionists appeared to be prostrate before the 
Liberals and the Irish Nationalists, they were regrouping under. the new . 
leadership of Bonar Law. Law's assumption of the Unionist leadership 
changed the tone of political life, for Law was more harshly partisan 
than Balfour, more willing to go to extreme lengths in opposition than 
8 
·.The Times (London), September 26, 19ll, 6. 
9stewart, The Ulster Crisis, 41. 
10 
· Ibid., 63. 
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Balfour. Within just a few months of Law's ascension to party leadership, 
people were referring to the "new style" of politics. 11 
Law had strong personal feelings on the Ulster issue, as he had 
a Calvinist upbringing and, in addition, had family relations in Ulster. 12 
Many other Unionists, however, cared little about Ulster but were willing 
to use it as a means to block Home Rule. Indeed, these Unionists, such 
as Lansdowne and the Cecil family, were completely opposed to any form 
of compromise which might make Home Rule more acceptable. 13 To these 
Unionists, the issue was whether a "temporary Parliamentary coalition was 
justified in disrupting the United Kingdom. 1114 From a tactical viewpoint, 
the decision by Unionist leaders to support Ulster was sound because it 
put the Government in a bind: If it tried to coerce Ulster into accept-
ing Home Rule, it would risk civil war and alienate the moderate element 
of the electorate; if it refused to apply pressure to Ulster, it would 
jeopardize its standing with Redmond and his followers. 15 
Lord Randolph Churchill had given Ulster its lead in 1886 with 
his "Ulster will fight" speech, and, in a letter written in that same 
year, he gave the Unionists of 1912 their plan of battle when he cynically 
wrote: "I decided some time ago that if the G. 0. M. [Gladstone] went for 
Home Rule the Orange Card would be the one to play. Please God it may 
·turn out the ace of trumps. . • 1116 By 1912, the Unionists '~ere sick 
llBlake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 93-96. 
12
.!lli.' 125. 
13Ibid., 125-126, 149-150. 
14Amery, ~Political Life, I, 399. 
15Ibid., 439. 
16 Bromage, Churchill and Ireland, 40. 
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with office hunger" and feared that if the Liberals solved the Irish 
problem, the general election in 1914 or 1915 would endorse the Liberals' 
achievement and put the Unionists in the position of a permanent minority 
17 party. Hence, the Unionists were so desperate to break the Liberals' 
control of the Government that they were willing to use the "Orange Card," 
the issue of Ulster and Ireland, to drive the Liberals from office. 
In the context of both these emotional and political considerations, 
Bonar Law gave the formal Unionist reply to the Home Rule bill on April 
16, 1912. Law denounced Home Rule and described the resistance movement 
in Ulster as the "expression of the soul of a people" who were prepared 
"to lay down their lives in what they believe to be the cause of justice 
and liberty." Law then set the tone for the Irish debate by saying that 
he could conceive of "nothing which the Unionists in Ireland can do, which 
will not be justified against a trick of this kind. 1118 The strident tone 
of Law's speech could have been dismissed as just another example of the 
"new style" but not Law's decision to take the anti-Home Rule campaign 
outside of Parliament, to stir up public opinion and thus pressure the 
.Government into modifying or killing the Home Rule bill; in this extra-
Parliamentary campaign, Law's principal lieutenant was F. E. Smith. 19 
Smith's role in the Home Rule controversy of 1912-14 is the most 
~eatedly debated aspect of his public career. It is a widely held belief 
that Smith was completely cynical in his actions and was motivated solely 
17J k. en ins, Asquith, 274-276. 
18Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1912, 5th Series, XXXVII, 296, 
300-301. 
192nd Earl of Birkenhead, I··!., 210. 
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by a desire for political gain. This cynicism might seem justified in 
view of a letter written during the constitutional crisis in which Smith 
said that Home Rule was "a dead quarrel for which neither the country nor 
the party cares a damn outside of Ulster and Liverpool. 1120 Poli ti cal 
necessity, however, may have been as great a factor as political opportun-
ism, given the nature of Smith's constituency. Unionist politics in 
Liverpool, as mentioned above, had an Orange basis. Irish laborers, both 
Protestant and Catholic, had flocked across the Irish Sea to take advantage 
of the higher wages in England; a large number of them settled in the 
Lancashire cities of Liverpool and Manchester. Among the Irish Catholics, 
there was a strong inclination to vote for the Liberal Party. To offset 
the Irish Catholic votes for the Liberals, the Unionist strategy was to 
solidify Protestant voters by appealing to pro-Union and anti-Catholic 
sentiments. 21 In his actions against Home Rule, Smith was very likely 
.reflecting the wishes of the majority of Liverpool voters, but, other 
than his public actions and speeches, Smith left very little evidence of 
his personal convictions regarding Ireland. It may be safely surmised, 
however, that Smith was not emotionally involved in the Ulster Protestant 
cause to the extent that Carson and Law were. 
An early inkling of the Unionists' tactics was given at a dinner 
party at Buckingham Palace in May 1912. On that occasion, Law suggested 
to George V that if the Liberal Cabinet refused to hold an election on 
the Home Rule issue. the King had the power to dismiss the Government and 
20J k" en ins, Mr. Balfour's Poodle, 159. 
21Randolph S. Churchill, Lord Derby, King of Lancashire: The 
Official Life of Edward Stanley, Seventeenth Earl of Derby, 1865-1948 
(New York~60')", 133. 
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send for ministers who would call for an election. The King "turned red" 
at this remark and Law asked, "Have you never considered that, Sir7" 
George V replied that he had not. Law then told the King that he should 
not listen to those who said that the Royal Assent was "a purely formal 
act and the prerogative of veto is dead." That might have been the case 
as long as the House of Lords existed as a "buff er" between the monarch 
and the Commons, but since the Liberal Government had seen fit to destroy 
the effectiveness of the Lords, the King had no choice but to play a 
. 1 22 more active ro e. This was indeed the "new style," for it would have 
been inconceivable for Balfour to have advised the King to exercise the 
veto power which no monarch had used for two centuries. This also 
revealed the second part of the Unionists' two-pronged attack against 
Home Rule: In addition to the campaign to arouse public opinion, Law 
attempted to apply subtle pressure on the Government by prodding the 
painfully conscientious monarch into action~ 
As for the public campaign against the new Home Rule bill, the 
opening shot was fired by F. E. Smith on "Boyne Day" in 1912. Smith, 
who had joined the Unionist "shadow" Cabinet and front bench the previous 
November, acted as the official representative of Britain's Unionist 
Party at Ulster's traditional "Orange" ceremonies. Smith assured Ulster-
men that their resistance to Home Rule had the full support of the 
Unionist Party, saying that Unionists would "not shrink from the 
consequences of this view, not though the whole fabric of the Common-
·. ~ealth b~ convuls'ed." When Smith remarked that July 12 was his birthday,: 
22Austen Chamberlain, Politics From Inside: An Epistolary 
Chronicle, 1906-1914 (New Haven, 1937), 486-487. 
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he was presented with an orange sash as the crowd cheered and shouted for 
"Orange Smith. 1123 
While Smith was flexing his vocal muscles in Ulster, Asquith and 
Redmond visited Dublin to offer encouragement to the Irish Nationalists, 
and Asquith, referring obliquely to the Ulster movement, said that 
"Ireland is a nation, not two nations, but one nation. 1124 The Unionist 
answer to Asquith came a week later at Blenheim Palace, the home of the 
Duke of Marlborough, where a Unionist rally was held, the featured 
speakers being Sir Edward Carson, Bonar Law, and F. E. Smith. The 
apocalyptic oratory of Carson was to be expected, but the words of the 
two British Unionists must have chilled Liberal hearts. Smith not so 
subtly hinted at armed resistance to Home Rule when he said: 
Should it happen that Ulster is threatened with a violent 
attempt to incorporate her in an Irish Parliament, I say 
to Sir Edward Carson, "Appeal to the young men of England!" 
This was strong stuff, even for Smith, but it was almost temperate 
in comparison with the remarks of the leader of the Unionist Party. Law 
condemned the Government as a "revolutionary corrunittee which has seized 
upon despotic power by fraud"; he scorned the Home Rule bill as a 
"corrupt Parliamentary bargain" between Asquith and Redmond and said that 
''we shall not be guided by considerations or bound by the restraints 
. which would influence us in an ordinary constitutional struggle." Law 
conceded that the Government might well pass the Home Rule bill but 
asked rhetorically: "What then?" He warned menacingly that "there are 
23The Times (London), July ~3, 1912, 9-lQ. 
-- • • '.·- • '· • 'r, 
24
rbid., July 20~ 1912, 9~10: 
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things stronger than Parliamentary majorities" and said that the Ulster 
loyalists "would be justified in resisting by all means in their power, 
including force." He then concluded with the peroration that he could 
"imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall 
25 
not be ready to support them. 11 That the leader of the opposition--the 
man who would become Prime Minister if his party won the next election--
could make such inflammatory statements was extraordinary, and Asquith 
was fully justified in calling the Blenheim speech a "declaration of war 
. . t• 1 1126 against constitu iona government. 
As the Home Rule bill moved inexorably through Parliament, the 
drama in Ulster reached its emotional apex in September 1912 when 
"Covenant Day" arrived. The Solemn League and Covenant, with its 
Calvinist overtones, was drawn up by James Craig. It pledged Ulster 
Unionists to fight "the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule 
Parliament in Ireland" and, if the Home Rule Parliament was established, 
"to refuse to recognise its authority." Smith accompanied Carson to 
Belfast for the signing of the Covenant on Saturday, September 28, and 
it seemed to eyewitnesses as if the entire Protestant population of 
Belfast and the surrounding area had turned out for the occasion. The 
most impressive feature of the ceremony was the stillness, the deadly 
quiet of the huge throngs who, bareheaded, lined the streets, giving 
the ceremony the imprint of a religious experience. After attending 
2138. 
25 Ibid., July 29, 1912, 7-8; 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. E., 215. 
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church services, Carson, like a Moses, led the procession of dignitaries 
to Ulster Hall for the signing of the Covenant. Preceding Carson was a 
standard bearer carrying a flag which allegedly had flown at the Battle 
of the Boyne; Smith, along with Craig, the Marquis of Londonderry, and 
various Ulster politicians and Protestant clergymen, walked behind Carson. 
In Ulster Hall, the Covenant lay on a table that was covered with the 
Union Jack and was signed by Carson and the other important personages, 
the first of nearly 500,000 people who signed it. 
As Carson and Smith left for the Belfast docks to return to England, 
they were surrounded by crowds which cried out, "Don't leave us!" As their 
ship pulled away from port, they were serenaded by people on the docks who 
sang, "God Save the King" and "Auld Lang Syne." The scene in Liverpool 
was equally impressive when the ship docked there the next day. Carson 
and Smith were greeted by Archibald Salvidge on behalf of the Working Men's 
·Conservative Association, and an estimated crowd of 150,000 people, almost 
entirely working-class, had turned out to meet them on this Sunday morning, 
even though the ship docked before eight o'clock (many people told newsmen 
that they had been waiting for several hours). Smith told the multitude 
that if an attempt was made to force Ulster into an Irish Parliament, "ten 
thousand young men of Liverpool" were prepared to fight for the Orange cause. 
Carson exclaimed, "W~ll done, Liverpool!" And added, "Belfast gave her 
answer last Saturday, Lancashire gives it to-day, and England will give it 
tomorrow." The gathering, with heads bared and with orange emblems every-
where in 'evidence, then sang, "Onward Christian Soldiers," "O God, Our Help 
. 27 in Ages Past," and the national anthem. 
27The Times (London), September 30, 1912, 9-10; Colvin, Carson the 
Statesman,ls3; 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. li·, Zlfr-217; Salvidge, SalvitlSe 
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These events in Belfast and Liverpool must have had a profound 
impact on the Cabinet and made the Governrrent fully aware that Home Rule 
was no ordinary Parliamentary legislation. An indication of the growing 
intensity of feeling came in November 1912 when the Unionists called for 
a sudden vote on a financial resolution relating to the Home Rule bill. 
Because many Liberals were absent, not expecting a vote until later, the 
Unionists won the vote and then demanded the Government's resignation. 
Placid and unflappable the next day, Asquith calmly announced that the 
Unionist resolution would be repealed and, with the Liberals and Irish 
Nationalists in full attendance, the Government repealed the resolution; 
Unionist anger was so great that the Speaker was forced to adjourn the 
House because of "grave disorder." As he walked out of the House, Winston 
Churchill taunted the Unionists by waving his handkerchief at them, and 
one enraged Unionist M. P. retaliated by hurling a book which struck 
Churchill in the face. The two men charged towards each other and only 
the intervention of other men present stopped a probable fistfight. The 
next day, a formal apology was given and Churchill accepted it graciously, 
but the anger and hatred which were revealed at that moment were not so 
28 
easily forgotten. Tensions between the pro-Home Rule and anti-Hane Rule 
forces increased as most Liberals and Unionists stopped socializing with 
one another, and acquaintances of years' standing refused to speak to 
each other if they held differing views on the Irish question. 29 The 
28 . '· 
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virulent passions which had been released by the debates over Lloyd George's 
budget and the Parliament bill were being carried to their logical extreme. 
The Home Rule bill had its third reading in the Commons on Jan-
uary 16, 1913, at which time Smith asked Asquith, 11Will you on any terms 
consent to the exclusion of Ulster? If so, what are those terms?1130 Smith's 
query went unanswered as the bill passed the Commons and was sent to the 
. 31 
Lords. Later that evening, Smith harangued an anti-Home Rule gathering 
from the balcony of the Constitutional Club, telling the crowd that the 
"fate of this Home Rule Bill will not be determined in this House of Commons. 
It will be determined in the streets of Belfast. 1132 As expected, the 
bill was rejected by the House of Lords later in the month, 33 but, under 
the provisions of the Parliament bill, this process had only .to be re-
peated, and then the bill had only to pass the Commons a third time for 
it to be automatically placed on the Statute rolls and become the law of 
the realm~-probably by the end of 1914. 
Smith continued his anti-Home Rule activities in 1913, serving on 
· the executive committee of the League for the Defense of Ulster and the 
Union, which was designed to recruit young Englishmen to fight for Ulster 
if there wai war in Ireland. 34 In the autumn of 1913, Smith again repre-
sented the Unionist Party in Ulster, this occasion being in honor of the 
Ulster Volunteer Force, a paramilitary organization created in January 1913, 
30Parliamentary Debates, Conunons, 1913, 5th Series, XLVI, 2323-2325. 
_31Ibid., z412-2418~ 
32 2nd Earl '.of Birke.nhead, .!· ,._g_.·, .222-223_. · 
33Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1913, 5th Series, XIII, 813-816. 
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which was to consist of 100,000 men between the ages of seventeen and 
sixty-five. 35 
On September 20, 1913, Smith surpassed all of his previous Ulster 
performances with the extremism of his remarks. Smith said that he spoke 
on behalf of the Unionists in Britain when he pledged that if the Govern-
ment attempted to coerce Ulster, 
.•• from that moment they would hold themselves absolved 
from all allegiance !£ this Government. From that moment 
they would say to their followers in England, "To your 
tents, 0 Israel," from that moment they would stand by the 
side of Ulster, refusing to recognize any~ and prepared 
with them!£ risk~ collapse of the whole body politic 
to prevent this monstrous crime~6 [Italics mineJ 
A week later, Smith reviewed the various Ulster Volunteer organizations 
with the Ulster military commander, Sir George Richardson, a retired 
general of the British Army. On September 27, Smith, on horseback as 
were Richardson and his staff, took the salute from 12,000 Belfast 
V ·1 h d . . 37 o unteers as t ey passe 1n review. This spectacle of September 27 
·prompted the widely circulated comment in England that Smith had "galloped 
for Carson," and forever after, he was known to his enemies as "Galloper" 
Smith. 38 
This excursion in September and early October was the high-water 
mark of Smith's public involvement with the Ulster cause. His highly 
publicized activities against Home Rule had certainly kept him in the 
35stewart, The Ulster Crisis, 70. 
36The Times (London), September 22, 1913, 24. 
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·
382nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. ~-. 224. 
52 
limelight and had assured his position as one of the nation's most prom-
inent political figures; but Smith had also proven to be an invaluable 
asset to the anti-Home Rule movement, as well as being a beneficiary of 
it. Smith was one of the few Unionists to possess what might be termed 
"charisma," and as Lord Beaverbrook later observed, Smith was a top 
drawing card at political rallies: "In the Conservative Party, which was 
weak in public appeal and platform ability, he almost alone had only to 
put up a notice that he would speak in order to fill any meeting place in 
Britain. 1139 
While the public campaign against Home Rule was in full swing, 
Bonar Law was assiduously prodding George V behind the scenes. In 
September 1912, Law had written to the King, telling him that an election 
on the Irish issue was the only solution and tactfully adding that 
"whatever course was taken by His Majesty, half of his people would think 
40 that he had failed in his duty." Two months later, Law wrote to the 
King's private secretary, Lord Stamfordham, saying that unless the Home 
Rule issue was resolved, the Unionists "shall have to decide between 
breaking the Parliamentary machine and allowing these terrible results 
. to happen''; if the Unionists were confronted with such a choice, they 
w6uld not hesitate "in considering that the injury to the House of 
41 Commons is not so great an evil as the other." 
In July 1913, Law and Lord Lansdowne advised the King to dismiss 
39 Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917-1918 (New York, 1956), 48. 
40Nicolson, George the Fifth, 201. 
41 Ibid., 201-202. 
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the Government and dissolve Parliament so that new elections could be 
he.ld. 42 h 11 Te fo owing September, when Law was the King's guest at 
Balmoral, the King told Law that, in his opinion, the Home Rule question 
should be placed before the electorate. This was undoubtedly music to 
the ears of Law, who expressed his doubts as to whether the Army would 
enforce Home Rule unless such a policy had a clear mandate from the 
people. If a dispute arose between the Army and the Government, Law 
43 told the King that the Unionist Party would support the Army. 
Law was even more forbidding in a conversation with Churchill, 
who was also a guest at Balmoral. He told Churchill that Carson would 
lead a separatist movement if Home Rule became law and that the Unionists 
would support him. Churchill stated that the Government would never 
allow Ulster to secede, but Law replied that the Government could not 
1 h b . d 44 re.yon t e Army too ey its or ers. Of course, Ulster and the Union-
·ists might well have been bluffing by threatening civil conflict, but, as 
one historian wrote, "a bluff is only a bluff when someone has the 
. 45 
.courage to call it." 
The Cabinet had considered arresting Carson for seditious 
behavior but decided against it for various reasons: Redmond warned the 
Government that arresting Carson would only make him a martyr Ca role 
he.would have relished); arresting Carson for sedition would have 
42 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 152. 
43 Ibid., 154-155. 
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entailed the arrests of those ~10 had abetted his sedition, which meant 
Ulster's political and religious leaders, the leaders of the Unionist 
Party (including Law, Smith, and numerous peers of the realm), and the 
owners and editors of the newspapers and periodicals which supported 
Ulster; and the Cabinet was unsure that any jury would have convicted 
Carson--an acquittal would have placed the Government in a ridiculous 
light and made Carson stronger than ever. 46 Finally, the arrest of 
Carson would have caused a major crisis, and it was Asquith's firm policy 
to keep conditions stable and to treat the Home Rule bill as normal 
legislation to be handled by Parliament. 47 
Against this background, Smith wrote to Churchill on October 5, 
1913, immediately after returning from Ulster. In the letter, _Smith 
referred to the position of Carson "and his friends" as "a factious 
opposition.- 1148 At first glance, this letter would seem to confirm the 
most damning opinions of Smith's critics: That Smith could publicly 
rouse people to Armageddon and privately denigrate these same people as 
"a: factious opposition" seems to be the most calculated and cold-blooded 
cynicism imaginable and makes Smith appear to be the shabbiest sort of 
demagogue. However, this letter had another meaning, for at this time, 
as incongruous- as it may seem, Smith was actively seeking a peaceful 
solution to the Irish problem. 
46 Oxford and Asquith, Fifty Years of British Parliament, II, 157-
159. 
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(3) 
The search for a solution to the Home Rule impasse had occupied 
the attention of various individuals throughout 1913 as the tempo of 
public rhetoric increased. Most of these people concluded that the only 
answer was to exclude Ulster from the provisions of the Home Rule bill, 
a solution condemned by Irish Nationalists as "partition." 
The Cabinet had discussed the possibility of Ulster's exclusion 
as early as February 1912 when the Home Rule bill was still being formu-
lated. It was decided at that time to place all of Ireland under Home 
Rule and only if the necessity arose would a special exception be made 
for Ulster. 49 In 1912-13, that necessity rapidly arose. A Liberal 
backbencher named T. C. R. Agar-Robartes was the first to raise publicly 
the question of Ulster's exclusion. During a debate on Home Rule in June 
1912, Agar-Robartes called for the exclusion of the Ulster counties of 
Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry; his position was that it was 
essential for Home Rule to become law, and therefore, Ulster had to be 
removed as an obstacle. He remarked wryly, "I have never heard that 
orange bitters will mix with Irish whisky. 1150 
As noted earlier, F. E. Smith had brought the exclusion of Ulster 
into consideration before the vote on Home Rule in January 1913. A 
strangely ignored event of great significance took place in the same 
month when Sir Edward Carson, in a rare gesture of conciliation, indicated 
that he might be amenable to Home Rule provided that sufficient safeguards 
51 
were given for Ulster. However, the impact of his words was lost in a 
49J k" "th 276 277 en ins, Asqui , - • 
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heated partisan exchange when Bonar Law said that Ulster would rather be 
governed by a foreign country than be ruled by Dublin, and Churchill 
accused the Unionists of trying to involve Germany in the Irish dispute.s 2 
Thus, a possible compromise between the Government and the Unionists was 
temporarily lost. 
Throughout 1913, no one was more diligent in exploring the means 
for a peaceful solution than the King. He was constantly being bombarded 
with warnings of insurrection from Law, and he was emotionally affected 
by letters from his subjects, such as one from an Ulster Protestant who 
wrote: S3 "Surely the King is not going to hand us over to the Pope." His 
meetings with the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Augustine Birrell, left 
him even more disturbed. Birrell casually dismissed any possibility of 
conflict in Ireland, saying that the dispute between Ulster and the Irish 
Nationalists was "artificial" and that there was no feeling against Home 
S4 Rule except in Belfast. Birrell's whimsical, distracted air certainly 
did nothing to allay the King's anxieties. 
George V was willing to grant Home Rule because he felt that 
Ireland would be a loyal Dominion like Canada if Britain acted generously 
and justly, but he thought that Ulster's resistance was reaching alarming 
proportions.SS Consequently, the King carried on a lengthy correspondence 
with the Prime Minister in August and September in regard to the Govern-
ment's Irish policy. Overcoming his fear of accusations that he would 
be interfering in politics, the King wrote to Asquith on August 11, telling 
52 Ibid., 464 ff. 
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him that "the Government is drifting and taking me with it! 11 The King 
suggested a bipartisan conference to settle the Irish problem. Asquith 
rejected the idea of a conference but indicated that he might be willing 
to amend the Home Rule bill as far as Ulster was concerned. 56 
Asquith then wrote two memoranda to the King, outlining his views 
on the Irish situation. The first memorandum dealt with the constitutional 
ramifications of the Irish controversy; Asquith was aware of the advice 
which the King had received from Law and Lansdowne, and he stressed the 
position of the monarch. He denied that the Parliament bill had altered 
the monarch's role, and he pointed out that no monarch had exercised the 
. veto power for two centuries and that the principle of a monarch being 
bound by the advice of his ministers was firmly established: This 
principle had protect~d the Crown "from the storms and vicissitudes.of 
party politics" and had made the Crown "an invaluabl~ safeguard for 
the continuity of our national life." Asquith reminded the King.that 
while, theoretically, he had the right to dismiss a Government which 
controlled a majority of the Commons, no monarch had attempted such an 
action since the reign of William IV--not an "auspicious precedent." 
Furthermore, if the King dissolved Parliament on his own authority, he 
would be· lowering himself into the political arena and making the Crown 
"the football of contending factions." 
Asquith's legalistic mind was on firm ground when writing about 
constitutional issues, and his advice was a masterful synopsis of the 
role of a constitutional monarch. The Prime Minister was not as convincing 
when dealing with the political realities of the Irish issue in his second 
56 Ibid., 222-.224; Jenkins, Asquith, 285. 
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memorandum. He conceded that there might be "organised disorder" in Ulster 
but discounted the idea of civil war. He was not opposed to an election 
after the Home Rule bill became law, but an election before that would be 
tantamount to a referendum, and a referendum on Home Rule or any other 
issue would nullify the intent of the Parliament bill. 57 
These memoranda failed to satisfy the King. In another letter 
to the Prime Minister, George V said that he did not feel that the 
election of December 1910 was a sufficient mandate for the Home Rule 
bill. He worried about the morale of the Army and the effect on public 
opinion in Britain and the Dominions of coercing Ulster Protestants into 
accepting Catholic rule. The King told Asquith that the Unionist leaders 
had assured him that they would accept the verdict of an election on the 
Irish issue but that they would support Ulster if Redmond and the Liberals 
tried to ram Home Rule through Parliament. He also expressed concern that 
the· Crown would be placed in an embarrassing position if the Unionists 
won an election after Home Rule became law, passed a repeal of Home Rule 
and forced the King to sign the repeal after he had just signed the 
original bill. The King urged Asquith either to hold an election or to 
amend the bill so that the interests of Ulster would be protected. 58 
Si~ultaneously, Arthur Balfour wrote to Lord Stamfordham, suggesting that 
the best solution was a general election on the Home Rule question; but, 
since Asquith was unwilling to hold an election and the King was unable 
to.,dismiss the Government, the only alternative was a compromise excluding 
Ulster from the Home Rule bill. The King respected Balfour's judgment 
57Nico~son, George the Fifth, 224-225. 
58 Ibid., 225-229. 
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more than that of any other statesman, and this letter confirmed his 
. . I 1 d 59 own opinions on re an • These activities on the King's part were not 
an indication that he favored the Unionist Party. On the contrary, the 
King decidedly preferred Asquith to Law, for whom he had a strong 
personal distaste. Furthermore, George V thought that, in the current 
climate of European affairs, it would be disastrous for the Foreign 
60 Office to lose a man of the ability and experience of Sir Edward Grey. 
The King was merely attempting to avert a potentially grave crisis. 
Although Asquith may have appeared recalcitrant in his correspon-
dence with the King, he had come to believe that the necessity for modify-
ing the Home Rule bill had finally arisen. While he was exchanging 
views with the King, he wrote to Churchill that the Government would 
"probably have to make some sort of bargain about Ulster as the price 
of Home Rule. 1161 In the midst of these private communications, consi-
derable comment was caused by a letter written to The Times by the Earl 
of Loreburn, an elder statesman of the Liberal Party and a former Lord 
Chancellor, who urged the Government to seek a "settlement by consent" 
and advocated a bipartisan conference to reach an agreement which would 
be satisfactory to both Ulster and the Irish Nationalists. 62 Loreburn's 
· letter had the effect of clearing the air and creating a more concilia-
tory atmosphere, and Smith and Churchill decided that this was the time 
to·implement their plan for Ireland. 
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Smith and Churchill had been working secretly for more than a 
year on a solution to the Irish question. They came to the conclusion 
that the only basis for a settlement was Home Rule for Ireland, with a 
provision for excluding Ulster. This is the most controversial period 
of Smith's career, but the controversy stems from a misunderstanding of 
Smith's motives. One of the two major biographies of Smith was written 
by his son, the second Earl of Birkenhead. He wrote that Smith, in his 
public campaign for Ulster, was motivated by idealistic concern for 
Ulster's Protestants. Smith, on the contrary, was a Christian only in 
the sense that he was a Gentile rather than a Jew. His son grudgingly 
conceded that Smith had a completely secular and materialistic view of 
the· world and was totally amoral in his private life; but he then 
attempted to portray Smith as a man stirred to the depths of his being 
by the plight of God-fearing Calvinists being forced to accept the 
majority rule of a Papist, "anti-Christ" Parliament in Dublin. 
Equally unconvincing was the argument of William Camp, the 
author pf The Glittering Prizes, the more critical biography of Smith. 
Camp asserted that Smith's actions in 1912-14 were purely cynical: 
Ulster was the issue of the moment and he played it for all it was worth. 
Indeed, Camp seemed to feel that Smith would have advocated cannibalism 
or human sacrifice if he had thought that it might have advanced his 
political career. This concept of Smith as a ruthless mercenary is 
shared by many other· historians. However, Camp and other historians 
re~ognize· the crucial part which Smi~h played in the 1921 Anglo-Irish . 
Treaty and are at a loss to explain it. If Smith was such a Machiavellian 
opportunist, it would hardly have been in.keeping with his character for 
hi.m to labor so arduously to reach an accord with the Irish at the expense 
of·. his standing within his own party. 
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Both of these views are misleading. Political considerations did 
serve as a factor in Smith's determination to support the Orange cause, 
but it would have been political suicide for any Unionist to have done 
otherwise. During this controversy, Smith was working as a "double agent," 
in secret collaboration with Churchill and, to a lesser extent, Lloyd 
George, to modify the positions which he asserted in public with Carson 
and Law. Smith, unlike Law or Carson, always maintained an emotional 
detachment from Ulster and was able to appraise the situation more 
realistically than they could. Having seen the frightening depths of 
emotion and fervor in Ulster and in Lancashire, Smith was too perceptive 
not to have realized that the Orange cause was a Frankenstein's monster 
.which the Unionist Party might not be able to control. Smith was con-
vinced that national unity was impossible as long as the Irish question 
hung over British politics, and he was aware that Irish Catholic nation-
~lism and Ulster Protestant particularism were incompatible. Thus, 
rationally, Smith decided that Ulster's exclusion from Home Rule was the 
only answer. 
For a short while, Churchill thought that "devolution" was the 
ideal solution. Devolution would have entailed Home Rule for Ulster, 
Home Rule for southern Ireland, Home Rule for Scotland and Home Rule for 
Wales. This would have enabled Westminster to deal with foreign policy, 
national defense, and other Imperial matters while local problems were 
handled by the various Home Rule Parliaments. Churchill became so 
'fascinated'by.devolutionary-schemes that Sini~h jokingly accused him of 
63 
wanting to restore the Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy. Before long, though, 
632nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. !•, 216. 
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both men had decided on Home Rule for Ireland sans Ulster. In August 
1912, Churchill wrote to Redmond, asking him to consider the possibility 
of a "moratorium" on Ulster's entry into an all-Ireland Parliament, 64 and, 
in the aforementioned Home Rule debate in January 1913, Smith put the 
question of excluding Ulster directly to Asquith. During 1913, Churchill 
arranged a number of private dinners for Smith to exchange views with 
65 
various Liberal and Irish spokesmen. As Churchill's son later wrote: 
Smith and Churchill "worked tirelessly behind the scenes to produce an 
accommodation over Irish and other matters that might hamper national 
unity. Both were alive to the German danger and the need of Britain to 
face it. 1166 
In the fall of 1913, with Asquith leaning toward exclusion. and 
with Lord Loreburn's advice uppermost in many minds, Churchill and Smith 
decided that now was the time to gamble on reaching a settlement. 
Churchi 11 explicitly stated his views to Lord Stamfordham on September 17, 
when he told him that Catholic Ireland should have Home Rule--"Is it likely 
that she can now stand by and see the cup almost at her lips, dashed to 
67 the.ground?"--but he said that "Ulster has a case." Churchill was 
making it known to the King that there were high-ranking officials in 
the Government who were willing to compromise, and he could be sure.that 
the message would be passed to Law. While Churchill was conveying his 
message to Stamfordham, Smith embarked upon his notorious Ulster visit, 
64 '. 
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during which he approached Carson and various Ulster leaders on the 
matter of a compromise settlement. On September 29, in the midst of his 
Ulster trip, Smith wrote a personal memorandum in which he expressed his 
private views on the Irish situation. This memorandum is one of the very 
few personal papers which Smith saved, and it is an invaluable aid in 
shedding light on his actions. 
In the memorandum, Smith wrote that he had told Carson that "no 
accommodation was possible unless sacrifices and concessions were forth-
coming from both sides" and had asked him for his position if Ulster was 
offered exclusion from the Home Rule bill. Carson, Smith wrote, replied 
that he would "readily accept" such a proposal as the basis for working 
·out an agreement with Redmond and the Government. According to the 
memorandum, Smith pointed out to Carson that partition would be a great 
sacrifice for Redmond and that it was only fair to expect some reciprocal 
gesture from Ulster: Namely, a willingness to accept Home Rule for the 
rest of Ireland. Smith concluded the memorandum by stating his impression 
. . 68 
.that Carson would not block Home Rule if Ulster was excluded. 
Another document which is crucial to an understanding of Smith's 
actions at this time was the letter which he wrote to Churchill on 
October 5, upon his return from Ulster. This letter, found in Churchill's 
papers, was the one in which he referred to the Ulster Protestants' posi-
tion as "a factious opposition." Because of its importance, the letter 
should be quoted in its entirety: 
Dear W, 
. I think you will agree that I have played up well. I hope 
68znd Earl of Birkenhead, I·.§_., 225. 
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you will do the same now. 
Couldn't you ask--what does Sir Ed Carson mean by exclusion? 
Does he mean that he and his friends will abandon a factious 
opposition in that part of Ireland when they are in so small 
a minority? Does he mean that he and his friends will remem-
ber that they are Irishmen and apply their ability and influ-
ence to make the experiment a success in the South? 
But you can do the thing much better than I can suggest. 
Only do play up. I have run no small risks and incurred 
considerable censure. 
Carson is most reasonable. 
Yours ever, 
F E 
69 I think he wd be glad to meet you. 
It is clear from the September 29 memorandum and the October 5 
letter that Smith's public actions in Ulster were an elaborate charade, 
·part of a concerted effort with Churchill to bring about negotiations on 
Ireland. Smith's flamboyant tour through Ulster and his violent, incendiary 
speeches were prompted not by pure idealism or pure cynicism but were 
designed to impress Ulster's demands upon the public consciousness with 
such dramatic boldness that the Irish Nationalists would find it impos-
sible to refuse negotiations on the basis of Ulster's exclusion. There 
.is no other way to interpret Smith's letter to Churchill, with its opening 
remarks (111 think you will agree that I have played up well.") and its 
conclusion ("Only do play up. I have run no small risks and incurred 
considerable censure."). Three days after Smith wrote the letter, 
Churchill made a speech to his constituents in Dundee in which his usual 
bellicose rhetoric was missing •. Churchill said that the Government 
·intended to carry out Home Rule but stated that the Home Rule bill could 
69 Rand~lph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, II, 461. 
65 
be altered so that a "settlement by agreement" could be reached; he urged 
"goodwill" and a "mitigation of bitter feelings" on both sides. 70 
Two days after Churchill's address, Smith spoke at West Bromwich, 
and his low-keyed remarks must have astounded those who had read of his 
swashbuckling Ulster campaign several weeks earlier. Smith emphasized 
that he was stating his own personal views and was not speaking on 
behalf of the Unionist Party. He said that Ulster would resort to violence 
only to prevent coercion into a Home Rule Parliament, and he advised the 
Government and the Irish Nationalists to recognize this fact. Smith 
urged an all-party meeting of "men of goodwill" to work out a settlement 
based on the exclusion of Ulster, and he praised Churchill's recent, 
statesmanlike speech as an indication from a leading Cabinet member that 
71 the Home Rule bill was not "unalterable." There can be little doubt 
that these moderate speeches from Churchill and Smith, who were regarded 
as extremists by their respective opposing parties, had considerable 
impact. There can also be little doubt that the timing of these two 
speeches, coupled with their similarity in tone and content, strongly 
indicates a definite plan by Churchill and Smith to force the Irish 
issue. 
Within the Cabinet, Churchill was the most aggressive spokesman 
for a compromise settlement, and he was supported by Lord Morley and Lloyd 
George. 72 Because of his knowledge of the nonconformist temperament in 
70The Times (London), October 9, 1913, 7-8. 
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Wales, Lloyd George was acutely aware of the political danger of forcing 
Protestants to accept Catholic domination, 73 and he was also involved with 
Smith on the Irish question. In October 1913, Lloyd George wrote to 
Smith, telling him that he had conveyed Smith's ideas on a settlement to 
the Prime Minister and added: "You know how anxious I have been for 
years to work with you and a few others on your side. I have always 
realised that our differences have been artificial and do not reach the 
'realities' •• .74 
Because of his efforts to reach a compromise, Smith was harshly 
cri.ticized in certain quarters of the Unionist Party. Lansdowne, in 
particular, was infuriated by Smith's overtures to the Government, and 
he wrote a bristling letter to Law suggesting that the Unionist leader-
ship disassociate itself from Smith. 75 Smith had gone so far as to inform 
the King that a compromise might be reached; Law, whose strategy was still 
to keep George V worrying, said, "F. E.'s talk with the King seemed to me 
76 just about as unwise as anything could be." 
Lord Stamfordham wrote to Law in October, asking him to request 
a conference with the Prime Minister, but Law refused, saying that an 
overture on his part would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and that 
77 th~ King should initiate such a conference. In fairness to Law, it 
73
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should be pointed out that he was under heavy pressure from extreme Union-
ists, such as Lansdowne and the Cecils, not to make any concessions to the 
Liberals.
78 
In the end, it was the Prime Minister who finally proposed 
a meeting. Asquith was also under great pressure--from the King, from 
members of his Cabinet, from the results of recent by-elections which 
were against the Government 79--and he asked Law to meet him informally to 
discuss the Irish situation. Asquith and Law met on October 15 and again 
on November 6 at the home of Sir Maxwell Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook). 
They discussed the political realities of their respective positions, and 
both agreed that the only feasible solution was Home Rule with some form 
of exclusion for Ulster. 80 These meetings seemed to suggest that there 
was a basis for agreement, and an extremely conciliatory speech by Asquith 
at Ladybank created a climate of optimism. 81 
In this atmosphere, Churchill entertained Austen Chamberlain 
aboard an Admiralty yacht in order to secure the support of a famous 
name for.a compromise settlement. Churchill told him that the Government 
would not allow Ulster to block Home Rule but was willing to consider 
separate treatment for Ulster: "We have never excluded that possibility--
never." Chamberlain said that the Unionists favored exclusion for Ulster 
for an indefinite period, while Churchill said that the Cabinet was 
leaning towards the idea of exclusion for a fixed term and then automatic 
inclusion into the Dublin Parliament unless Westminster had decided 
78' Blake, The UnknoWn Prime Minister, 211-212. 
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otherwise; however, Churchill conceded that the Government might move 
closer to the Unionist position if it was necessary to reach an agreement. 
Chamberlain stated that he was not opposed to Home Rule~~' just the 
idea of "Ireland a nation," the idea that Ireland was a separate and 
distinct nation from Britain. Churchill laughed and said that denying 
Ireland a sense of nationhood would deny the Irish any satisfaction in 
having their own Parliament: "You are like the R. C. Church which admits 
the necessity of the marriage bed but holds that you must find no pleasure 
in the enjoyment of it." Churchill gave Chamberlain the impression that 
the leading members of the Cabinet--Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, Morley--
favored a settlement, but Churchill expressed his fear that "a little 
d bl d h . fl II b f h I . h . 1 d 82 re oo as got to ow e ore t e ris question was sett e • 
This congenial atmosphere was shattered at the end of November. 
·At the meeting between Asquith and Law on November 6, Law thought that 
. Asquith had agreed to a settlement based on Ulster 1 s exclusion and that 
the Prime Minister had agreed to recommend it to the Cabinet; but Asquith 
had only considered their discussions a tentative, hypothetical solution 
which he would present to the Cabinet for consideration. At any rate, 
Law waited expectantly to hear from Asquith and when he failed to 
·receive a positive response from the Prime Minister, who found his Cabinet 
d~eply divided on the proposed solution, Law felt that Asquith had trifled 
with him. Consequently, Law showed no further interest in talking to 
A . h 83 squit • 
The sudden turn £or. !:he. worse-; wa~' r·eflected in a· speech which: 
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Asquith made on November 27 at Leeds, in which he stated that the Govern-
ment had been given its mandate in 1910 and that there would be no 
election on the Home Rule issue. In his grim, pessimistic address, 
Asquith said that he saw no prospect for agreement and emphasized that 
the Government would not be intimidated by threats of civil war. 84 Asquith 
was answered on the following day by a speech which Law gave in Dublin to 
a meeting of Irish Unionists. Law reaffirmed Unionist support for Ulster 
and said, "Mr. Redmond has given his orders, and ••• Mr. Asquith is not 
prepared to disobey them." He compared 1913 to 1688 and suggested that 
the Army treat Asquith the same way James II had been treated. 85 
Incredibly, arrangements were made for another meeting between 
Asquith and Law, but the December meeting was predictably abortive: 
Asquith was bound by Redmond's declaration that the Irish Nationalists 
could go no farther than "Home Rule within Home Rule," which meant that 
Ulster would come under the all-Ireland Parliament but would be given 
extensive local autonomy under Dublin's supervision; while Law demanded 
the absolute exclusion of Ulster until the time when the people of Ulster 
voted to accept an Irish Parliament. 86 The failure of Asquith and Law 
to reach an accord was made even more regrettable by the formation in 
late 1913 of the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization that was 
87 Catholic Ireland's answer to the Ulster Volunteers. 
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Bonar Law's constant references to the attitude of the Army in 
his speeches and in his meetings with the King and the Prime Minister 
were not without substance. He was in constant communication with Major-
General Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations at the War 
Office. Wilson has been described as a "tireless and unscrupulous 
· · 
1188 f w· 1 h i · 1 d 11 intriguer, or i son was t e po itica sol ier par exce ence. 
Wilson, being of Anglo-Irish stock, was very sympathetic to Ulster, and 
his biographer noted that Wilson viewed the Government's Home Rule program 
"with a growing indignation. 1189 Wilson secretly advised the Ulster Volun-
teer Force and was in frequent contact with Law, feeding him information 
from the War Office and suggesting questions to ask the Liberal ministers 
in the Commons in order to embarrass them. In fact, Wilson seemed to feel 
that his duty was not to provide for the defense of Great Britain but to 
bring down the Liberal Government. As his extraordinary diaries reveal, 
S · H w· 1 f B L ' 11 · 90 ir enry i son was one o onar aw s strongest a i.es. 
Acting with Wilson's full support, Law was planning his most 
radical measure yet to block Home Rule. The plan was to use the House of 
Lords to amend the perfunctory Army Annual bill--which was necessary to 
maintain the Army--so that the Army could not be used to coerce Ulster 
into Home Rule unless an election had been held specifically on the Irish 
issue. 91 If the Government accepted this amendment to the Army Annual 
bill, it would be handing the Unionists a great victory; if the Government 
88J. B. Priestly,~ Edwardians (New York, 1970), 268. 
89charles Edward Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson:' His 
~and Diaries, I (New York, 1927), 124. 
90Ibid., 124, 131-132, 138. 
91Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 173-174; Callwell, Sir Henry 
Wilson, I, 138. 
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refused to accept the amendment, it would be without an army for at 
least three sessions of Parliament (under the provisions of the Govern-
ment's own Parliament bill). Law consulted the leaders and elder states-
men of the Unionist Party, and they reluctantly agreed to this proposed 
blackmail, with the sole exception of Arthur Balfour who thought it was 
a ,;dangerous precedent. 1192 
While Law and Wilson were concocting their scheme to render the 
British Government impotent, George V conferred with the Prime Minister 
at Windsor in February 1914, at which time the King once more expressed 
~i~ concern over possible bloodshed in Ireland unless there was an agree-
ment. He said that Ulster would never accept Home Rule and stated that 
the Army could not be relied upon to coerce Ulster. The King urged 
Asquith to hold an election because that would give the Government a clear 
mandate--if it won--to enact Home Rule and would absolve the Government 
and the Crown of responsibility for any violence that might accompany 
Home.Rule. The Prime Minister wearily replied that an election would 
"settle nothing" and reminded the King that, constitutionally, he was 
not responsible for his ministers' policies. The King stated that 
"although constitutionally he might not be responsible, still he could 
not allow bloodshed among his loyal subjects in any part of his Dominions 
without exerting every means in his power to avert it." He went on to 
say thathe would "feel it his duty to do what in his own judgment was 
best for his people generally." 
Stamfordham recorded that the ''Prime Minister expressed no little 
surprise at this declaration" and warned the King not to veto the Home 
92 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 175-177. 
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Rule bill or attempt to dismiss the Government. This warning, Asquith 
said, was given "not for his own sake so much as for that of the Crown." 
The King said that he had no desire to dismiss the Government but "his 
future action must be guided by circumstances," and he implored Asquith 
to seek a "settlement by consent" with Carson and the Unionists. 93 
Asquith, seeing the traumatic effect that the Home Rule controversy was 
having on the King, decided to resume his efforts. to end the political 
•f 94 stri e. 
Asquith convinced Redmond that the only way out of the deadlock 
was to make an offer to Ulster that was generous enough so that if it 
was refused, Ulster would lose 11all moral force." Redmond did not approve 
of .this concession to Ulster, and he realized that he could. bring down 
the Government if he so desired; but if an election brought the Unionists 
to power, the Irish Nationalists might lose everything which they almost 
had in their grasp. So Redmond swallowed hard and accepted the Government 
95 proposal. 
The Government proposal was presented to the Commons on March 9; 
1914, when Asquith moved to amend the Home Rule bill. He proposed to 
offer each Ulster county the option of remaining in the United Kingdom 
or becoming part of the Irish Parliament; if the county voted to remain 
in the United Kingdom, it would do so for six years, at the end of which 
time it would be automatically included in the Irish Parliament unless 
Westminster had changed this provision in the meantime. The six-year 
93 . Nicolson, George the Fifth, 233-234; Jenkins, Asquith, 302. 
94J k. en ins, Asquith, 302. 
95 Gwynn, The ~of John Redmond, 250-252. 
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period would give Ulster an opportunity to gauge the effectiveness of 
Dubiin's government and, as elections were due in 1915 and 1920, would 
give the Unionists an opportunity to take office and alter or repeal the 
Home Rule bill.96 
Law immediately denounced the proposal as an inadequate safe-
guard for Ulster's rights, 97 and Carson said that Ulster would never 
accept a "sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years. 11 98 
At this slap in the face, Redmond angrily told the Unionists that the 
Irish Nationalists had sacrificed enough to satisfy Ulster's sensibilities 
and that there would be no more concessions. 99 Redmond's anger was 
justified because he had been severely criticized for agreeing to the 
Amending bill, and, thereby, accepting partition.lOO With the Govern-
ment's offer of compromise thus rebuffed, it appeared that the work of 
me~ like Smith, Churchill, and George V had gone for naught. 
(4) 
Although the Government intended to pursue the Amending bill, it 
regarded the Unionist rebuff as a refusal to consider anything except the 
complete abandonment of Home Rule, and the Cabinet decided to take the 
offensive in the public opinion battle. Lloyd George told Lord Riddell 
that Churchill had been chosen by the Cabinet to attack the Unionist Party 
96Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1914, 5th Series, LIX, 906-918. 
97rbid".; 9'1s-926i;. 
98Ibid., 934. 
_
99Ibid., 926-929. 
lOOMacardle, The~ Republic, 106-107. 
74 
position on Ireland,lOl and Churchill's mailed fisted language certainly 
marked a departure from Asquith's policy of maintaining calm and stability. 
In his address at Bradford on March 14, Churchill accused Carson and the 
Unionists of being engaged in "a treasonable conspiracy" and said that the 
Unionists' philosophy was that "coercion for four-fifths of Ireland is a 
healthful, exhilarating and salutary exercise--but lay a finger on the Tory 
one~fifth--sacrilege, tyranny, murder!" He went on to say: 
As long as it affects the working man in England or Nationalist 
peasants in Ireland there is no measure of military force which 
the Tory Party will not readily employ. They denounce all vio-
lence except their own. They uphold all law except the law 
they choose to break. They • • • select from the Statute Book 
the laws they will obey and the laws they will resist .••• If 
it should happen that the Constitution or the law ••• stand 
in the path of some Tory project .•• then they vie with the 
wildest anarchists in the language which they use. 
Then Churchill, with reckless belligerence, challenged the Unionists to 
make good their rhetoric. He said that if the Unionists wanted a peace-
ful solution to the Irish problem, they would find the Government more 
. than cooperative; but if they wanted a fight, "Let us go forward together 
a.nd put thes.e grave matters to the proof. 11102 
Churchill's speech caused tremendous anger and resentment among 
Unionists, 103 and, while such language may have been just what the 
Unionists deserved, it only exacerbated tensions at a time when the Govern-
ment had been planning to take violently controversial action in regard 
to Ulster. The Government had become alarmed at the activities of the 
101Bar~n Riddell, ~ Page~ 'From .lli'., DiarY, 1908.:.1914 (London·, 
1934), 203-204. 
102The Tfmes (Lo~don), furch·l6, 1914, i3. 
103Amery, !!z Political Life, I, 443-444. 
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Ulster Volunteers and, early in 1914, had learned of plans by Ulster 
extremists to seize supplies and materiel from British Army depots in 
Ulster. 104 To investigate the situation in Ulster, a special Cabinet 
subcommittee was created, consisting of Lord Crewe, Lord Privy Seal and 
leader of the House of Lords; Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty; 
Birrell, Chief Secretary for Ireland; John Seely, Secretary for War; and 
Sir John Simon, Attorney-General. The subcommittee recommended that 
extra guards be placed on the military depots in Ulster and that the 
number of troops in Ulster be increased by transferring forces from 
southern Ireland and England. 105 Churchill ordered naval units into the 
Irish Sea as a show of force and as a means of transporting soldiers if 
106 
necessary. 
The Government had reason to doubt the reliability of British 
troops stationed in. Ireland. It was believed that most of the officers 
had Unionist sympathies, and in fact, "many of them had connections of 
blood and property with Ulster"; even among the enlisted troops, there 
was a large percentage of men who had an Irish Protestant heritage. 107 
These doubts were apparently confirmed when Sir Arthur Paget, the command-
ing general of British forces in Ireland, balked at the proposed troop 
transfer, saying that it.would provoke a crisis and that it would be 
better to keep the troops in reserve rather than move them to Ulster. 
Consequently, Paget was ordered to report to the War Office in London on 
104Randolph Churchill,. Winston .§_. Churchill, II, 470-471. 
105Jenkins, Asquith, 305-306. 
l06Winston s. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914 (New York, 
1928), 194-195. 
107Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, II, 475. 
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March 18 for a briefing from Government officials. 108 At the War Office, 
Paget was instructed to secure the Army depots and equipment in Ulster. 
He was told to expect sabotage and, possibly, sporadic violence; in the 
event that the Ulster Volunteers mobilized to thwart this operation, pro-
visions had been made to establish a British military government in Belfast. 109 
When Paget returned to Ireland, he called a meeting of his general 
officers to inform them of the nature of the operation. Paget's remarks 
at this meeting have been a source of controversy for more than half a 
century; but, whatever his exact words were, he gave many of the officers 
the distinct impression that the Government was planning an active, agres-
siv_e campaign to subdue Ulster. 110 One such officer was Brigadier-General 
Hubert Gough, commander of the Third Cavalry Brigade, who returned to his 
headquarters at the Curragh, an army post near Dublin, and gave his own 
officers his impression of Paget's remarks. Gough and fifty-seven of his 
officers said that they would take part in the Ulster campaign if the 
campaign was designed to protect property and maintain order, but they 
unequivocally refused to participate in any operation which was designed 
111 
to coerce .Ulster into Home Rule. 
News of this "mutiny" stunned the Government, and the War Office 
directed Paget to relieve Gough of his command and send him to London. 
Paget sped to the Curragh and tried to convince Gough that his statements 
had been misinterpreted, that the Ulster campaign was merely precautionary. 
108Alfred Patrick Ryan, Mutiny 2!.the Curragh (London, 1956), 119. 
l09Ibid., 120-122. 
llOibid., 130-133. 
111
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When Gough remained obdurate, Paget ordered him to report to the War 
ff . 112 0 ice. Gough was steadfast in his refusal when he met War Secretary 
Seely, and, finally, the Cabinet drew up a memorandum for the British 
troops in Ireland to follow, giving general assurances to the rebellious 
officers. Gough,finding the assurances too bland and privately encouraged 
by Wilson, demanded more specific guarantees. Seely totally collapsed in 
the face of Gough's adamant demands; he and Lord Morley added extra 
assurances to the memorandum--without the knowledge of the Cabinet--which 
guaranteed that the Government would not attempt to use the Army "to 
crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home Rule 
Bill." This surrender was initialled by two generals at the War Office, 
whereupon Gough hastened back _to Ireland to resume his command and display 
113 his battle trophy to his colleagues. The Cabinet exploded when it 
learned of Seely's concessions, and their embarrassment was enormously 
increased after Sir Henry Wilson leaked information about the Curragh 
incident to .Bonar Law, who promptly leaked it to friends in the press. 114 
No Government had been in such an ignominious position since 
Gladstone's ministry had been blamed for the massacre at Khartoum in 1885. 
. -
The Unionists accused the Cabinet of plotting a nefarious scheme to subju-
gate Ulster which was prevented only by patriotic Army officers, while 
those who believed that Ulster should come under Home Rule felt that the 
Government had been cravenly intimidated. The Curragh incident was the 
foremost subject of debate in the Commons on March 30, 1914, at which time, 
112
rbid., 140-143. 
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the Prime Minister announced the resignations of the hapless Seely and 
the two generals who had initialled his guarantee to Gough, and Asquith 
took the House by surprise when he announced that he would personally 
assume direction of the War Office. 115 
F. E. Smith was designated to make the major address for the 
Unionists, and he meticulously set forth the Government's "plot" against 
Ulster: Churchill's Bradford speech, the Curragh incident, and the 
naval maneuvers in the Irish Sea. Most of the speech was vintage F. E. 
Smith as his taunts and innuendoes brought gales of laughter and cheers 
from the Unionist benches, to the silent discomfiture of the Liberals. 
The plot against Ulster was "Napoleonic," Smith remarked, but alas, "there 
was no Napoleon. 11116 However, he ended by making as generous a statement 
as the Commons had heard in many months. He asked the House to consider 
"where are we all drifting" and said, "Nobody can ever persuade us on 
this side of the House that we have not been justified in the things we 
have done, and no one will ever persuade the honourable gentlemen opposite 
that they . '. • were not justified in what they have done." He said that 
historians would record that the "whole House of Commons" should have 
been the "trustees, not for any party, but for the nation as a whole" and 
that the House had "inherited from the past a great and splendid posses-
. d h . "t ?"117 s1on, an w ere is i now. 
The Unionists, taking full advantage of the Curragh ·fiasco, held 
. a •nions ter ;.rally in Hyde Park ·on. Sat_~rd~y, ·April 4, supporting Ulster and 
llSParliamentary Debates, Commons, 1914, 5th Series, LX, 840-841. 
116rbid., 877. 
117rbid.' 891. 
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de C1·n·g the Li"be 1 bf "ldl · d ll8 noun · ra s e ore a w1 y receptive crow • Although he 
was one of the speakers at the rally, Smith continued to work privately 
for a compromise settlement and tried to dilute the bitterness of recent 
events. Leopold Amery recorded an instance when Smith persuaded several 
Army officers to remain in the service rather than resign to join the 
119 Ulster Volunteers. Despite the efforts of individuals like Smith, 
tensions increased when the Ulster Volunteers smuggled 35,000 German 
rifles and nearly three million rounds of ammunition into Ulster on the 
night of April 24, 1914. 120 This gun-running episode at Larne may have 
strengthened the Ulster Volunteers, but it put the Unionists on the 
defensive for the first time since the Curragh rebellion and when the 
Unionists attempted a motion of censure against the Government on April 
28, Churchi 11 was able to say that the "first maxim of English jurispru-
dence is that complainers should come into Court with clean hands. 11121 
Yet, Churchill took this opportunity to make a plea for conciliation, 
telling Carson that if he would accept Home Rule, the Government would 
. 122 
"safeguard the dignity and the interests of Protestant Ulster." 
Bonar Law had, in the meantime, abandoned the idea of amending 
the Army Annual .bi 11, agreeing with Balfour that it might adversely 
affect national security. Law was also aware that the Curragh incident 
had made it virtually impossible for the Government to use the Army 
118rhe Times (London), April 6, 1914, 9-10. 
119~ery, ~.!:!l. P~lttical ~~ l:,: 448.~ 
120 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 105. 
121Par~iamentary Debates, Commons, 1914, 5th Series, LXI, 1574. 
122
rbid., 1591-1592. 
80 
against Ulster--hence, there was no longer any reason to amend the bill. 123 
On May 5, 1914, Law met with Carson and the Prime Minister to find a way 
to avert the inevitable bloodshed in Ireland. The three men "provisionally 
agreed" that Ulster should be offered the option of entering the Irish 
Parliament or remaining part of the United Kingdom, but further details 
124 
·were not worked out. Asquith was being continually prodded by the 
King in the spring and early summer to bring his "great powers" to bear 
on an Irish settlement and was being warned by the monarch that "time 
125 
was slipping away." Home Rule was due to become law before the year 
was out, and the Government would be placed in the position of coercing 
Ulster to accept the statute or allowing the Ulster Protestants to defy 
Parliament. In the summer of 1914, Churchill expressed the attitude of 
.many concerned. people when he wrote to a Cabinet colleague that the Irish 
question had to be resolved before it crippled Britain and the Empire--
"if possible with Irish acquiescence, but if necessary over the heads of 
b . h h . ,,i26 ot · Iris parties. 
The House of Lords brought the issue to a head when it made known 
its plan to alter the Government's Amending bi 11 so that all of Ulster 
. 1 . f h . d f 1 . 127 would be excluded without any time imit or t e perio o exc usion. 
This was unacceptable to the Government, and on July 17, Asquith wrote 
to the King, asking him to invite the concerned parties to a conference 
123Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 181-182. 
124J. A.. Spender and Cyril Asquith, The Life of Herbert Henry 
Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith, II (London, 1932), 50. 
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to iron out their differences on Ireland. 128 On July 21, the parties 
gathered at Buckingham Palace: Asquith and Lloyd George represented the 
Liberals; Law and Lansdowne were the Unionist representatives; the Irish 
Nationalists sent Redmond and John Dillon; Carson and Craig served as 
Ulster's spokesmen; and James Lowther, Speaker of the House of Corrunons, 
presided over the meetings. The conference was terminated after four days 
due to differences between the two Irish parties over the conditions and 
length of Ulster's exclusion and the number of counties which were to be 
incorporated in Ulster (both parties claimed Fermanagh and Tyrone). 129 
Asquith and Lloyd George returned to Downing Street to inform the 
Cabinet. As the celebrated passage in Churchill's memoirs relates, the 
Cabinet was rehashing the Irish situation and floundering "around the 
muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone" on the evening of July 24 when Sir 
Edward Grey interrupted the discussion to read a note from the Foreign 
Office which gave the details of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. 130 
(5) 
The British Government had been so mesmerized by the Irish ques-
· tion that it had paid scant attention to the ominous developments in 
Europe which had been set in motion by the assasination of the Austrian 
Archduke at Sarajevo on June 28. The forces of nationalism, militarism, 
and the system of alliances were now savagely activated and as events 
marched inexorably to war, British leaders became aware that their 
128 Nicolson, George the Fifth, 241. 
129
rbid., 242-243. 
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country would probably be sucked into this cataclysm, the magnitude and 
horror of which no one could foresee. 
A debate on the Government's Amending bill was scheduled for 
July 31, but Asquith and Law agreed that, due to the international crisis 
and the need for national unity, consideration of the Amending bill should 
be postponed indefinitely by the Commons. 131 On August 3, 1914, Sir 
Edward Grey announced to the Commons that Britain had given an ultimatum 
to Germany in regard to Belgian neutrality. At the end of his long speech, 
Grey optimistically remarked that the "one bright spot in the whole of 
132 this terrible situation is Ireland." John Redmond was so moved by 
Grey's remark that he told the House that Ireland would stand by Britain 
in this hour of crisis and that Nationalist Catholics would unite with 
their Protestant brothers in Ulster to defend Ireland's shores. Redmond's 
emotional speech won a standing ovation from the entire House, including 
1 . u . ' . b h 133 tle nionist enc es. 
Britain's entry into the War caused all other issues to recede in 
importance. Home Rule was certainly too controversial a subject to be 
dealt with during the life-and-death struggle with the Central Powers. 
Therefore, on September 15, 1914, Asquith introduced the Suspensory Act, 
which allowed Home Rule for Ireland to become law but suspended its 
operation for a minimum period of twelve months; if the war was still in 
progress at the end of that time, an order in council would set a date 
"not later than the duration of the War," at which time the thorny problem 
131
oxford and Asquith, Fifty Years.£.!. British Parliament, II, 176; 
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of Ulster could be settled. The Suspensory Act was hastily passed by 
both Houses and, on September 18, both the Home Rule bill and the Suspen-
sory Act received the Royal assent. 134 
Thus, as one historian wrote, the Irish question was "bundled into 
cold storage .••. When the issue was next exposed to view at Easter, 
1916, the freezing plant was shown to be disappointingly ineffective. The 
maggots. had been hard at work. 11135 
134Ibid., LXVI, 882-890, 920, 1018; Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
1914, 5th Series, XVII, 732, 741-742. 
135Jenkins, Asquith, 323. 
III 
A TERRIBLE BEAUTY 
(1) 
When Britain went to war in August 1914, Churchill used Smith as 
an intermediary with the Unionist leaders to discuss the possibility of 
~nrming a coalition ministry. Certain Liberals with pacifistic convictions, 
irnch as Lord Morley, were resigning from the Government, and Churchill 
wanted to form a broadly based ministry which would have overwhelming sup-
port in Parliament and which would prosecute the war with utmost vigor. 
Smith was in complete agreement with Churchill's views, and, in a meeting 
with Law, Carson, and "Max" Aitken, he asked them to consider forming a 
~ipartisan government. Although Law refused to join forces with the 
Liberals, saying that he did not trust Churchill, he indicated a willing-
' l' 1 ness to support the Government s war po icy. 
Smith; however, did join the Government. Within days of Britain's 
declaration of war, Smith accepted his first governmental post--Director 
of the Press Bureau. His task was, in Lord Kitchener's words, to make sure 
2 
that "nothing dangerous goes into the newspapers." Assisted by a small 
staff,. Smith work):~d in »whiit Lord Riddell described as a· "rat-infested · 
12nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. E., 241; A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook 
(New York, 1972), 83-84. 
2Baron Riddell,~ Riddell's War Diary_,~-~ (London, 1933), 9. 
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building in Whitehall, 113 attempting to edit news dispatches from the war 
front. In accepting such a minor, thankless position, Smith was making a 
genuine effort to achieve national unity and to realize the ideal of a 
coalition government, which he had favored since 1910. Another demonstra-
tion of bipartisan spirit came in September when Smith accompanied 
Churchill to Liverpool for a war rally. Smith and Churchill, together 
with Archibald Salvidge and T. P. O'Connor, an Irish Nationalist M. P., 
urged support for the war against Germany. This rally was designed to 
show that support for the war cut across party lines, even on the issue 
4 
of Ireland. 
Smith's romance with the Liberal Government soured rapidly, 
however, as his new post became increasingly unbearable. He was forced to 
c·arry out policies which he had no voice in formulating, and he found 
~imself accused by the press of heavy-handed censorship and accused by 
military and Government officials of laxity in allowing information to 
b~come public. In addition, Smith was undoubtedly aware of his delicate 
political situation: He was the only Unionist in a Liberal Government, 
and he feared cutting himself off from the Unionist backbenchers--his 
source of political strength--and being used by Liberals as a lightning 
rod for criticism. Consequently, he resigned from the Press Bureau at 
the end of September and went into the military. Since he held a reserve 
commission in the Queen's Own Oxfordshire Hussars, Smith requested that 
his commission be activated and, when his request was approved, went to 
France where he served as an intelligence officer with the Indian Corps. 
3 Ibid., 10. · 
4salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, 138. 
Major Smith remained in France until the political crisis of May 1915 
necessitated his return to London. 5 
The political crisis had been prompted by the failure of the 
86 
Dardanelles expedition, an attempt to open a new front against the Central 
Powers and, hopefully, shorten the stalemate in France that had already 
become a war of attrition, producing staggering casualties on both sides. 
Deciding to bolster support for his Government by putting it on a biparti-
san basis, Asquith formed a coalition with Bonar Law, who was now ready to 
accept what he had rejected the previous August. Law, however, gave 
Asquith two absolute conditions for Unionist participation in the Govern-
merit: The dismissal from the Cabinet of Churchill, who was despised by 
most Unionists and blamed for the Dardanelles fiasco, and Viscount Haldane, 
6 
who was alleged to be sympathetic to Germany. Asquith consented to those 
conditions, and the two men were sacked; it appeared that Churchill's 
caieer was ruined, that he had followed the same route as his father--
the brilliant promise of youth destroyed by recklessness, impulsiveness, 
and overweening ambition. 
The formation of the coalition Government brought many Unionists 
and even some Labourites into office. Law took the Colonial Office, 
Austen Chamberlain went to the India Office, Balfour came out of retire-
ment to become First Lord of the Admiralty, and Carson became Attorney-
General. Through Law's influence, Smith secured the post of Solicitor-
. ' 7 
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consolation, he was knighted. 8 Smith's tenure as Solicitor-General lasted 
less than six months because Carson resigned his post at the end of October, 
and Smith was chosen to replace him. Thus, on November 4, 1915, F. E. 
Smith--or Sir Frederick Smith, as he was now known--became Attorney-General 
with full Cabinet rank. 9 
The prodigious energy which Smith had previously spent on his law 
practice and his private dissipations was now devoted to the enormous 
amount of work which his job involved. The primary functions of the 
Attorney-General were to advise the Cabinet on matters of English law and 
international law that affected Parliamentary legislation and to act as 
the Crown prosecutor in state trials. However, the war had expanded the 
powers and controls of the state to an unprecedented degree, and the 
Attorney-General had to consider the constitutionality of a veritable 
flood of legislation from Parliament: The Defense of the Realm Acts (D. 
O. R. A.); the laws involving conscription, espionage, and the confiscation 
of property; and the numerous regulations involving industry and labor. 
Furthermore, the Attorney-General was concerned with cases before the 
Prize Court, regarding goods and contraband seized on the seas, and he 
made the final decision on appeals in court-martial cases, which, in light 
of the massive expansion of the armed forces, was almost a full-time job 
in itself. No Att~rney-General in British history had ever been given so 
much responsibility, and Smith discharged his duties admirably. He had a 
8camp. The Glittering Prizes, 93. 
9 . 
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remarkable capacity for work and proved to be a superb administrator, 
displaying keen discernment in choosing subordinates and delegating 
authority. Smith demanded long hours and competent work from his subor-
dinates, but he took full responsibility for all work in his department 
and vigorously defended his men from attack by other officials, thereby 
giving his department an esprit de corps which very few other branches of 
10 Government could match. 
Smith's performances at Cabinet meetings was equally impressive. 
Many of his Cabinet colleagues, who knew of Smith only as a firebrand and 
a profligate, were astonished at the logic and moderation of his advice. 
Churchill later described Smith's effectiveness in Cabinet sessions. 
He was a singularly silent member. He had acquired in the 
legal profession the habit of listening mute and motionless 
hour after hour, and he rarely spoke until his counsel was 
sought. Then his manner was so quiet, so reasonable, so 
matter-of-fact and sensible that you could feel opinion 
being changed.11 
The friendship between Smith and Churchill continued as before, 
even though Churchill was in political disgrace. While Churchill was 
licking his wounds and waiting for the most propitious moment to make his 
"comeback," he relied upon Smith to keep him informed of Government busi-
ness and political gossip and to "represent his interests" within the inner 
12 
circles of the Government. 
In December 1916, there was another political upheaval when Lloyd 
George and Bonar Law forced Asquith out of office. The war had not been 
·.! 
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going well for Britain, and, in fact, 1916 had been the worst year of the 
war. Britain suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties in the Somme 
River campaign, and despite the endless suffering, there was no hope for 
a settlement to the war. In his candid memoirs, Lloyd George wrote that 
"Asquith's will became visibly flabbier," and he referred to Asquith's 
"lack of initiative and drive, his inability to apprehend the importance 
of time in a crisis." Asquith had been Prime Minister for a longer 
period of time than any other man since Lord Liverpool in the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century, and it is possible that he was simply exhausted; 
Lloyd George also pointed out that the death of Asquith's eldest son in the 
war was a terrible blow to the Prime Minister. 13 Regardless of compassion 
for Asquith's· personal problems, Lloyd George and Law felt that, unless 
Britain had more dynami.c leadership, Germany would win the war--hence, 
Asquith was ousted from power when he refused Lloyd George's demand for a 
new direction in Britain's war policy. The ouster of Asquith split the 
Liberal Party irrevocably into Asquith and Lloyd George factions, and many 
prominent Liberals resigned from the Government, forcing Lloyd George to 
rely primarily on Unionist support. Lloyd George became Prime Minister, 
Law became Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the Commons, and 
Balfour took the Foreign Office after Grey resigned. 
These events had no marked effect on Smith, for his position 
remained the same. He served as Attorney-General for the rest of the war 
and, though he took little part in formulating military strategy or 
•'· 
·diplomatic policy,., receive~ recogni t~?n as an excellent Attorney-Gener at. 
13navi,d Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II 
(Boston, 1933), 411, 419. 
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Indeed, after the war, Lloyd George remarked that Smith had the only depart-
ment in the British Government which never wasted any of the War Cabinet's 
. 14 time. 
(2) 
Much to Britain's dismay, the Irish question did not disappear in 
August 1914. As always, when the British were engaged in war, the Irish 
became restless. Before the war, the British had been mainly concerned 
with the potential violence of the Ulster Protestants; after August 1914, 
it was Catholic Ireland which worried the Government. 
A leading historian of modern Ireland has written that the Parlia-
mentary tactics of Redmond's Irish Nationalist Party were on trial in the 
1912-14 period. .Arthur Griffith, the leader of the militant Sinn Fein 
movement, wrote that, if Redmond failed to secure Home Rule, the Parlia-
·mentary party should "leave the stage to those who are in earnest. 1115 
The frustrated anger of Irish Catholics was certainly understandable. For 
decades, the Tories and the Unionists had prevented Home Rule by their 
domination of Parliament; but, as Churchill pointed out in his Bradford 
speech in 1914, when control of Parliament was secured by the Liberals 
and the Irish Nationalists, the Unionists--the party of "law and order"--
resorted to illegal street tactics and threats of civil war to defy 
Parliament and block Home Rule. The inequity of this situation and 
example of the Ulster Volunteers led to the formation of the Irish 
Volunteers in November 1913 to insure Irish self-government. Among 
I 
Catholics who joined the Irish Volunteers was a young 
14camp, The Glittering Prizes, 105. 
15Macardle, ~ ~ Republic, 81. 
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Eamon de Valera, who was convinced that Irish self-rule would be achieved 
16 
"not by ballots but by bullets." Men like de Valera had their opinions 
confirmed when the Government was humiliated by the Curragh incident. It 
appeared that the Government either could not or would not enforce Home 
17 Rule in the face of Unionist opposition and Army pressure. 
Irish Catholics were outraged by an incident which occurred in 
the stnnmer of 1914. On July 26, the Irish Volunteers smuggled German 
guns into Ireland at Howth, near Dublin. Dublin police and British troops 
rushed to the scene when news of the event spread to the city, but most 
of the Volunteers had disappeared with their rifles by the time the 
authorities arrived. When the British soldiers were marching back to 
their post, a crowd in the Bachelor's Walk section of Dublin jeered and 
stoned the soldiers, some of whom fired into the crowd, killing three 
.people and wounding dozens. A wave of revulsion swept over Catholic 
Ireland as the Bachelor's Walk massacre was compared to the gun-running 
episode at Larne in April, when the British Government and Army looked 
the other way at the smuggling of weapons by Ulster Protestants. The 
Army regiment which had been involved in the shooting was transferred, 
18 but no disciplinary action was taken. 
One week after the Bachelor's Walk incident, Britain went to war 
against Germany, and by giving blind support to the British, Redmond 
h N . l" 19 forfeited his claim to Iris ationa ism. Redmond had alienated many 
l6Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera (Boston, 
1971), 19-20. 
17Macardle, The Irish Republic, 104. 
18 Ibid. , ll4-115·. 
19Patrick Sarsfield O'Hegarty, ! History of Ireland Under the 
Union, 1801 to 1922 (London, 1952), 683-686. 
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nationalists by acquiescing in the Amending bill (March 1914) and then 
the Suspensory Act. By acting as a "recruiting sergeant" for the British 
Army, he provoked a reaction from many nationalists which was best 
expressed by Arthur Griffith, who wrote: "Ireland is not at war with 
Germany. . We are Irish nationalists and the only duty we can have is 
to stand for Ireland's interests. 112° Control of the Irish Volunteers was 
another bone of contention between Redmond and the more militant national-
ists. Redmond had been apprehensive of the Volunteers since their forma-
tion, regarding the organization as a threat to his leadership; and, by his 
efforts to exert control over it, he split the nationalist movement. 
Redmond proceeded to form his own organization, the National Volunteers, 
while the Irish Volunteers came to be dominated by Sinn Fein. 21 
Sinn Fein appealed to a more emotiona~ indigenous nationalism than 
did Redmond with his sense of Parliamentary tradition and his respect, 
and even affection, for Westminster. Sinn Fein evoked Ireland's unique 
Celtic heritage and ancient Gaelic language; the very name Sinn Fein is 
Gaelic for "ourselves alone." Lloyd George later wrote that suspending 
Home Rule in September 1914 had been a mistake because it aided the 
cause of the Irish extremists: Catholic Ireland, "seeing its hopes 
dashed at the moment when they were about to be realised at first sulked 
in resentment and soon became a mass of seething disaffection. 1122 
Despite the activity in the nationalist ranks, more than 200,000 
Irishmen enlisted in the British Army. Yet, even then, Irish Catholics 
,. 
· 20Macardle. The lrish Republic, p6, 119 . 
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in the Army were subjected to endless discrimination and harassment. They 
had to serve under the Union Jack and with British officers, while Ulster 
Protestants were allowed to have their own banners and officers, and the 
Army made it almost impossible for Irish Catholics to receive commissions. 23 
Enlistments in Ireland gradually declined as more and more Irish patriots 
drifted into the Irish Volunteers. Money and arms were sent to the 
Volunteers from sympathetic Irish-Americans in the United States, 24 and 
the extremists were given further encouragement by the formation of the 
coalition Government in May 1915, when men like Bonar Law, Sir Edward 
.·Carson, and "Galloper" Smith were given positions of authority. The 
entry into the Government of these Orange agitators had a great impact in 
Ire land, and Birrell, the Chief Secretary, later wrote: "It is impossible 
to describe or overestimate the effect of this in Ireland •.•. This step 
. R 1 ,.25 seemed to make an end of Horne u e. 
The British Government did not help matters by stringently 
applying D. O. R. A. to Ireland in an effort to suppress dissent, national-
. bl" . d II • B . . h". . t. 26 1st pu 1cat1ons, an anti- ritis organiza ions. By the summer of 
1915, the Irish Volunteers, under Sinn Fein direction, were openly march-
ing ~nd drilling with their weapons through the streets of Dublin. The 
Volunteers collected money from Irish Catholics to buy arms and ammunition; 
and~ increasingly, juries refused to convict persons brought to trial 
under D. O. R. A. Dublin Castle was aware of the growing militancy of 
23Macardle, ~~Republic, 121. 
24Ibid., 126, 13L;l32. 
25Ibid., 133. 
26rbid., 125-126, 134. 
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the Irish Volunteers but feared to take action lest such oppression 
increase Irish sympathy for the Volunteers and Sinn Fein. 27 London was 
also aware of Sinn Fein's increasing influence, but it feared alienating 
Irish-American opinion, and Britain wanted to stay on good terms with the 
United States, for the British desperately hoped to bring American manpower, 
28 industry, and economic resources into the balance against Germany. 
Events in Ireland were rapidly approaching a climax in 1915-16. 
As early as August 1914, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I. R. B.), a 
republican cell within the Irish Volunteers, had decided that "there must 
29 be an Irish insurrection before the end of England's war." Extremists 
in the I. R. B. and Sinn Fein planned an uprising against British authority 
on Easter Sunday, 1916. The plan was to attack Dublin Castle and other 
Crown installations and to establish the provisional government of Ireland; 
military operations were to be initiated in the provinces but the major 
effort was to be in Dublin. 30 The militant leaders felt a sense of urgency 
in making their plans because they feared that if they did not strike, 
public interest in the nationalist movement would turn to apathy, and 
British intelligence would disrupt their organization and imprison them. 31 
However, their plans were thrown awry by the seizure of a crucial arms 
shipment from Germany on Thursday, April 20, by a British naval patrol, 
27 Ibid., 134, 137-138. 
2811oyd Georg~, War Memoirs, II, 146-147. 
29 Charles Duff, Six Days to Shake ~ Empire:: Events and Fac'tors 
Behind the Irish Rebellion of 1916 (South Brunswick, N. J., 1967), 78. 
30 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 155. 
31 Ibid., 145. 
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and the capture of Sir Roger Casement, the leading Irish emissary to 
Germany, by Crown officials on the following morning. 32 
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Nevertheless, the Irish insurgents decided to strike on Monday, 
April 24. On Easter Monday, most civil servants and military officials 
would have a holiday, the banks would be closed, and the police would only 
be partially staffed. 33 The insurgents knew that their efforts were doomed, 
but they had long believed that, even if the uprising failed, it was neces-
sary to give the Irish cause a "blood sacrifice" and establish Ireland as 
34 
a belligerent power to be treated accordingly in any post-war settlement. 
On Monday morning, the Volunteers launched their attacks. They failed to 
take Dublin Castle, but they did capture the Four Courts, the General Post 
Office, and the Dublin railway stations, as barricades were thrown up 
throughout Dublin and the Irish republic was proclaimed. 35 By the end of 
the first day, the rebels had brought Dublin to a stands ti 11, having 
disrupted the postal service, the supply of food and milk into the city, 
36 
and Dublin's communications with the outside world. 
Inevitably, the British counterattack came, ending the momentary 
euphoria of the rebels. The British Government thought that the Dublin 
uprising was in conjunction with a German military operation, and, thus, 
a large number of British troops poured into Ireland. 37 The alertness and 
' . 
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32 Ibid., 158-159. 
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tough efficiency of the Royal Irish Constabulary (R. I. C.) kept the 
. 1 . . th . b 1 . 38 vio ence in e provinces to an a so ute minimum. Most of the Irish 
units surrendered on April 29, and the British began mopping-up operations. 
The Easter rebellion had caused casualties estimated at 3,000 people, 
. 1 d. . . l' 39 inc u ing civi ians. 
The insurgents had grievously miscalculated the effect that the 
uprising would have on Irish opinion. Many who looked favorably upon the 
nationalist movement were horrified by the bloodshed, the killing of 
innocent civilians, and the reduction of many sections of Dublin to ruins; 
the rebels were viewed as fanatical troublemakers and German dupes. Irish 
women had given food and drink to the British soldiers and a number of 
Irishmen had volunteered to help the authorities maintain order. When 
40 
the.rebels were led to jail, they had been cursed by Irish crowds. As 
one historian has written: "If the Government had shown a politic 
clemency at this crisis the Rising might indeed have failed. 1141 
The British, however, employed that maladroit touch which they 
always displayed when dealing with the Irish--they decided on a policy of 
reprisals. In fact, the initial reaction of the Dublin Castle administra-
tion was delight because the uprising gave the authorities a long-awaited 
F . 42 excuse to crack down on Sinn ein. Dublin was placed under martial law; 
3,500 people were arrested, 170 were deported to England for imprisonment, 
38Macardle, ~ Irish 
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and many were sentenced to hard labor in penal institutions. Most shock-
43 ingly, fourteen leaders were tried by British courts-martial and executed. 
One of the unit commanders of the Volunteers, Eamon de Valera, was spared 
death because he was born in New York, and the British were not sure 
h th h Am • • • 44 w e er e was an erican citizen. 
This rough British policy completely changed the mood of the Irish 
populace and transformed the insurgents into martyrs and heroes. When 
Irish prisoners were being taken to ships that would transport them to 
England, they were stunned to see crowds cheer and bless them when only a 
45 few weeks earlier they had been cursed--this was the "turning of the tide." 
The Attorney-General, Sir Frederick Smith, was deeply involved in the 
aftermath of the Easter rebellion, for he was, to a large degree, respon-
sible for the execution of the most famous of the Irish martyrs, Sir Roger 
Casement. 
The Easter rebellion hardened and purified Irish Catholic national-
ism, and it was this feeling, both ugly and sublime, to which the poet 
Yeats referred when he wrote: "A terrible beauty is born" (Easter 1916). 
(3) 
Sir Roger Casement, unlike the other Irish martyrs, was an inter-
nationally respected figure. He had served with distinction for many 
years in the British diplomatic corps, and his activities in exposing the 
brutal exploitation of the natives in the Belgian Congo and on the rubber 
43 . 
Macardle, The Irish Republic, 181 ff. 
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plantations of South America had earned him widespread acclaim--and a 
knighthood in 1911. Poor health led Casement to retire from Government 
service, and, in his retirement, he became deeply involved in the cause 
of Irish independence. 
When the war in Europe began, Casement went to Germany, hoping to 
secure German aid for the Irish Volunteers, in the form of arms, ammunition, 
and even an expedition of German troops to fight the British. He also 
hoped to form an "Irish Brigade" from the ranks of Irish prisoners of war 
who were captured by the Germans while in the British Army. Casement 
remained in Germany until the spring of 1916, his efforts having been a 
dismal failure. He had managed to recruit only fifty-two Irishmen for his 
·Brigade, and his constant entreaties in Berlin had produced only marginal 
German aid for Ireland. Indeed, it is generally believed that Casement 
returned to Ireland in April 1916 to persuade the Volunteers to cancel the 
revol_t, as very little support would be forthcoming from the Germans. 46 
Because of his reputation, Casement was not summarily executed by the 
British military but was transported to England to stand trial. In May, 
Casement was indicted by a grand jury (jury of presentment) on a charge 
of high treason, and on June 26, Casement's trial began at the Royal 
Courts of Justice in London, with Lord Reading, the Lord Chief Justice of 
England, as the presiding judge. As this was a state trial, the Crown 
prosecutor was the Attorney-General, Sir Frederick Smith. The Casement 
trial was easily the mos~ celebrated case in which Smith was inyolved as 
·Attorney-General; and th~ grim irony of a •genuine idealist -like Casement· 
46 Ibid., 149-152. 
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being prosecuted for sedition by "Galloper" Smith was noted indignantly 
b I . h . 1. 47 y ris nationa ists. 
In his opening remarks to the court, Smith said that the "charge 
upon which the prisoner is arraigned is a grave one. The law knows none 
graver." Smith described Casement as a loyal, trusted, and honored 
servant of the Crown in peacetime who betrayed the Crown in time of war. 
Outlining the state's case against the defendant, Smith emphasized 
Casement's attempts to lure Irish prisoners into fighting against Britain 
and the German reprisals against those who refused to listen to him and, 
because of a German code found on Casement's person when he was arrested, 
connected him with the abortive Easter uprising. Smith concluded his 
opening remarks with this blunt statement: 
The prisoner, blinded by a hatred to this country, as 
malignant in quality as it was sudden in origin, has 
played a desperate hazard. He has played it and he has 
lost it. Today the forfeit is claimed. 48 
After the Government had presented its evidence, the defense 
counsel, Serjeant Alexander Sullivan of Dublin, moved to dismiss the 
charge against Casement. The defense contended that the law under which 
Casement was being tried did not apply in this case. The treason statute 
o{ 1351 was interpreted by Sullivan to apply only to seditious acts 
committed within the realm of England. Therefore, Casement could not be 
49 
tried for acts alleged to have been committed in Germany. It is 
difficult to believe that Sullivan actually thought that this extraordinary 
47 Ibid.,' 197. 
•. 
, ~ 48H. Montgomery Hyde," ed-., · Triai Of Str Roger Casement (London, 
1960), 7-15. 
49w. de Bracy Herbert, ed., Cox's Reports of Cases in Criminal 
~' XXV (London, 1919), 483-485. 
100 
interpretation of the law would sway the court. At any rate, Smith quickly 
punctured the defense argument by stating that, while crime is usually con-
sidered to be local in character, this is not true in the case of treason 
because allegiance to the sovereign was a binding, personal tie which the 
subject carried with him wherever he went. 50 Moreover, the Government had 
done its legal research more thoroughly than the defense, for the Government 
was able to produce a statute from the reign of Henry VIII which specifically 
provided for treason outside of the realm. The Bench denied the defense 
. h h . d. . c 51 motion to quas t e in ictment against asement. 
The only witness which the·defense could produce to offset the 
Government's evidence was Casement himself, and the defense lawyers obviously 
doubted Casement's ability to withstand Smith's cross-examination since 
they declined to present any case, on the theory that the prosecution had 
failed to substantiate its charges. Both sides then made their closing 
statements to the jury. Sullivan argued that Casement had not engaged in 
seditious activities but had only been acting as an Irish patriot. Again 
splitting semantic hairs, Sullivan contended that Casement had merely 
urged Irish prisoners to fight for Ireland, not against Britain, and he 
stated that Casement had been unaware of any reprisals which had been 
taken against those prisoners who refused to join the Irish Brigade. 
Sullivan compared Casement's activities to those of Sir Edward Carson in 
forming the Ulster Volunteers and said that Casement only wanted to 
insure that Home Rule was carried out. 52 So wrought up was Sullivan by 
his endeavors that he suffered an emotional collapse in the courtroom, 
SOibid., 489-492. 
Sllbid., 493-498. 
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stammering to the court that he could no longer continue. 53 
In giving the Crown's concluding statement, Smith's technical 
brilliance as a barrister was never shown to greater advantage. Speaking 
without notes, Smith, with disarming frankness, conceded the validity of 
Sullivan's comparison of the Irish Brigade to the Ulster Volunteers, and 
he said that, in normal times, Casement would win a great deal of under-
standing for his activities, and certainly, a court would show a large 
degree of clemency, if not grant an acquital. However, Smith went on to 
say that this was not a normal period in the nation's history but a time 
of war, and the inescapable fact was that Casement had actively and 
consciously collaborated with Germany, the enemy nation which was trying 
to destroy Britain and her Empire. Smith then put a series of loaded 
questions to the jury which left the defense argument in ruins: If 
Casement was just a simple Irish patriot, why did he feel compelled to go 
to Germany to form his Irish Brigade when there was an abundance of able-
·bodied men in Ireland? Why was such a simple, ordinary Irish patriot 
given privileged treatment by the German government for more than a year? 
Was the German government so benevolent and altruistic that.it was merely 
interested in securing an efficacious Home Rule settlement for Ireland? 
Why did Casement have a code worked out with the Germans? Was it mere 
coincidence that Casement's return to Ireland occurred at the same time 
that a German arms shipment arrived and the Easter rebellion took place? 
. . 
. d . 1. d. . t 54 
.The answer to these questions po1nte in on y one 1rect1on-- reason. 
55 The jury found Casement gpilty· as charged. Casement's statement 
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before sentence was pronounced was a lengthy dissertation on the nature 
of Irish nationalism. The most dramatic moment of the trial came when 
Casement contrasted his behavior with the Unionist politicians who had 
led the Ulster revolt. Speaking directly to Smith, Casement said that 
the "difference between us was that the Unionist champions chose a path 
they felt would lead to the Woolsack; while I went a road I knew must lead 
to the dock." He stated further, 111 am prouder to stand here today in the 
traitor's dock to answer this impeachment than to fill the place of my 
right honourable accusers. 1156 At this denunciation, Smith smiled and 
muttered aloud to one of his assistants, "Change places with him? Nothing 
doing!" Contemptuously, Smith rose and sauntered out of the courtroom 
with his hands in his pockets. 57 Smith was absent when Casement concluded 
his statement by saying that his only crime was to love Ireland more than 
58 England; Casement was then sentenced to be hanged. 
Casement's lawyers wanted to appeal to the House of Lords, but 
under English law, the Attorney-General has the power to decide which 
cases shall be appealed to the Lords, and Smith, to the undying enmity of 
Casement's sympathizers, refused to allow the appeal. Smith later wrote 
that the legal basis of the defense appeal--the interpretation of the 1351 
treason statute--had no merit: "I had throughout argued that there was 
no substance in the point raised by the defence. It would have been easy 
to have consented, but that would have been a negation of my duty. 1159 
56rb.ld ~ :, >zoJ-20·4: ' 
5 71 bid. , c v. 
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The defense then took it's case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which heard 
the defense arguments on July 17. Casement's lawyers tried to persuade 
the appellate court that the 1351 statute could not be interpreted to 
cover treason "without the realm," and since Casement was indicted under 
that statute, the case against him was invalid. 60 As anticipated, the 
appellate court rejected the argument on July 18 and upheld the convic-
tion and death sentence of Casement.~ 1 
The only hope which remained for Casement was that the Home 
Secretary, Herbert Samuel, would recommend that the King commute the 
death sen.terice to life imprisonment. Samuel, however, dumped the case 
into the Cabinet's lap. The Cabinet wanted to reprieve Casement out of 
fear of making him a martyr and inflaming the Irish. 62 The British, in 
addition, vastly overestimated the influence of Irish-Americans on the 
United States·government, and the ambassador in Washington warned that 
Casement's execution would c~use an anti-British "backlash" in America. 63 . 
There was also pressure .within Britain for Casement's reprieve. A large 
segment of the· intellectual community favored clemency .for Casement, 
including George Bernard Shaw, Arthur Conan Doyle, Arnold Bennett, John 
Galsworthy, G. K. Cheste;ton, G. P. Gooch, John. Masefield, and Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb. 64 The Cabinet met on three occasions to discuss 
60Herman Cohen, ed., The Criminal Appeal Reports, XII (London, 
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Casement, and it was felt that only a certificate of insanity would 
constitute legitimate grounds for a reprieve. Therefore, Casement's 
notorious "black diaries," with their lurid, homosexual passages, were 
given to a psychiatrist for analysis, but the analyst said that Casement's 
diaries indicated only that he was abnormal, not insane. 65 Finally, the 
factor which weighed most heavily on the minds of the Cabinet members was 
the harsh treatment which the Germans had given to the Irish prisoners who 
had rejected Casement's appeals to join the Irish Brigade. 66 The Cabinet 
unanimously decided against a reprieve, and Casement was hanged on August 3, 
1916, at Pentonville Gao1. 67 
To the many people who have believed in Roger Casement's innocence 
and idealist1c heroism, Smith is the arch-ogre of the affair. There are 
usually any of three charges leveled against Smith by Casement partisans: 
Casem_ent' s "black diaries" were forged, and Smith either was responsible 
for th2 forgery or knew about it; Smi t.h tried to demoralize Casement's 
lawyers by .giving them copies of the forgeries; and Smith leaked passages 
from the diaries to. the press in order to prejudice the public against 
- . 68 Casement. . 
As to the charge that the "black diaries" were forged, Casement's 
lawyer, Sullivan, gave an interview many years later in which he said 
that Casement had admitted to him that he was a homosexual. Casement had 
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told him that homosexuality was the true hallmark of genius and invited 
him to list for the court all of the brilliant figures of history who had 
been homosexual--as Sullivan recalled, Casement "was not a bit ashamed."69 
Another person who attested to the authenticity of the diaries was Sir 
John Harris, the secretary of an anti-slavery organization called the 
Aborigines Protection Society, who read the diaries at the behest of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, who was considering signing the petition for 
clemency for Casement. Harris was convinced from the outset that the 
diaries were forged: He had worked with Casement in Africa and had never 
observed any sign of perversion. It was in this skeptical frame of mind 
that he read the diaries, and to his utter amazement, he discovered that 
passages "dealt with places and incidents in the Congo which would have 
been known only to Casement and Harris himself; so that it could not be 
. . ,JO an ·invention • Further corroboration came from none other than Michael 
. · . 
Collins; the Irish military leader. Collins was in London in 1921 for 
the treaty negotfations and asked the Cabinet for permission to look at 
the diaries. Colli.ns had known Casement and was familiar with Casement 1 s 
handwriting and manner of expressing himself; after reading the diaries, 
Collins regretfully stated his opinion that they were genuine. 
71 
If the 
"black diaries" were forged, the forger, in a very short period_ of time, 
would have had to have mastered Casement's handwriting and speech patterns 
.. ; /,-
69 -· 1 c t., Rene MacCol , Roger asemen : A New Judgment (New York, 1957), 
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and to have acquired an exact knowledge of the most minute details of 
Casement's life. 72 
106 
The accusation that Smith sought to demoralize the defense lawyers 
by showing them the diaries is easily refuted. Sullivan's assistant, 
Artemus Jones, later stated that Smith had given the defense lawyers a 
copy of the diaries in the event that they desired to plead guilt due to 
. . 73 Of insanity. course, homosexuality is not, ipso facto, evidence of 
insanity, but Government officials felt that Casement's diaries contained 
passages which were so graphically and rhapsodically obscene that only a 
sick mind could have been responsible for them. Even Casement's staunchest 
defenders concede that his arduous years in the tropics may have affected 
74 his personality and mental soundness. The position of the Government, 
as expressed privately to Casement's lawyers by Smith, was that, if the 
defensewould introduce the diaries into evidence and plead mental incompe..: 
tence, th.e Crown would accept a plea of guilt due to insanity and would 
75 grant clemency after judgment was passed. Since the diaries had no 
bearing on the treason. charge against Casement, the prosecution could not 
introduce them into evide.nce, and hence, Smith strenuously urged Sullivan 
. 76 to do so and enter an insanity plea. The Government was extremely 
reluctant to execute Casement, due to the possible effect on public opinion 
72For the most detailed defense of Casement's innocence in re_ga:r:d 
to the diaries, see: Herbert o. Mackey, Roger Casement: The Forged 
Diaries (London, 1.966) •• 
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in Ireland and the United States, and this would account for Smith's 
repeated efforts to influence Casement's lawyers. 
Sullivan knew that Casement would never agree to an insanity plea. 
On the contrary, Casement was seemingly proud of his homosexuality; 
Sullivan said that Casement "took up the attitude that we pigmies could 
not understand the conduct of great men and had no right to pass judgment 
. "77 s· c 1 on it. ince asement wou d not plead insanity, Sullivan correctly 
declined to offer the diaries into evidence, for it would have served no 
purpose but to alienate the jury and, as Sullivan said, would only have 
78 
"dirtied the man." Nevertheless, after the trial, Sullivan sent a note 
to Smith, expressing "my appreciation of the kindness and consideration 
accorded to me throughout the Casement trial by yourself and your col-
79 leagues." It is hardly likely that Sullivan would have written such a note 
had Smith subjected him to ruthless, "demoralizing" pressure. 
Smith has also been suspected of making portions of the diaries 
available for public consumption, in order to inflame public opinion to such 
an extent that Casement would be unable to receive a fair trial. Smith's 
son has countered this accusation by producing correspondence between 
Smith and Sir Edward Grey in June 1916. Smith wrote to Grey, saying that 
he was disturbed by rumors that officials in the Foreign Office were 
circulating copies of the diaries to various people outside of the Govern-
ment, and Smith called such a policy "a ghoulish proposal." Grey replied 
to Smith by saying that the Foreign Office would not engage in such 
77 Hyde, eq., T:r:ial of Sir Ro9er .Casement, lxx n~ 
t ·i. 
78 . 
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activities. ne istorian traced the leaks to Basil Thompson, the 
Assistant Commissioner of Police at Scotland Yard, who had custody of 
Casement's personal effects after his arrest. 81 However, the Cabinet 
may have decided later to sanction deliberate disclosures to selected, 
influential people. In a conversation with the American ambassador, 
Walter Hines Page, in the surmner of 1916, Prime Minister Asquith asked 
if Page had seen passages from the diaries. When Page replied in the 
affirmative, Asquith said: "Excellent, and you need not be particular 
82 
about keeping it to yourself." 
108 
The Prime Minister's statement indicates a high-level Government 
decision to discredit Casement. Indeed, it is only logical that the 
Gov.ernment would attempt to prevent Casement from becoming a martyr after 
his appeal had failed and the Cabinet had made its final decision to 
execute him. Perhaps such a cours~ was not entirely.scrupulous, but it 
should be remembered that Britain was engaged in a war that was going 
quite badly.at the time and that, from the British point of view, the 
individual in question was a sexual pervert and a traitor who had, 
directly or indirectly, caused the suffering of Irish prisoners of war 
who had remained loyal to Britain. If there was a deliberate campaign 
by the Government· to destroy Casement 1 s reputation, Smith was only as 
culpable as any. other member of the Cabinet. 
In the winter of 1917-18, Smith visited North America on behalf 
80
rbid., 308. 
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of the British Government, touring the United States on a goodwill, 
speechmaking trip. He became further entangled in the controversy 
surrounding the Casement affair with an interview given to a Boston Post 
reporter in January 1918. In this interview, Smith was quoted as saying 
that he had been "delighted" by the execution of Casement and that he had 
threatened to resign from the Cabinet unless Casement was hanged. 83 Smith 
vehemently disavowed this interview, charging that the reporter had 
distorted his remarks, but Casement's supporters seized upon the interview 
as proof of the villainous role which Smith had played in the Casement 
affair. Smith's biographer, William Camp, wrote that this interview was 
probably reported accurately, that Smith had been nettled by criticism 
from Irish-Americans and decided to infuriate them with calculatedly 
cynical remarks--an example of Smith's streak of perversity, a delight in 
h k . ' 1 84 s.oc ing peop e. Regardless of this interview, it is clear that the 
Cabinet and Smith sought to avoid the execution of Casement, if only for 
political reasons. 
On the whole, Smith's conduct throughout the Casement affair, 
while open to .legitimate criticsm, was honorable and aboveboard. For 
example, one of Smith's assistants, Travers Humphreys, afterwards described 
the circumstances surrounding Smith's refusal to allow Casement's appeal 
to the House of Lords. Humphreys recalled that Smith had invited his 
assistants and members of his legal staff, ~ncluding the Solici tor-.General, 
into his office and had asked each man to state his opinion on the. matter 
l ' ' 
: ! 
:,.,.>I 
E~th of th,~ ro't;n ·.s,aid that Casemen.t' 3· app~al had r{o ' .. 
'of Casement Is appeal~ 
83 7 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 19 n. 
84camp, The Glittering Prizes, 110. 
legal merit and should be rejected. Smith then told his subordinates: 
My clerk has already received my refusal in writing, which 
would have gone out whatever your views had been. I am 
gratified to know that you all agree, but I was not going 
to have it said in the House of Corrnnons that any of you 
were re~ponsible for the decision. I can now say as I 
always intended to say, that the decision was mine alone , 
but I shall add that having consulted you afterwards you 
were all of the same mind. 
no 
Humphreys added: "Loyal to his juniors as through life he was loyal to 
85 his friends--a very great man. 11 
(4) 
After the Easter rebellion, Prime Minister Asquith went to Dublin 
to consult the British military and administrative officials. On his 
return to England, Asquith asked Lloyd George to bring his furious energy 
and innovative genius to bear on the Irish problem. Lloyd George was 
extremely reluctant to become involved with the Irish question, especially 
at this juncture in the war. He had become so totally immersed in the · 
war effort that he had resigned his position at the Exchequer to take the 
much less prestigious post of Minister of Munitions, and, in May 1916, he 
was scheduled to accompany Lord Kitchener, the Secretary for War, to 
Russia to coordinate plans with the Russians for greater aid to the Eastern 
front. Asquith, however, finally convinced Lloyd George to try to solve 
the Irish dilemma. This decision had far-reaching consequences for Lloyd 
George and for Britain because the ship which carried Kitchener on his 
journey to Russia struck a mine near the Orkney Islands and sunk, and 
Kitchener drowned--preswrtably, so: tqo}woutd Ll~yd.,.George .had; he· been wi tp 
K. 86 
.itchener. 
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On May 25, 1916, Asquith announced to the Commons that Lloyd 
George was being assigned the task of finding a solution to the Irish 
87 problem. Lloyd George immediately conferred with the leaders of both 
Irish factions and, in June, drew up his proposed settlement: Horne Rule 
would be given immediately to Ireland except for the six counties of 
Ulster, which would remain part of the United Kingdom until the end of the 
war, and the Irish would retain some representation in Westminster until 
the war was over; after the war, an Imperial conference would provide a 
88 permanent settlement for Ireland. Lloyd George was convinced that his 
plan was acceptable to Carson, who returned to Ulster to consult his col-
leagues. In fact, his plan was approved by both Redmond's Nationalists 
and the Ulster Unionist Council but was sabotaged by "extremists" in 
Unionist circles. 89 On June 23, a manifesto against Lloyd George's policy 
was signed by a number of influential Unionist peers; and, on June 28, 
Lansdowne expressed his hostility to the plan in a letter to Asquith. in 
Lloyd George's opinion, it was Lansdowne's opposition which destroyed the 
possibility of a settlemen~ based on his formula. 90 
Lansdowne made his position publicly known in a rigidly inflexible 
speech in the Lords on July 11, in which he said that Ireland should remain 
under British .rnili tary rule for an indefinite period and called for the 
"permanent and enduring" exclusion of Ulster .from any future Horne Rule 
settlernent. 91 A Unionist meeting at the Carlton Club on July 17 supported 
2311. 
87Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1916, 5th Series, LXXXII, 2308-
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Lansdowne's suggestions by condemning any immediate enactment of Home Rule 
and by advocating a policy of military repression for Ireland. 92 Since 
Asquith was the Prime Minister of a coalition Government, he could not 
afford to disregard Unionist opinion. Asquith 1 s decision came on July 31 
when he announced the appointment of a new Chief Secretary for Ireland to 
replace Birrell, who had resigned after the uprising. Asquith's choice 
was a Unionist named H. E. Duke, an appointment which sent the Irish 
N · l" · f 93 w· h h" l ationa ists into paroxysms o rage. it t is announcement, Asquit1 
turned his back on Lloyd George's plan and reverted to the old system of 
governing Ireland. 
For the remainder of his tenure in office, Asquith made no other 
attempt to come to grips with Ireland. In March 1917, the new Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, said that Ireland "is no more reconciled to Britrsh 
rule than she was in the days of Cromwell" and stated_ that Britain would 
grant self-government to any part of Ireland which desired it but would 
not force any part of the country to leave the Union. 94 With this rather 
ambiguous statement, Lloyd George was, in effect, telling the Irish to 
work out a settlement among themselves. However, his statement produced_ 
no discernible results; consequently, in May 1917, Lloyd George sent 
letters to the leaders of the Irish factions,·inviting them to accept one 
of two British offers: Immediate Home Rule for Ireland, with the exclu-
sion of Ulster until the end of the war, or a convention of the various 
Irish parties to formulate a p_lan .~or· self-govequnent whi_ch would .be· 
9211oyd George, War Memoirs, II, 155. 
2148. 
93 Pariiamentary Debates, Commons, 1916, 5th Series, LXXXIV, 2146-
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95 
submitted to London for approval. Since Redmond would not accept the 
first alternative, plans were drawn up for the convention of the Irish 
groups, but the convention was crippled from the outset because Sinn Fein 
announced that it would send no representatives. Sinn Fein refused to 
participate unless the convention be elected by universal suffrage, the 
convention have the authority to declare complete Irish independence, and 
the British Government agree to abide by whatever settlement was reached. 
The British refused to agree to these conditions, and Sinn Fein leaders 
decided to boycott the convention. 96 
Nevertheless,· in June, Lloyd George announced the composition of 
the convention, which was to consist of 101 delegates, fifteen of whom 
b 1 d b h B .. h G . . 97 were to e se ecte y t e ritis overnment. In order to create an 
atmosphere of goodwill for the convention; the British released the Irish 
prisoners whohad been imprisoned since the Easter rebellion. 98 The 
delegates to the convention met at Trinity College, Dublin, on July 25, 
·. . . 99 
1917, to seek a settlement which had eluded statesmen.for generations. 
Even as. the convention assembled, it was obvious that political 
power in. Ireland was shifting from the moderate parliamentarians meeting 
at Trinity College to Sinn Fein. In the sunnner of 1917, a by-election 
was held in the East Clare district, the results of which resounded 
throughout the United Kingdom. The favored candidate was an Irish 
. 
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Nationalist who came from a prominent Catholic family and was close to 
Redmond; his opponent, recently released from prison by the British, was 
Eamon de Valera, who ran on an uncompromising Sinn Fein platform that 
called for absolute Irish independence, the revival of the Gaelic language, 
a refusal to recognize the authority of Westminster, and Irish unity (no 
exclusion for Ulster). De Valera won an overwhelming victory, receiving 
more than 70 percent of the vote and as a contemporary journalist put it, 
rendering the convention in Dublin "Dead Sea fruit."lOO In October, de 
Valera was elected President of Sinn Fein--with Arthur Griffith becoming 
Vice-President--and declared that Sinn Fein's goals would be to secure 
recognition for an.independent Irish republic and "to make English rule 
. . 101 
absolutely impossible in Ireland." 
.Meanwhile, the Irish convention staggered on, and it became clear 
that the Ulster bloc of delegates was determined to play the role of 
"spoiler.". The issue which the Ulster delegates seized upon was fiscal 
autonomy, refusing to. accept even the southern Unionist proposal for 
. 1 bl 1 f" 102 minima Du in contro . over inances. When Redmond supported the 
Unionist idea, his Nationalist colleagues rejected his efforts to reach a 
compromise and demanded fiscal autonomy for the Irish Parliament. 103 In 
February 1918, .Lloyd George jolted the delegates out of their squabbling 
inertia by laying down new British conditions for a settlement: Britain 
would retain police powers in Ireland for the rest of the war; there would 
be no change in the trade relations between the two countries until the 
100 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 63-65. 
101 •. Macardle, The Irish Republic, 233-235. 
'I.'. 
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war was over; any partition would be unacceptable in any Irish settlement, 
but Ulster would have to be given ample safeguards concerning religion 
d . 104 an taxation. Yet, Lloyd George only succeeded in offending both major 
factions by extending British police powers and by denying Ulster's right 
of exclusion from Home Rule. One month later, John Redmond died, repudiated 
by the Irish Catholics and the nationalist movement. Modern British 
history offers few stories more tragic than that of John Redmond, who 
sincerely believed in the Parliamentary process and who must have thought 
in 1912 that he could achieve what had been denied to Grattan, Wolfe Tone, 
Daniel O'Connell, Parnell and countless other Irish leaders. 
Mercifully, Redmond was spared the final collapse of the Irish 
convention which was brought about by German Field Marshal Erich Ludendorff. 
In March 1918, with the war on the Russian front at an end, Ludendorff and 
the German military leaders decided to risk everything on a daring.gamble 
to knock out the' exhausted British and French forces before the full weight 
of American manpower could be felt in the struggle. The situation of the 
Allies was more desperate in lateMarch and early April than at any other 
point in the war. The British Government decided that it must increase 
the flow of manpower to the army in France, and therefore, on April 9, 
Lloyd George introduced his new conscription bill which extended the 
draft age to fifty and which introduced conscription to Ireland on the 
same terms as in Britain. This was an absolute bombshell to the Irish 
Nationalists, but the Government argued that the extra manpower in Ireland 
was needed to bolster the army in. France a:id1 though the Irish had always. 
been given the option of voluntary enlistment, it was no longer fair to 
l04Ibid., 159-160. 
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conscript only the men in England, Wales, and Scotland, and expect them to 
carry the entire burden of defending the United Kingdom. 105 Adding insult 
to injury, Lloyd George said that, since the Irish convention had not been 
able .to agree on a plan, the British Government would have to devise a new 
106 program for Ireland. An Irish Nationalist M. P. expressed the feelings 
of his colleagues when he warned Lloyd George: "You will be mad if you 
f . . . I 1 d "107 en orce conscription in re an • 
The Government's new Irish policy made the convention in Dublin a 
meaningless farce, and the delegates decided to disband. It is doubtful 
whether the Government expected any. concrete r.esults from the conventi.on, 
even though it represented the last attempt by Redmond and his moderate 
supporters to.work out a settlement. Smith, in his celebrated Boston Post 
interview in January 1918, was quoted as saying that the Government expected 
the convention to fail and tha_t the convention had only been called to 
placate opinion in America •. ·Although Smith repudiated the interview, this 
f I . hm 108 story confirmed the worst suspicions o many ris en. 
The Government's new program, particularly the. conscription bill, 
ended any influence which the moderate nationalists exerted over Irish 
Catholics. In fact, Irish Nationalist M. P.s boycotted Parliament and 
·1· : . 109 
collaborated with Sinn Fein in working against mi itary conscription. 
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A meeting of Catholic bishops at Maynooth issued a denunciation of the 
conscription act, calling it llan oppressive and inhuman law," and a pledge 
against conscription was signed by virtually all Catholics at their church 
doors. On April 23, there was a general strike throughout southern Ireland 
110 
to protest the new law. London's response to the Irish protest was the 
time-honored British policy of coercion. In May, the Crown arrested the 
leaders of Sinn Fein, including Griffith and de Valera, on charges of aiding 
Germany and transported them to England. The Government gave Crown forces 
in Ireland broad powers to censor "seditious" literature and prevent public 
gatherings; by June, thirteen counties in southern Ireland had been placed 
under direct military control. However, the Irish gave their own answer to 
the British by electing Arthur Griffith in a June by-election for Parliament, 
d . h . f h G ff" h 1 . h' ' E l" h · ·1 lll espite t e act t at ri it was anguis ing in an ng is Jal • 
The trend of events in Ireland was clearly shown by the results of 
the general election in December .1918. Sinn Fein won 73 seats--every seat 
in Ireland outside of Ulster, with the exception of the four traditionally 
Tory seats from Dublin University. The Sinn Fein M. P.s, many of whom 
were in jai 1, refused to. take. their seats in Westminster in accordance 
with the avowed Sinn Fein policy of refusing to recognize any vestige of 
B "t" h h . 112 ri is aut ority. In the first flush of victory over Germany and in 
the midst of preparations for the peace conference in Paris, the British. 
Government did not fully appreciate these events in Ireland, but it soon 
became obvious that Ireland was the ghost at the coalition Government's 
banquet. 
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IV 
THE PITFALLS OF COALITION: 
BRITISH POLITICS, 1918-21 
(1) 
The long, debilitating war finally ended in November 1918 with 
Germany's surrender to the Allied powers. During the war, Parliament had 
suspended the provisions of the Parliament Act of 1911 which had restricted 
the life of a Parliarrient to five years. With the war over, the necessity 
for a new Parliamentary election was overwhelming, for the voters had not 
been permitted to express their will for eight years. The Government 
leaders decided to continue the ·coalition of Unionists and Lloyd George 
Liberals, and arrangements were made that any candidate, whether Unionist 
or Liberal, who had a letter of endorsement from Lloyd George and Bonar 
Law would be considered the Government's official candidate--Asquith 
1 derisiv~ly called this letter of endorsement a "coupon." 
The Government was in an extremely strong position, as the country -
Was swept by patriotic fervor over Britain's victory and by a feeling of 
profound relief that the war had been brought to an end, and the 1icoupon-
1 
election" produced a massive vote of confidence in the coalition ministry. 
Government candidates won 484 seats in °the Commons, 338 of which were won 
1
charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-i940 (Chicago, 
1955), 3. 
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by the Unionists. Asquith, who had once dominated the Commons, was reduced 
to leadership of a "rump" faction of 26 Liberals. Aside from the Sinn Fein 
victory in Ireland, the most striking result of the election was that the 
Labour Party, which had refused to remain in the coalition, won 59 seats 
and was the largest group in the Commons outside of the Government benches. 
It was to many an ominous portent of postwar politics that the Labour 
Party had become the official opposition party. 2 
After the election, Lloyd George asked Smith to remain Attorney-
General but said that the office would cease to carry Cabinet status--the 
. Prime Minister was committed to reducing the size of the Cabinet. Consider-
ing his position in the Unionist Party and the fact that he had been a 
Cabinet member for. more than. three years, Smith refused Lloyd· George's offer. 
The Prime Minister then tendered the Woolsack--the post of Lord Chancellor.--
which astonished Smith and created for him a political and personal dilemma. 
The post would raise him to the peerage, make him the highest officer in 
the English judiciary, and bring him the honor of presiding over the House 
of Lords. On the other hand, leaving the Commons could diminish his pros-
pects of becoming Prime Minister, and he was only forty-six years old. 
There was also a financial consideration because, if he accepted a peerage, 
he ~buld be unable to continue his career at the Bar, thus entailing a 
sizable loss of income. However, Smith decided that the prestige and 
dignity of the Lord Chancellorship overcame the liabilities, and he ac-
cepted the proposal. 3 
The announcement: ;of s~~th Is :~ppoi:~timJ.n't:. as; Lord Chancellor arous~~ 
,f ~ : 
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a storm of controversy. The prospect of "Galloper" Smith as Lord 
Chancellor, the "keeper of the King's conscience," filled many with con-
sternation, even the Earl of Derby, Smith's political ally in Lancashire. 4 
The King was disturbed by memories of Smith's cynical, caustic remarks and 
by rumors that Smith was a sybaritic libertine, and his secretary, 
Stamfordham, suggested to Lloyd George that Smith's talent and intelligence 
certainly qualified him for Cabinet membership but, perhaps, some other 
post where his "reputation in men's minds" would not detract from the 
dignity of the office. 5 Lloyd George, however, was adamant in his conten-
tion that Smith's brilliant mind would make him an outstanding Lord 
Chancellor as it had made him a superior Attorney-General. 6 Consequently, 
Smith was elevated :to the peerage as Baron Birkenhead;· he was created 
viscount in 1921 and earl in 1922. A typical reaction to Smith's new 
title was the remark by Lady Londonderry: "F .. E. is brilliant and self-. 
made • so he really deserves success, though he has no character. ,; 7 
In the coalition, Lloyd George remained Prime Minister while Law 
continued to lead the Commons .. Law's health was beginning to fail, and 
he gave up his post at the Exchequer to become Lord Privy Seal, a less 
rigorous position. Austen Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and Balfour remained Foreign· Secretary until after the Paris conference, 
when he became Lord President of the Council and Earl Curzon went to the 
4rbid., 331-333. 
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Foreign Office. The coalition Government was dominated by Unionists, and, 
besides Lloyd George, the only prominent Liberal in the Cabinet was Winston 
Churchill, who was Secretary for War. Churchill had returned to office in 
1917 as Minister of Munitions, and after the election, Lloyd George felt 
strong enough to withstand Unionist protests and offer Churchill the War 
Office. Thus, after more than a dozen years of behind-the-scenes comrade-
ship, Churchill and Birkenhead were Cabinet colleagues. 
As Lord Chancellor, Birkenhead confounded the skeptics by exceeding 
even the highest expectations of his supporters. The Lord Chancellor was 
the head of the English judiciary and was deeply involved in the operations 
of the High Court of Chancery and the Court of Appeal. In addition, 
Birkenhead initiated a series of significant reforms in the English legal 
system. He remodelled the rules relating to litigation for the poor in 
equity courts, and his inquiries into the administration of the county 
court and appellate court systems laid the foundation for the County Courts 
Act. (1924) and the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act (1925). 
Birkenhead's monument, however, was the Law of Property Act (1922), which 
revolutionized the antiquated and inequitable land law system in England, 
bringing English real property law into the twentieth century. Birkenhead 
had to pilot the bill through Parliament over the opposition of entrenched, 
vested interests, and its final passage was a considerable triumph. The 
Law of Property Act was .BirkenhE7ad's greatest accomplishment in legal 
reform, ·but the legislation in which.he had. the most intense concern was 
-~ . ' ' . ' ' ~ ' ·.' 1· ' 
. the Matrimonial ca.uses bill', which w~Ul;~ have 'liberalized. the divorce· 1a~s '' 
of the country. As it was, adultery was the only basis for divorce, and 
generally, only the well-to-do were able to undertake divorce litigation. 
Birk~nhead.proposed to make it easier for women and lower income people 
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to initiate divorce actions and to expand the grounds for divorce to 
include insanity, alcoholism, and willful desertion. The bill faced 
strenuous opposition from Catholic noblemen, Anglican Church prelates, 
and conservative Unionist peers, but Birkenhead steered it through the 
Lords, giving what many consider to be the most eloquent speech of his 
career on March 24, 1920, in defense of the bill. 8 Ironically, the bill 
passed the Lords only to be defeated in the Commons, but Birkenhead's 
overall achievements in his post caused even his detractors to grant him 
grudging admiration. As one such detractor wrote: "Few today will quarrel 
with the verdict that he was an outstanding Lord Chancellor, if not the 
9 greatest of this century." 
Birkenhead was not entirely engrossed in his judicial reforms, 
however, ·for his duties as Lord Chancellor also entailed service as 
presiding officer in the Lords, and Birkenhead proved to be the most 
politically active Lord Chancellor that the Lords had seen in a long while. 
In Birkenhead's obituary, The Times was to state: "Wheri. he was on the 
Woolsack the influence of an original and powerful personality was felt 
' ' 10 
throughout the House of Lords." Not since Salisbury was Prime Minister. 
had any Government had so effective a spokesman in the Lords, and it was 
probably for this.reason that the crafty Lloyd George insisted on Birken-
head 1 s appointment to the Woolsack. 
Despite his effectiveness as Lord Chancellor, Birkenhead's 
relations with the King were somewhat strained. George V maintained a 
; '. 
8Parliamentary Deb~~e.~}. Lord~}, 1920,,,.5,~h Series,. ~D,C, 663-?_7;9. ! . 
9 ', .:. ' ' .. '· '.;' .. ·.. ' ' ' " • .. ' 
Mendelssohn, ·The Age of:Churchill, 308. 
lOThe Times (London), October 1, 1930, 17. 
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wary apprehension of Birkenhead because of his flamboyance and rakish 
reputation, and the King's disapproval was reflected in the actions of 
his secretary, Stamfordham, who peppered Birkenhead with notes commenting 
on his flashy .clothes and night life until Birkenhead sent Stamfordham a 
caustic letter, implying that, as long as he carried out the functions of 
his office competently, his personal life was nobody's business--the King 
ll 
commented that this was "a very rude letter." George V was certainly an 
unlikely person to preside over the "new morality" which had been inaugur-
ated after the war, and nothing alarmed him more than the new sexual 
permissiveness. The King primly inquired of the Lord Chancellor whether 
divorce cases could be tried in camera (without publicity) if explicit 
references were made to the private lives of the individuals concerned; 
Birkenhead replied that it was not legally possible to bar the press from 
d . d" 12 ivorce procee ings. 
However, if Birkenhead's relationship with the King was less than 
idyllic, he enjoyed extremely warm relations with the King's sons and met 
them often on social occasions. In fact, Birkenhead won the lasting 
affection of the Duke of York (later King George VI) when the shy, self- · 
conscious youth made his first appearance in the House of Lords in June 
1920. George Vl's biographer wrote that as the young Duke approached the 
Woolsack to be received by the Lord Chancellor on this solemn occasion, 
he was "almost tottering" with nervousness; when Birkenhead leaned forward 
to clasp the new peer's hands between his own, he whispered, "Been playing 
much tennis lately, sir'?" This light remark relaxed the Duke and "saved 
112nd. Earl. of Birkenhead, !.· !·, 394-395 • 
12N. 1 ico son, George the Fifth, 429. 
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th • t at• II b t 0 h • f • d 13 e si u ion y res oring is con i ence. 
Throughout most of the 1919-20 period, the coalition was highly 
secure. Lloyd George's prestige was at its height, and he was recognized 
as one of the world's foremost statesmen, a man with a supernatural ability 
to solve insoluble problems. Many Unionist M. P.s believed that they owed 
their seats in Westminster to the magic of Lloyd George's name and hence, 
were very willing, for a time, to follow his lead. 14 The combination of 
Lloyd George's international prestige, the economic boom of 1919-20, and 
the Government's huge Parliamentary majority made the coalition ministry 
seemingly invincible. 
(2) 
· Tbere were, however, a few clouds on the horizon for the coalition, 
one 'of which was· the startling growth of the labor movement and especially, 
of the Labour Party. One historian has written that the Labour Party 
"offered a new party of the Left, .not associated with past failures and 
free from the Liberal trammels with the privileged classes. 1115 In February 
1918, the Labour Party drew up a new constitution which was a declaration: 
of intent to enact socialistic legislation: Public works programs; eco- . 
nomic policies which would guarantee full employment; broad social security 
programs; nationalization of various industries, such as coal, insurance, 
tailways, and utilities; a more equitable tax structure; and, most 
menacingly, the "common ownership of the nation's land" arid " means" of. 
,. . .~ ,:,i .. "~ ; >:_•·. :/:: 1.'· 
.. " 
13 . . John W. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI: His Life and Reign 
(New York, 1958), 141-142. 
14Lord Beaverbrook, ~ Decline ~ ~ of Lloyd George (New York, 
1963), 14~ 
15Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, .91. 
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production. 1116 Labour had achieved respectability during the war by the 
fact that Labourites had served in the Government, and one of them, Arthur 
Henderson, had been in Lloyd George's War Cabinet. As mentioned above, the 
Labour Party made an extremely impressive showing in the 1918 election, 
capturing 59 seats, which made Labour the largest single bloc of M. P.s on 
the opposition benches. Those 59 seats, however, were not an accurate 
gauge of Labour's strength, for even though the coalition secured eight 
times as many seats as Labour, the Labour Party candidates garnered nearly 
half as many votes as all of the coalition candidates, and they polled twice 
as many votes as 'did the traditional Liberal Party candidates who supported 
A . h 17 . squi t • 
In the immediate postwar period, .the trade union movement was 
rapidly expanding and' by 1920' had reached a membership of eight million. 18·. 
Goaded by the rampant inflation.which accompanied the postwar prosperity 
and the fact that prices were rising faster than wages, British workers 
di splayed a startling militancy as they demanded an improvement in their 
standard of living~ To the outrage of the workers and socialists who 
wanted state control over the economy, the Lloyd George Government yielded 
to demands by the business conununity for an end to wartime controls on 
. d . . . 19 in ustry and finance. Furthermore, the alliance between the Trades 
Union Congress (T. u. c.) and the Parliamentary Labour Party was made.even 
16Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 18-19. 
17 b'd 1-2:._·' 6-7. 
18 ' 945 142 Taylor, English History, ~--1 __ , • 
19 ·: . . ' . . . ' 
Mowat. Britain Between the Wars, 27~29 • 
. , --~
~' - ' .iJ.~ .• ... 
' 
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firmer than it had been before the war when the trade unions occasionally 
had supported Liberal candidates. 20 
The year following the war saw strikes by textile and iron workers, 
the threat of a police strike, and strikes by miners and railway workers 
that were regarded with such seriousness that the Government felt compelled 
11 h . l" 21 to ca out t e mi itary. In 1919, thirty million work days were lost 
due to strikes, many of them local, "wildcat" strikes called by the extremely 
22 
militant shop stewards. The trade unions even extended their direct 
political action to the Government's foreign policy. In May 1920, London 
dockworkers refused to load munitions on the Jolly George, a ship bound 
for Poland to help the Poles fight the Bolsheviks, and they refused to 
coal the ship, thus keeping it in port. By August, the leaders of the 
Labour Party and the T. U. C. were threatening a nation-wide strike to 
prevent further British intervention against the Bolshevik regime in Russia, 
but the Russo-Polish war ended before there was a clash between the 
23 Government and labor. 
The growing strength of the Labour Party and the increasing 
militancy of the trade unions caused apprehension by many who felt the 
sociaL and political traditions of Britain were threatened. Some political 
leaders, including Birkenhead, favored a new fusion party of Unionists and 
24 Liberals, leaving Labour as a leftist fringe group. A contemporary 
20 Ibid., 19-20. 
21 Ibid., 38-40. 
22Nicolson, George the Fifth, 339. 
23 Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 41-42. 
24Baron Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace 
,S>nference and After, 1918-1923 (New York, 1934), 159, 365. ---..;~:..:.:.::...::. -- --- ---
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writer predicted that Lloyd George, Law, Churchill, and Birkenhead would 
form a new political party, the ''Democratic Party," which would "combine 
the patriotism and stability of the Conservative Party with the broad 
humanities and tolerance of Liberalism. 1125 At the very time the article 
was published, a high level meeting was held to discuss the formation of 
such a party. Lloyd George, Churchill, Austen Chamberlain, and Archibald 
Salvidge met Birkenhead at his London home in February 1920 to discuss the 
possibility of fusion; the discussion produced a rather cumbersome name for 
the proposed party, the "Constitutional Reform Party," but the idea never 
progressed beyond the realm of the hypothetical, and the coalition Govern-
ment headed into the stormy waters of 1921. 26 
In the winter of 1920-21, the Government was seriously damaged when 
the postwar economic boom came to an end. The foremost historian of this 
period traced the end of the.boom to April 1920 when the Government 
attempted to halt the inflation and speculation of the overheated economy 
by raising bank rates and increasing the excess profits tax. This policy 
stifled investment and had a deflationary effect, hurting industries which 
had invested and expanded by causing injurious overproduction. This, in 
turn, produced the classic cycle of economic recession~ Overproduction 
caused prices to fall, causing industries to lose money, which led those 
industries to reduce production and overhead, which, of course, meant that 
27 
workers were laid off and thrown into the ranks of the unemployed. 
Review, 
25 c. F~ .. q> Mast'JJ~~ri\':~j~~h~ij~~: b~~ci'~r;ti'.~ Party;'': "rhe. Contemporary.··: 
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Export trades, particularly th~ coal industry, suffered the mo~t, due to 
overproduction, loss of overseas markets, and failure to adapt production 
to the most modern, efficient techniques. 28 
By December 1920, unemployment was 700,000; by March 1921, unem-
ployment had risen to 1,300,000 people,and, three months later, more than 
two million workers were out of jobs. 29 During the winter of 1920-21, 
there were demonstrations of protest by unemployed workers, often leading 
. 1 t 1 h . h h l" 3o Th 1 d ·1 . d to vio en c as es wit t e po ice. e coa an texti e in ustries 
were·in a state of severe depression, as was British shipping, 31 and steel 
and iron production dropped to a fraction of the 1920 lever. 32 In March 
1921, the Government attempted to deal with the unemployment problem by 
introducing the policy of the "uncovenanted" benefit, by which unemployed 
workers could draw more benefits than they had contributed to the national 
insurance plan and which.was supposed to be held against future contribu-. 
tions--thus was born the "dole," which was "ungratefully accepted by those 
it saved and bitterly condemned by the comfortable classes whosaw in it 
only the symbol of national.demoralisation. 1133 
The Government's announcement in March 1921 that it would restore 
the coal industry to private control by ending its subsidy prompted the 
threat of a. general strike by labor. The miners went on strike and called 
on the transport and railway workers to honor their "triple alliance" and 
28Tay1or, English History, 1914-1945, 144-145'. 
29N. 1 ico son, George the Fifth, 340. 
30 Mowat, Britain Between the War~, 125. 
31Taylor, English History, 1914-1945,' 145. 
32Mowat, Britaip Between the Wars, 125. 
33
rbid., 127-128. 
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force the Government to maintain control over the coal industry. The 
Government mobilized troops in April, and a special defense force of 
75,000 men was created for the duration of the crisis. On "Black Friday," 
April 15, 1921, the transport and railway workers withdrew their support 
from the miners after the miners refused the Government's compromise solu-
tion. 34 Labor unity had been severely strained by these crises, but 
another casualty was the Prime Minister, once the greatest radical reformer 
in British politics, who was now regarded virtually as a "blackleg" by 
labor: "Lloyd George lost his last shadow of hold over the working class. 
He had become for them a fraud, a sham. 1135 The only response which the 
Lloyd George ministry could seemingly devise for the recession was 
governmental retrenchment. In 1921, a committee headed by Sir Eric Geddes 
was established to investigate the economic crisis, and the cormnittee's 
subsequent recommendation angered not only socialists but people with 
moderately liberal convictions• . The committee urged a Draconian form. of 
retrenchment which was cal led the ''Geddes axe": The reduction of Govern-
ment expenditures for teachers' and policemen's salaries, health services, 
36 
educational aid, the military, and the abolition of the labor exchanges •. 
The erstwhile radical, Lloyd George, had apparently lost his zeal for the 
underprivileged. 
Economic recession was not the only problem which the Government 
faced, for, increasingly, Ireland was becoming a festering sore in British ),) 
i , I J , .. ·. '··•. ' .. 
34rbid~~ .p.9. 
35 . Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, 146. 
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politics. The warfare between Irish guerillas and Crown forces had 
escalated inexorably throughout 1919 and 1920 until it dominated the 
Government's actions. Leftist intellectuals were in the vanguard of critics 
of the Government's Irish policy, and they focused public attention on the 
ugly aspects of the Irish conflict. In 1920, the Labour Party sent a com-
mission to Ireland under Arthur Henderson's chairmanship to observe the 
nature of the conflict. The Labour commission's report was released to the 
public in 1921, and it stated: "Things are being done in the name of 
Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole world. 1137 
The economic recession and the Irish war intensified political 
problems and revealed cracks in the coalition's facade. A number of 
Unionists had long suspected that Lloyd George was merely using them until 
he could re-unite the Liberals, while Lloyd George feared that he would 
38 become a captive of the Unionists without any Liberal support. The 
recession pulled the Government in two directions, as the Unionists 
attempted to raise tariff rates on imports to protect British industry 
and help Britain's balance-of-payments, and Lloyd George worked surrepti-
tiously to kill the tariff because it might alienate his Liberal followers 
39 
who beiieved in free trade. The uneasy alliance between Lloyd George and 
the Unionists grew more strained after March 1921 when Law's poor health 
forced him to retire from active politics, and he was succeeded as 
Unionist leader by Austen Chamberlain, who came to be regarded by many in 
the Party as being subservient to Lloyd George and not aggressive enough 
1,\ . ; 
',' , 
l921), 
3 7Labour Party, Report of .!h!. Labour Commission ~>Ireland· (~~n~fn, ·I·. '·'. ~·. 
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in defending Tory principles. In June 1921, one of the most influential 
Unionist peers, the Marquis of Salisbury, reflected the growing disenchant-
ment with Lloyd George in a letter to The Times, in which he urged Unionists 
to withdraw their support from the Government, which, he stated, "no longer 
possesses the full confidence of the Unionist Party. 1140 
The Prime Minister's popularity and prestige had greatly diminished 
since the triumphant days of 1918-19, both in Parliament and in public opin-
ion. In his reliance on Law and then Chamberlain to lead the Commons, 
which he rarely attended, Lloyd George acted more like an American President 
than a Prime Minister. The use of a subordinate to lead the Commons was, 
perhaps, justifiable during the war and during the peace conference in 
Paris when Lloyd George did not have the time to handle Parliamentary 
matters; but, by 1921, this practice implied a cavalier disdain for the_ 
traditions of Parliament, especially in light of the personal, unofficial 
advisers whom Lloyd George retained. ·Lloyd George's sale of honors--
peerages, knighthoods, decorations--in return for political contributions 
to the mysterious ."Lloyd George fund" caused i: considerable outcry and 
confirmed the impression of Lloyd George as "too clever by halL. 1141 
Friction developed even within the Cabinet. There was serious. 
disagreement over the conflict between Greece and Turkey, with only Lloyd 
George and Balfour favoring a policy that was sympathetic towards the 
Greeks. 42 Lloyd George and Churchill gre;' ;increasingly estranged over the 
i 
issue of Russia, as Churchill advocated all.-out aid to the "White" Russians 
40The Times (London), June 20, 1921, 6. 
41 ·. Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 52-53; Mowat, 
Britain Between the Wars, 133-134. 
42Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall.of Lloyd George, 38-39. 
132 
in their fight against the Bolsheviks, while Lloyd George was more cogni-
zant of the extent to which public opinion would tolerate involvement in 
another war. Lloyd George finally transferred Churchill to the Colonial 
Office in the hope of making him forget about Russia, but Churchill was 
not happy about the transfer because he regarded the Colonial Office as a 
lower echelon position. Churchill was in the Middle East in March 1921 
when he received word of Law's retirement and the new position of Austen 
Chamberlain, who was leaving the Exchequer to become Lord Privy Seal and 
leader of the Commons. Hurrying back to London in the expectation of 
moving up to the Exchequer, Churchill was flabbergasted to discover that 
Lloyd George had offered the post to one of his personal advisers, Sir 
Robert Horne. It was inconceivable to Churchill that he could be ignored 
in favor of a nonentity like Horne, and, as stunned disbelief gave way to 
cold anger, Churchill ended all dealings with Lloyd George except on 
43 governmental matters. . 
The Prime Minister's relations with the Lord Chancellor also declined 
in 1921. The major dispute between Lloyd George and Birkenhead was over 
an appointment to the Bench• As the head of the English judiciary, 
Birkenhead felt that his recommendation should prevail, but Lloyd George 
ignored Birkenhead 1 s advice and appointed a Liberal supp_orter whom 
Birkenhead did not think was qualified. According to Beaverbrook, 
Birkenhead was "outraged." For all his flippant cynicism, Birkenhead 
had "a deep respect for the traditions of the Bench," and he was genuinely 
. ~· . ~ ·t - . · '. ... : > . -~ .. -~· ' j :1 ( F:: < 
. shocked that ;Lloyd Georg'~ ·w9.u'ld us~ .. th~ judi.ciary·· ~s' a; po~'i ti ca~ pork ... ~ ;;.:· 
barrel. An angry ·corresp~ndenc~ ·b~tw'een the t~o men follmyed, and their 
43 Ibid., 30-34. 
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relationship degenerated into one of frigid formality. 44 Additional 
tension developed between Lord Curzon and Churchill over whether the 
Middle East came under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office or the 
Colonial Office. 45 Moreover, Curzon loathed and feared the Prime Minister, 
and in turn, the pompous, arrogant Foreign Secretary was despised by most 
of his Cabinet colleagues as "inconsistent, unreliable, untruthful, and 
46 
treacherous." 
By June 1921, Birkenhead and Churchill were involved in an abortive 
coup against Lloyd George. Both men still believed in the idea of coalition, 
but they felt that Lloyd George had become a liability to the coalition 
Government. They proposed to lead a backbench revolt against Lloyd George, 
the result being ~ coalition ministry with Birkenhead as Prime Minister 
and Churchill as leader of the Commons and, presumably, at the Exchequer 
h F ' Off' 47 or t e . oreLgn ice. However, such a plan required a great deal of 
d.elicacy and, somehow, news of the plan reached Lloyd George, who was 
nothing if not a cunning infighter. Lloyd George leaked the story to the 
Manchester Guardian, and the resultant publicity caused Birkenhead and 
48 Churchill to abandon their strategy. 
Lloyd George had won ~ tattical victory over the plotters, but 
at this very time, he suffered a terrible humiliation. Lloyd George was 
under grave attack for waste and scandal in the Government's housing 
44 Ibid., 35-37. 
45
rbid., 40-45. 
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program. One of the Prime Minister's most famous quotes from the 1918 
election was.his statement that he would provide postwar Britain with 
"homes fit for heroes," but the Government's housing policy had turned 
into a bureaucratic shambles. The scapegoat was Dr. Christopher Addison, 
who had been Minister of Health and who was "kicked upstairs" to the post 
of Minister without Portfolio at a salary of t5,000 ~annum. This 
appointment came under serious attack as a reward for incompetence, and· 
the debate in the Commons was tantamount to a motion of censure against 
the Government. Lloyd George defended the appointment but, at the same 
tine, announced that Addison would be at his position only for a temporary 
period and at a much reduced salary. 49 Lloyd George won his vote of con-
fidence, but his lame defense of Addison, while effectively throwing him 
to the wolves, brought de_risi ve laughter from the M. P. s, even from the 
Government. benches. The Prime Minister had aroused almost every emotion · 
in the Commons during his amazing career, but this was the first time 
that he had. ever excited contempt from the benches--the "Welsh wi.zard," 
"the man who won the war," was revealed as just another jobber, clinging 
tb office by his fingernails. Addison showed his scorn for Lloyd George 
by resigning and joining the Labour Party, in which he subsequently had 
a distinguished career.SO 
Lloyd George and bis ministry were in serious trouble in 1921, but, 
for Lord Birkenhead, the future appeared to be rosy. In his admirable 
pol:L ti cal s tttdy of this period j 
l : ' : ''' ~; " ' ' 'J ::· ·,, 
was the "titular11 .leader~ o'f'the 
.' ' ' ' 
Beaverbrook. s,:i.id that Austen Chamberlain 
Un\~nist P~rt¥ artd emphas·ized that his 
leadership wa's on an interim basis. Chamberlain 1 s background was Liberal 
49P.atliamentary Debates, Commons, 1921, 5th Series, CXLIII, 1593-
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50Beaverbrook, ~ Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 77, 79. 
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·Unionist rather than Tory, and he was "wavering in his enthusiasm" for 
tariff reform, which was virtual sacrilege to the memory of his father; 
he was widely respected for his spotless integrity but had a stiff and 
colorless personality, possessing none of his father's magnetism. It was 
Beaverbrook's opinion that, if Bonar Law's health improved, Law would 
resume Unionist leadership; if his health continued to deteriorate, the 
Unionists would pick Birkenhead as leader. Birkenhead had always been 
popular with the Unionist backbenchers, and he had the support of the 
protectionists and the Ulster-Orange clique in the Party. Birkenhead 
also had powerful backing from the leading "press lord," Viscount 
Northcliffe, who supported the Lord Chancellor in The Times and Daily Mail 
as the logical heir to·Unionist leadership. If Law remained in retire~ 
ment, ;:irkenhead could easily oust Chamberlain from leadership; if Law 
returned to active politics, Birkenhead had only to bide his time until 
51 
the frail, aging Law retired permanently. 
As it was, Lloyd George and his now very vulnerable ministry--
burdened by the hatred of the working class, the alienation of the middle 
class due to the recession and the housing scandals, the .restiveness of 
many Unionists, and the tarnished reputation of the Prime Minister--went 
forth to meet the Irish crisis. 
:. ;· 1 ~ ; .. ~ 51 : . 
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THE TROUBLES: 
IRELAND, 1918-21 
(1) 
After the December 1918 election, Sinn Fein moved rapidly to 
exercise the sweeping mandate that it had received from Irish Catholics. 
On.January 21; 1919, the Sinn Fein members who had been elected as M. P.s 
in December~-and who had not been arrested by the British--met at the 
/ 
Mansion House in Dublin to establish an Irish assembly, Dail Eireann, 
and to proclaim the Irish republic and Ireland's complete independence 
1 from Britain. 
The Dtil sent representatives to the Paris conference to present 
the Irish nationalist case to the world statesmen, but British. influence 
prevented them from doing so •. Lloyd George insisted that Ireland was an 
2 internal matter for the British Government to handle. In February, Eamon 
de Valera escaped from his English jail in Li.ncoln and, through the amazing 
intelligence network created by Michael Collins, returned to Ireland, where, 
in April, he was re-elected President of Sinn Fein and was elected President 
of the Dail, at which time a cabinet was also formed. To avoid further 
1 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 272-274. 
2 .• Ibid., 277-278. 
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embarrassment, the British released the rest of the Irish prisoners who 
had been arrested in May 1918. 3 
Two months after his election, de Valera left for the United States, 
where he remained until December 1920. De Valera hoped to raise money fo~ 
the Irish cause and, by appealing to traditional, anti-British sentiments, 
to pressure the American government into recognizing Ireland as an inde-
pendent republic; he also wanted to impress upon Americans that, under 
Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant, American troops could be 
used in Ireland to preserve Britain's "territorial integrity"--though 
it was not his intention, de Valera unwittingly aided President Woodrow 
Wilson's foes in the Senate who wanted to defeat the League of Nations 
Treaty. In de Valera's absence, Arthur Griffith served as the acting 
President of the D~il. 4 
While de. Valera was in America, the Da'il, determined to expand 
its authority in II-eland, establisbed a republican legal system in the 
summer· of 1919. These secret courts functioned with the support of Irish 
Catholics and, when the Trinity sessions of the Imperial Courts opened in 
June 1920, there were no litigants and no cases to be heard; the same 
5 
situation confronted the Assize Courts in July. In addition to estab~ 
lishing criminal and civil courts, the D~il created a republican polic~ 
force to deal with local crime, 6 while Sinn Fein continued to.consolidate 
3Longford and 0 1 Neitl, ·Eamon de Valera, 83-91. 
i . 
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its hold on the political processes of the country. Municipal elections 
were scheduled to be held in January 1920 under the supervision of Dublin 
Castle, and Sinn Fein leaders decided to use this election as a means of 
showing their contempt for the British and of demonstrating to the world 
that Sinn Fein expressed the will of the Irish people. Of the twelve 
cities and boroughs of Ireland, all but one--Belfast--elected republican 
majorities; of 206 municipal or borough councils, the republicans captured 
172. 7 Five months later, in the county council and Poor Law Board elec-
tions, the republicans secured control of 29 of Ireland's 33 districts. 8 
I I 
Thus, Sinn Fein and Dail Eireann effectively controlled Catholic Ireland 
and had made a mockery of British rule. 
While the republicans were taking control of the political and 
legal sysiem in Ireland, the level of violence increased as Crown forces 
and guerillas. of .the Irish Republican Army (I. R. A.) were involved in 
frequent battles. There were some Irish nationalists who thought that 
armed conflict was the only method of ending British domination of Ireland. 
Early in 1919, Michael Collins said that "the sooner fighting was forced 
and a general state of disorder created through the country . the bet-
ter it would be for the country. 119 In the spring of 1919, there were a 
series of I. R. A. raids on British supply depots and Royal Irish Constabu-
lary (R. I. C.) stations in order to secure arms and munitions. The policy 
of the I. R. A. was to avoid shooting Crown forces if possible, but this 
'··, ~ ·.·.. ' . ,,", ~·· ;·.~:. . ~-:t:» . • ~ ~·. 
7Macardl~, The Irlsh Republic,. 325.:.32/. " ; . 
8Ibid:; 3Si-34~:.'• ;'. ,~:·.:.·. •' :.: .. 
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policy was abandoned as the British increased their efforts against the 
I . h . l' t lO ris nationa is s. 
The constant I. R. A. attacks on police and military barracks 
during the summer prodded the British Government into action. The British 
decided to deal with the Irish unrest by destroying the source of subver-
sive activity: The D~il, which the British had previously ignored as being 
beneath contempt, was formally outlawed in September 1919. After the D~il 
was outlawed, Crown authorities accelerated their tactics of harassment 
by disrupting public gatherings, by prohibiting classes in the Gaelic 
language and the singing of Irish nationalist songs, by censoring nation-
alist publications, and by searching private homes. In the very month 
that the D~il was outlawed, the I. R. A. ambushed a British patrol in 
County Cork; .two hundred British soldiers retaliated by destroying part of 
. 11 
the town of Fermoy. This incident illustrated the patternwhich the 
Irish conflict was to take: An I. R. A. atrocity was followed by a British 
counter~atrocity. 
Gradually-but inexorably, the scale of violence rose in Ireland. 
In December 1919, an assassination attempt was made against· the Lord 
Lieutenant; Lord French, 12 and during the next month the British launched 
more than 1,000 raids against the homes and headquarters of I. R. A. suspects 
which resulted in 220 arrests; in February 1920, 4,000 British raids netted 
3 . 13 nearly 00 suspected terrorists. The assassination of a Dublin constable 
10 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 292. 
11 Ibid., 307-308, .315.-317. 
. . 12 . . . 
Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, 297. 
13 1 The I ' h R bl' 330 Macard e, ris epu ic, . • 
. ,. 
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in February caused the British to place Dublin under an indefinite curfew. 14 
When the British attempted to investigate bank records to discover--and 
confiscate--Sinn Fein and I. R. A. funds, the intelligence officer in 
charge of the program was shot. In reprisal, the Lord Mayor of Cork, who 
was a member of Sinn Fein, was murdered in his home in the middle of the 
. h' 15 n1g t. "Flying columns" of I. R. A. gunmen mounted full-scale attacks 
across Ireland against R. I. C. barracks in April, causing many of the 
barracks to be vacated; Crown forces retaliated by ransacking the town of 
Thurles. On the anniversary of the Easter rebellion the I. R. A. burned 
16 the vacated R. I. C. barracks. 
The I. R. A. made twenty-four battalion-sized attacks against 
Crown troops in Jµne and thirty attacks in July. By the end of the, summer 
of 1920, the I. R. A. had forced the R. I. C. out of the small villages 
and rural areas, leaving these areas to Sinn Fein control. Government 
buildings were often the target of Irish sabotage, and in July, an I. R., · 
A. squadron raided the General Post Offi~e in Dublin~ seizing highly sensi-
17 tive correspondence. ·The guiding genius behind the I. R. A. campaign 
was Michael Collins, who pioneered the techniques of what came to be known 
as "wars of national liberation." Long before Mao or Giap, Collins 
developed modern, guerilla war tactics of wearing down the stronger side 
through attrition and the force of public opinion, and Collins' gunmen, 
14 Ibid. 
. .i.~· ' 
15 Ibid.:, }32. . '.:,y-·,. ·~,". · .. :; Yi 
... ··'· 
' / .... __ 
16Figgis, Recollections of the Irish War, 279-280. 
17 3 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 344, 35 • 
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as in Mao's phrase, moved through the native population like fish through 
water. The Labour commission wrote that the I. R. A. "is formidable 
because it is intangible. • • . without the sympathy and support of the 
vast majority of the population it could not exist. 1118 Collins was Minis-
/ 
ter of Finance in the Dail cabinet, but his real source of power was his 
position as the director of intelligence and organization for the I. R. A. 
an<l, even more specifically, his pre-eminent standing within the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, the elite corps which provided most of the leader-
ship for the I. R. A. 19 The handsome, strapping Collins, with his hail-
fellow-well-met personality, did not conform to the usual image of a 
revolutionary as a cold, hatchet-faced fanatic, and his miraculous, hair-
breadth escapes from British.dragnets made Collins a legendary figure in 
both Ireland and Britain. Certainly, in the 1919-21 period, Collins was 
the most powerful Irish leader in the struggle with the British. 
For their part, the British were not lacking in ruthless determi-
nation either. In March 1920, the British Government began a program of 
sendingBritish recruits to Ireland to support the Crown forces; These 
recruits were ex-soldiers of the British Army who had combat experience; 
because there were not enough dark green, R~ I. C. uniforms for them, they 
wore khaki uniforms with black belts and dark green hats and, hence, came 
. 
to be known as the "Black and Tans. 1120 By July, . there was yet another group 
of British recruits in Ireland--.the Auxiliary Division of the R. I. C . 
. (the 11Auxies 11 ), which was composed of former British Army officers. 21 The 
/. 
~ .. 
" ~' " . ; ~ -'-------~-_..;._..._4_~---",.;.' '..!...' _...,...-,--. -, ---- !' 
18Laoour Party, Report of; the Labour Commission, 8. 
;e• .• ~ ... -~~:. ·~:',,;• 
· 
19Tim Pat Cooga'n, ~ l.· B:· ~· (London, 1970) ·, 22. 
20Richard Bennett, The Black and~ (Boston, 1960), 36. 
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task of the "Auxies" and "Black and Tans" was to root out the I. R. A., 
to match the I. R. A.'s terror tactics, and to meet every I. R. A. atrocity 
with reprisals of brutal severity. Theoretically, these two groups were 
under the control of the British military but, in reality, acted as semi-
·autonomous units. The Labour commission report listed six categories of 
reprisals taken by the "Auxies" and "Black and Tans": General terrorism 
and provocative behavior; arson; willful destruction of property; other 
than by fire; looting; cruelty to individuals; and shooting. The report 
said that these groups were. regarded with "general dread and detestation" 
. 22 
by the Irish people. 
The campaign of terror brought the economic life of Ireland to a 
. stands ti 11. To thwart British operations, the I. R. A. blew up bridges, 
tore up railway tracks, and cut telephone lines; throughout most of 1920, 
Irish railway, transport, and dock workers refused to handle British arms 
or munitions or to transport British troops. The Crown authorities 
responded.by suppressing local fairs and markets, which hurt the rural 
economy, and by destroying mills, factories, and creameries. 23 Moreover, 
Catholics in southern Ireland boycotted Ulster products, while· I. R. A. 
partisans destroyed Ulster goods in stock and in transit. 24 The conditions 
in parts of Ireland were so appalling that only the efforts of relief 
organizations prevented starvation and the collapse of entire communities, 
. 25 
especially in the rural provinces. 
21 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 358. 
· 
221abour Party, Report of 'the Labour Commission, 4, 6. 
·., . 23 . . . . 
Macardle, The Irish Republic, 332, 342, 347, 377-378. 
24c.· J. c. Stre~t, Ireland in 1921 (L~ndon, 1922), 12. 
25Macardle, The Irish Republic, .434. 
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One of the ugliest aspects of the "troubles" was the plight of 
Catholics in Ulster. The I. R. A. carried out acts of violence and sabo-
tage in Ulster, the result of which was the revival of the Orange clubs 
and reprisals against innocent Catholics. In fact, the acts of Ulster 
Protestants against Catholics could only be described as pogroms. In 
July 1920, Protestant mobs rampaged through the Catholic areas of 
Londonderry and Belfast, burning and looting Catholic homes, attacking 
Catholic churches, and leaving scores of Catholics dead and hundreds 
injured. Catholics who were employed in the Belfast shipyards were dis-
missed from their jobs, and, throughout Ulster, Catholics were driven from 
their homes; in some communities, not a single Catholic family was left. 
The Catholics who remained in Ulster were forced to take an oath of alle-
giance to the Crown if they wished to retain or secure employment. In 
cities like Belfast, thousands of Catholic families were left homeless 
after the riots, . and many fled south. Indeed, one English correspondent 
' ' 
compared these Catlwlic refugees to the Belgians whom he had seen fleeing 
from the Germans in 1914. The most influential political leader in Ulster,· 
Sir James Craig, tacitly endorsed these Orange activities, and the British 
troops seemed to sympathize with the Orangemen. Over the protests of Sir 
Neville Macready, the commander of British forces in Ireland, Protestants 
in Ulster were permitted to form the Ulster Special Constabulary (the 11 B 
Specials''), a vigilante organization of bu.lly-boys that was given legal 
l "'·: 
~anction to harass'and intimidate Catholics. On one occasion, a party of 
~' " i :· 'l .. ' . ' 
"B Specials" undertook a. rcdd: ·of v~ngeax:ce against southern Catholics until 
' 26 
they were forced back after a gun battle with a R. I. C. patrol. 
26rbid., 356-357, 384-387; Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 74-75, 81. 
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Collins' basic strategy was to disrupt and destroy the British 
intelligence system, especially the R. I. c., which was filled with native 
Irishmen. Collins felt that if Dublin Castle's network of spies and 
· f mers was sh tt d th B 't' h ld b bl t f · 27 H 1n or a ere , e ri 1s wou e una e o unction. ence, 
the R. I. C. became the prime target of I. R. A. gunmen; many wives of men 
in the R. I. C. had their hair shorn by Catholic women; the homes of R. I. 
C. officials were burned; and the relatives of people who were connected 
with the R. I. C. were socially ostracized. Yet, to protect Catholics, a 
R. I. C. unit fought a gun battle once with "Auxies" who were rampaging 
wildly through an Irish town. Hating the "Auxies, 11 "Black and Tans," and 
"B Specials," but hated themselves by the majority of the Irish people, 
Irishmen .resigned in droves from the R. I.. C., leaving the Crown constabu-
lary almost wholly to the Brftish. 28 
The winter of 1920-21 saw the "Black and Tans" and "Auxies" at the 
peak of their power. To avenge the death of two Crown officials, the 
11
'"lack and Tans" partially gutted the town .. of Balbriggan, killing several 
29 people, beating many, and burning a factory and a number of houses. In 
the fall of 1920, as the conflict continued unabated, the attention of the 
world had been fastened on Terence MacSwiney, who had replaced the murdered 
Lord Mayor of Cork and was an outspoken republican. MacSwiney was arrested. 
by Crown authorities in August for seditious behavior and was transported 
to an English prison, whereupon he went on a hunger strike. The world 
watched in fascinated horror as the British attempted to keep him alive; 
.'· 
27 ". Macard~e, The Irish Republic,· 306-307. 
~·- ""'.\ 
. . 
28 Ibid., 362; Street, Ireland i~ 1921, 52; Labour Party, Report 
of the Labour Commission, 9. 
-- . 
29Labour Party,· Report of the Labour Commission, 38-40. · 
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however, in October, MacSwiney died, a martyr to the cause of Irish 
nationalism, and his death stirred universal revulsion for Britain's 
tactics and compassion for the Irish cause. Crowds in London watched in 
respectful silence as MacSwiney's coffin was carried to the ship which was 
to take his body back to Ireland, where his burial was a day of national 
. 30 
mourning. 
The chilling horror of the Irish war was graphically underscored 
on Sunday, November 21, 1920. Michael Collins feared that British intel-
·· ligence was coming periously close to uncovering the I. R. A. 1 s underground 
operations, and he decided that the British intelligence network had to be 
disrupted. On Sunday morning, I. R. A. gunmen went into action in Dublin, 
bursting into the domiciles of the leading British intelligence officers 
and killing a. total of fourteen men, some of whom were shot whi.le in bed 
with their .wives. The British response was swift and terrible. That 
afternoon, R •. I. C. and "Black and Tans" units converged on Croke Park 
in Dublin, where several thousand people were watching a football game, 
in·the hope of trapping some of the gunmen involved in the shootings. The 
British claimed that a shot was fired from the crowd while the Irish 
claimed that the Crown forces fired first, but whichever version was the 
truth, all parties agreed that some of the "Black and Tanstr fired indis-
criminately into the crowd, killing a dozen people, wounding more than 
sixty, and causing hundreds to be trampled and injured as the terrified 
spectators panicked. The British claimed to have found thirty revolvers· 
on the ground afterwardsl but that could scarcely excuse such a cold-blooded t 
31 
massac;re. 
·' ~ . . .. 
30 3 9 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 83, 3 1-392. 
31 rbid., 398; Bennett, The Black and Tans, 121-128; Labour Party, 
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The counties of Cork, Kerry, Tipperary, and Limerick were placed 
under martial law in December, and a British proclamation declared that 
Irishmen convicted by court-martial in the military districts were subject 
to the death penalty if they had been charged with possessing arms or 
ammunition, harboring or aiding a suspected terrorist, or being a member 
of the I. R. A. One month later, the counties of Wexford, Waterford, 
Kilkenny, and Clare were put under martial law. 32 The I. R. A. frequently 
ambushed British patrols, and, after one such ambush wiped out a patrol 
in December, the "Auxies" and the "Black and Tans" sacked a large section 
of the city of Cork: Many people were beaten, two individuals suspected 
of having I. R. A. connections were summarily shot, and property damage 
was estimated at more than f.3,000,000. 33 
While the British were trying to tighten their grip on Ireland, 
I 
the Minister of Defence in the Dail cabinet, Cathal Brugha, took the con-
flict to Britain. In the winter of 1920~21, I. R. A. cells in Britain 
burned warehouses in Liverpool and carried out similar raids in Newcastle, 
Manchester, and Lo.ndon. 34 There were also attacks in England on relatives 
of British soldiers in Ireland; 35 plans were made to blow up docks and 
bridges throughout Britain, but a British raid on an I. R. A. unit in Dub-
lin produced a copy of these plans, and. hence, the operation was thwarted. 36 
32Macardle, ~ Irish Republic, 416, 418, 423. .•···.·, ,. 
33Ibid., 416-417; Labour Party, Report of the Labour Commission, 
33-38; Edgar Holt, Protest i£ ~:'.The Irish Troubles, 1916-1923 (N~w 
York, 1961), 231-232. · · · 
34Holt~ Protest in Arms, 231, 243. 
35street, Ireland l!! 1921, 23-27. 
36Macardle, ~ ~· Republic, 403-404. 
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The policy of carrying the war to Britain reflected the new tempo 
of the conflict, for the war reached a low point in viciousness and bru-
tality in early 1921. A conflict such as this one brings out the worst 
in human nature, and certainly, Ireland in 1920-21 displayed every facet 
of human squalor and degradation. As the I. R. A. continued its campaign 
of assassination and sabotage, the frustration and anger of the British 
became more evident. British troops ransacked or destroyed Irish houses 
in neighborhoods where an act of terror took place; any Irishman who 
refused to give information to Crown officials was regarded as a traitor 
and treated as such; and relatives of an I. R. A. suspect were sometimes 
beaten or shot. Individuals were picked at random by "Auxies" or "Black 
and Tansi' and beaten, flogged, spat upon, or forced to kneel. in the gutter 
and sing! "Gcid Save the 'King"--these petty, personal humiliations probably 
caused more bitterness than the large scale destruction. The torture of 
I. R. A. suspects became routine, and statements that suspects had been 
"shot while attempting to escape" were frequent. Life in Dublin was a 
nightmare of midnight searches and raids by Crown officials and of gun 
battles, ambushes, and assassinations; Erskine Childers, an English-born 
crusader for the Irish cause, wrote that when "the citizens go to bed, 
the barracks spring to life." Corpses were often foundmutilated, and 
in the provinces, the sight of persons having been hanged was not uncommon, 
though most people were not sure whether the individuals had been hanged 
by the British for being I. R. A. members or hanged by the I. R. A. for 
... 
·, ,• :.'• ; 
''·• •' 
' ' 
In Fe~ruar~, six I. R. A. captives were executed by the British, 
•· ;, .• l 
3 7Ibid., 330, 377-378, 423-424, 427; Labour Party, Report of the 
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and, that same day, six British soldiers were shot. The casualty lists 
for the first three months of 1921 were tabulated as 174 killed and 288 
wounded on the British side, and 317 killed and 285 wounded on the Irish 
. d (. 1 d. . . 1. ) 38 si e inc u ing civi ians • A two-day period in March was described 
as follows: A British officer was shot in Dublin; there was a bomb explo-
sion in Dublin; a British military vehicle was seized by the I. R. A.; a 
retired Crown official was.murdered at his home in County Cork; there was 
rioting in Belfast; a R. I. C. patrol was ambushed, with one person killed; 
a British armored car was attacked; there was an attempt to derail a train; 
the I. R. A. raided a farm in Ulster; a telephone office was burned; and 
. 39 
a person was found murdered in Kilkenny. The situation became so des-
perate that the British offered an incredible-tl0,000 reward to anyone 
who could give information leading to the capture of Michael Collins. 40 
There was a pitched gun battle in the streets of Dublin.on May 25, 1921, 
as an l• R. A. force of 120 men seized the Dublin Customs House and burned 
it in a successful attempt to destroy Crown records pertaining to. taxation 
and local government~ As the building was burning, a regiment of "Auxies" 
arrived, and a fight ensued, in which nearly eighty of the Irish were 
. 41 
captured. 
The British military was in an impossible situation, for it could 
. . 
not fight the I. R. A. in the conventional manner and could not even control 
38Macardle, The Irish Republic, 423-424, 429. 
39Mowcit, Britain Between the Wars, 79-80. 
4oMacardle, The Irish Republic, 424 • 
. 
41 Ibid., 462. 
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the "Auxies" or "Black and Tans." When the Army suspended several "Auxies" 
for unruly conduct and lack of discipline, the men in question threatened 
to publicize the activities of Crown forces in Ireland--Dublin Castle 
overruled the Army and reinstated the men. 42 The Lloyd George Government 
received tremendous opprobrium for British actions in Ireland. Of course, 
the British forces in Ireland were under great strain, and Irish terror 
tactics were certainly provocative. However, it was felt in many quarters 
that the British Government, the world's oldest example of government 
based on law, was sinking to the level of assassins and terrorists. This 
explains why most of the moral outrage was directed at the British rather 
than the Irish. At any rate, de Valera's prediction that the British 
would find it impossible to rule Ireland was manifestly being confirmed,· 
and the Government was faced with three alternatives: To let matters 
drift; to take an even harsher line and seek a total, military victory 
over the I. R. A.; or to attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. 
(2) 
At his moment of triumph in November 1918, Lloyd George was aware 
of the need to solve the Irish problem. He wrote to Bonar Law, saying 
that, in regard to Ireland, the British Government was hamstrung by two 
factor-s: The legal reality that the 1914 Home Rule bill was on the statute 
rolls and the pragmatic reality that Ulster could not be coerced. Lloyd 
,· 
George added that, in any event, th~ present condi pon of Ireland made a '· 
. . 4j 
settlement impossible. '. However, the condition of Ireland grew worse 
42 Ibid., 429. 
43Macardle, The Irish Republic, 261-262; D. G. Boyce, "How to Settle 
the Irish Question: Lloyd George and Ireland, 1916-21," Lloyd George: 
l!relve Essays, ed. by A. J. P. Taylor (New York, 1971), 146. 
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rather than better, and the need for some policy regarding Ireland was 
imperative. 
It was obvious in 1919 that the old solution of Parliamentary 
Home Rule was anachronistic. The Home Rule bill, however, had been 
accompanied by the Suspensory Act, which had suspended the operation of 
the bill until the principles of Irish Home Rule and Ulster's exclusion 
had been reconciled. This gave the Government a chance to offer the Irish 
more than the provisions of the Home Rule bill. In September 1919, the 
Cabinet decided to formulate a new Home Rule measure.44 A special Cabinet 
subcommittee--to which Birkenhead was appointed--was established to deal 
with the Irish problem, and in November, the subcommittee reported to the 
Cabinet: 
.. it is essential, now that the war is over, and that 
the Peace Conference has dealt with so many analogous 
questions in Europe, that the Government should make a 
sincere attempt to deal with the Irish question once and 
. for all. 45 
The subcommittee's proposals were stated by Lloyd George when he 
introduced the Government of Ireland bill in the Commons on December 22, 
1919. This bill proposed to establish a Parliament in Dublin which would 
have autonomy over twenty-six counties of Ireland, and a Pa.rliament in 
Belfast, which would have autonomy over the six counties of Ulster (Armagh, 
Antrim, Down, Derry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh). A "council of Ireland" was to 
be created which would be composed of members of the two Parliaments and 
Would deal with problems common to both areas; the council was also intended 
t.o serve as a'b~si·~ for .. th~~ eutJre·' ·_unJ:'fiC:ai:ion of 'Irelarid:(; Howe've~,:i~;~e!·bilJi' 
- . '' ·, ··.·· 
Taylor 
' 
44win:ston Churchill, The Aftermath, 298. 
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146-147. 
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gave Westminster control over foreign policy, defense, taxation, and cus-
d . .d . 46 toms an excise uties. 
These proposals were, of course, rejected by Sinn Fein and yet, 
were regarded by Ulster and the Unionists as being too radical. The debate 
over the Ireland bill lasted for much of 1920, and Birkenhead labored 
mightily for its passage. He used his personal influence with Carson to 
win his grudging support for the bill, 47 which undoubtedly helped it pass 
48 the Commons on November 11, 1920. In addition, Birkenhead was responsible 
for steering the bill through the Lords, where many Unionist peers were 
distinctly disenchanted with the Government's policy, and his accomplish-
ment was.such that Curzon wrote to him, saying that the "Irish Bill in 
particular is your triumph. 1149 On December 23, 1920, the .Government of 
50 
Ireland Act received the Royal Assent. 
The motives .of the Government in sponsoring the Ireland bill have 
been subject to question. One historian felt that the Government was 
mainly interested in impressing world opinion, particularly in the United 
States and in the Dominions, with the integrity of Britain's policy in 
51 Ireland. This view would appear to be confirmed by a letter which 
Birkenhead wrote in November 1919, in which he said that the reason that· 
46Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1919, 5th Series, CXXIII, 1168-
1187. 
472nd Earl of Birkenhead,!·!·' 361~362. i; 
i 48Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1920, 5th Series, CXXXIV, 1463-
1466. 
49 2nd Earl of Birl)enhead, !: !•, 363.-365. 
50 ' , Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1920, 5th Series, CXXXVI, 2249-
2250. 
51Mowat, Britain Between the~' 73. 
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the subcommittee had recommended such reasonable proposals was the belief 
that Sinn Fein would reject them, thus undermining Sinn Fein's moral posi-
ti on: 
Otherwise in the present state of Ireland I could not even 
be a party to making the offer, for I believe that the Sinn 
Feiners if they did accept their Parliament, would only use 
it for the purpose of forwarding separation.52 
By the evidence of this letter, Birkenhead saw the Ireland bill simply as 
a tactical weapon to use against Sinn Fein. There can be little doubt that 
Birkenhead had less regard for Sinn Fein, which he viewed as a party of 
doctrinaire revolutionaries, than for Redmond's Irish Nationalist Party, 
with which he had been willing to deal before 1914. Birkenhead's son 
claimed that he supported the bill because it enabled Westminster to sus-
pend the Dublin Parliament if Sinn Fein secured control of it and undertook 
radical measures, such as secession from the Union. 53 Regardless of his or 
the Governme,nt 's motives, Birkenhead was instrumental in the passage of the. 
1920 Ireland bill, and as Winston Church.ill later wrote, this bill effec-
tively ended the Union, for it made Ulster . 
. . . a special entity clothed with constitutional 
form, possessing all the organs and administration. 
From that moment the position of Ulster became unassail-
able. It could never again be said that Ulster Protes-
tants barred the aspirations of their Southern country-
men. 54 
. . 
Lest his Government be accused of being "soft" on Sinn Fein, Lloyd George 
also instituted a hard-line program ,against,.the Irish terrorists. In_ April .. 
. . . - .f - , '• -·. :· . . :. - ,.·· ,. ;;.«' 
1920, he named one of hi:s private advisers as Chief Secretary of Ireland, 
I. 
52 Boyce, "How to Settle the Irish Question," Lloyd George, ed. by 
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Sir Hamar Greenwood, who acted as an exuberant cheerleader for the activi-
ties of the "Black and Tans" and the "Auxies." Lloyd George then introduced 
a tough coercion bill, the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, which the 
Commons enthusiastically approved on August 6, 1920.55 
During 1920, Lloyd George's views on Ireland were strongly in-
fluenced by Sir Henry Wilson, who was now Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff. 56 To say that Wilson favored a harsh policy towards the Irish would 
be a considerable understatement. Wilson wanted a complete military victory 
over the I. R. A. and spent a great deal of time attempting to persuade 
Lloyd George to place all of Ireland under martial law--except Ulster, of 
57 course. Wilson's unceasing efforts resulted in eight counties finally 
being declared military districts, but in the winter of 1920-21, Wilson 
found this to be inadequate. He was upset about the policy of ''unauthor-
ized" reprisals that was being practiced by irregular forces, like the 
"Black and Tans" and the "Auxies," but not, however, for any humanitarian 
reasons--Wilson distrusted Lloyd George and feared that he would later 
bl h . . 58 ame the military for t e atrocities. Wilson wanted the Government to 
assume responsibility for authorized. reprisals, a~~ he advocated a. "clean~ 
cut policy" ofmurders "by roster" carried out by plain-clot~esmen. More-
over, Wilson wanted a blockade of the Irish coast, complete press censorship, 
and a severe policy towards CathOlic priests, whom he regarded as subversive 
55Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1920, 5th Series, CXXXII, 2961-
., ... 
56Keith Middlemas, ed., ThOmas Jori.es: 
l!:eland: 1918-1925 (London,t 1971), 14. 
Whitehall Diary, Vo 1 ~ frt: 
57charles Edward Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His 
Life· and Diaries . 11 (New York, 1927), 262, 271-272, 274. 
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58rbid., 263-264. 
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59 
agents. As the Irish conrlict became more brutal, Wilson approached the 
borderline of hysteria: He urged the closing of all banks and post offices 
to disrupt the I, R. A. 's flow of money and correspondence and, iri order to 
reduce the mobility of the I. R. A., called for the confiscation of all motor 
vehicles, bicycles, and horses. Furthermore, Wilson estimated that, if the 
British were to put a force of between 100,000 and 200,000 men in Ireland, 
complete victory could be achieved after two years of concentrated fighting. 60 
As in the past, Wilson's strongest ally was Bonar Law, who felt that 
military coercion was the only answer and that "the Irish were an inferior 
race. 1161 Due to his·nonconformist upbringing, Lloyd. George may also have 
. been biased against Catholics, and one prominent historian has suggested 
that Lloyd George had no sympathy for Irish Catholics because he had re-
ceived little help from Catholics in his fight against Balfour Is Education 
Act of 1902, which he thought had given preferential status to Anglican 
Church schools.62 At any rate, Lloyd George and his ministry took ~n 
antagonistic attitude towards Irish freedom as expressed by Sinn Fein and 
I . -
the Dail; throughout 1920, Birkenhead and other members of the Cabinet 
publicly supported the Crown forces in Ireland as defenders of law and 
63 
order. 
In October, Birkenhead was involved in a fascinating encounter 
59Ibid., 271. 
60Ibid., 281, 305. 
61Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diary, III, 49-50. 
62Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, 155-156. 
632nd Earl of Birkenhead, K· f., 357-358. 
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with the I. R. A. Months before, he had been invited to speak at Trinity 
College in Dublin, but in October, he was advised that conditions in Ireland 
made his scheduled visit a grave security risk and that it should be cancelled. 
Nevertheless, Birkenhead insisted on fulfilling his obligation, and Inspector 
Harold Brust of Scotland Yard was assigned to be his bodyguard. Birkenhead 
travelled openly, without any attempt to conceal his identity or to travel 
by a circuitous route; in fact, he disregarded security advice to such an 
extent that Inspector Brust thought that he was daring the I. R. A. to make 
an attack on him. The temptation for the I. R. A. was great, for not only 
was Birkenhead a leading member of the Cabinet, but he was personally 
loathed by the Irish nationalists for his Orange activities before the war 
and for his prosecution of Sir.Roger Casement. When he arrived in Dublin, 
he was greeted with the news which Dublin Castle had received from an 
informer that the "Brotherhood has sentenced him. 11 Birkenhead smiled 
enigmatically at this report and said, "Thank you, rr. but he .r.efused to 
travel in an armed motorcade or to have more security men assigned to him. 
After making his speech at Trinity College, he impulsively decided to walk 
back to the Viceregal Lodge so that he could do some shopping and sightseeing! 
He and the nervous.Brust walked leisurely through the streets of Dublin, and 
as Birkenhead stopped frequently to browse in a shop, to look at a building 
or monument, or to light a cigar, Brust noticed that three men were following 
them. While Birkenhead and Brust were walking through Phoenix Park, 
!' . ' ."· - ··.·: .• ' :.: 
Birkenhead pointed out the spot where ~.ord Frederick Cavendish had been· · 
assassinated by terrorist~ in 1882; Brust:, glancing at the three men behind 
them, did not appreciate the gallows humor. By this time, Brust had given 
up hope of surviving and was pondering how many of the gunmen he would be 
able to shoot before he and Birkenhead were killed. To Brust's amazement, 
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the three men suddenly stopped and, after a moment, turned and walked 
·away. 
This riddle was solved in July 1921 when a truce had been declared 
and negotiations were being held between Lloyd George and de Valera in 
London. Inspector Brust was assigned to Downing Street, and on the occasion 
of one of the meetings, Brust recognized a member of de Valera's entourage 
as one of the three men who had followed Birkenhead and him in Dublin the 
previous October. The man recognized Brust also, for he walked over to him 
and asked, "How is 'Galloper' Smith?" The Irishman, with a guarantee of 
safe conduct by the British, confessed that he was a member. of the I. R. A. 
and that he and the other two men had been assigned the task of killing 
Birkenhead •. He said that they had been so impressed by Birkenhead's non-
chalance, his mocking defiance of the I. R. A., that they had spontaneously 
decided to spare his life, as a salute to his courage. The gunman then said: 
"Good luck to him. He's a man liishmen will always admire. 1164 
Meanwhile, public opinion in Britain was turning against the brutal, 
endless conflict in Ireland. The Labour Party, in Parliamentary speeches 
and in trade union publications, was vociferously outspoken in its condem:.... 
nation of the Government's Irish policy, and important newspapers, such as 
~Times, the Daily Mail, the Daily News, and the Manchester Guardian, 
condemned the trend of the Irish situation and exposed the horrible atro..; 
65 
cities, particularly those committed by Crown forces. Sir Harold 
Nicolson later wrote that the "reign of terror" in Ireland was Hfilling 
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the minds and hearts of British citizens with the mixed anguish of per-
plexity, resentment and shame. 11 66 
Publicly, the Government maintained a posture of unbending resolu-
tion to defeat the I. R. A. and of refusal to compromise with terrorism. 
Speaking at Carnavon in October, Lloyd George supported the efforts of the 
Crown forces in Ireland and said that the Irish would be granted a limited 
form of self-government but not full Dominion status. 67 One month later, 
in a speech at the Guild Hall, Lloyd George enthusiastically defended the 
activities of the "Black and Tans" and "Auxies" as necessary to combat the 
I. R. A. and, in a phrase which delighted the Tories, said that the British 
had "murder by the throat. 1168 Despite his public stance, Lloyd George ha.d 
his doubts about the Irish war, but he was uncertain as to the most feasible 
policy to adopt. On the one hand,. he.was advised by Sir Henry Wilson that 
a military ~ictory was th~ only solution and even Churchill, at the War 
Office, felt that Government_;authorized reprisals were better thanthe 
unautho~ized reprisals which, he thought, had a degenerative effect on 
British soldiers; on the other hand, Lloyd George indicated privately 
that he might be amenable to negotiations, but he thought that Sinn Fein 
would not negotiate until it had been battered into a bargalning position·. 69 
Lloyd George was also cognizant of the fact that his Government was 
dependent on Unionist support and that the Tories had traditionally favored 
a tough, no-nonsense approach to Ireland. Yet, in December, Wilson wrote 
in his diary that Lloyd George, Churchill, and Austen Chamberlain had been 
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discussing the possibility of a limited truce in Ireland. 70 As 1920 gave 
way to 1921, the Government's Irish policy was in a state of flux, as the 
Cabinet groped for the key to the Irish dilemma. 
A possible basis for negotiations came from a surprising source--
Eamon de Valera. While touring the United States in February 1920, de 
Valera had stated in a newspaper interview that he would accept an agree-
ment in which Britain guaranteed Ireland's independence, and in return, 
the Irish would guarantee that Ireland would never enter into a treaty 
which compromised Irish independence or jeopardized British security. 71 
During the debate before the final vote on the Government of Ireland bill 
in November 1920, another basis for a compromise settlement was provided by 
William Adamson, the chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who out-
lined Labour's. policy for Ireland: Completely withdrawing British military 
forces from Ireland; leaving the question of Ireland's Government to an 
Irish constituent assembly which would be elected "by free, equal, and 
secret vote" and on a basis.of proportional representation; and accepting 
whatever decision th.e constituent assembly reached, provided that it did 
not jeopardize the rights of any minority in Ireland nor the national 
. f B . . 72 security o ritain. Needless to say, the Government did not seriously 
consider such a course. A real possibility for a settlement seemed to 
. . 
appear in December due to the efforts of Archbishop Clune of Perth, 
Australia, who visited Lloyd George to discuss the Irish war and found 
the Prime Min:ister wi llirig to consider a truce in Ireland. Clune then 
70callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 274. 
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spoke to Arthur Griffith, and he discovered that Griffith and Collins would 
agree to a truce on the condition that the I. R. A. would not have to 
surrender its arms. Lloyd George's attitude had changed, however, when 
Clune reported back to him because the Galway County Council in Ireland 
had publicly urged the D~il to negotiate with the British and because of a 
telegram which the Prime Minister had received from Father 0 1 Flanagan, a 
leading member of Sinn Fein, who said that Ireland was "willing to make 
73 peace." Hence, the Cabinet felt that Sinn Fein was losing its grip on 
Ireland, and thus, there was no need to deal with the rebels at the present 
time, as it was to Britain's advantage to wait until Sinn Fein had been 
74 
weakened to a much greater extent. Lloyd George expressed this sentiment 
in.an inflexible speech in the Commons, in which he stated that the British 
Government did not recognize "the body called the D~il fil.reann" and. would 
hm. . 1 d . . f . . h B • · h f 75 nOt. negotiate with any Iris · en invo ve in war are wit ri tis · orces. 
The year of 1920 ended on a sour note as the Cabinet decided to 
' 76 
embark on a program of authorized reprisals in Ireland .by Crown forces, · 
and in February 1'921, the Government's policy was reflected in a statement 
which Birkenhead made to Salvidge in which he said that, as matters stood, 
77 
the answer to the Irish question.was force. 
2607~ 
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(3) 
In the first half of 1921, the Cabinet came to realize that it 
could not allow matters to drift, that it must make a firm decision to seek 
either a military settlement or a negotiated settlement. Many Unionists 
were becoming increasingly restive with what they regarded as the Govern-
ment's wishy-washy policy and desired a clean-cut military victory over 
Sinn Fein and the I. R. A. 78 However, the Cabinet was receiving disturbing 
reports from the military. General Macready, the British commander in 
Ireland, told the War Office that the strain on his soldiers a_nd officers 
was unbearable and that if the war was still continuing in October, his men 
would have ta. be replaced. and an entirely new force sent. to Ireland. The 
Cabinet·disparaged Macready 1 s· predictions, but to receive such a report 
. . 79 
from a major conunander was unsettling to say the. least. The Government's 
paralysis of will was dramatically illustrated when Sir Henry Wilson, 
venting the anger of the hard-liners, publicly criticized the Government's 
Irish policy for its timidity, but the Cabinet dared not dismiss or 
reprimand him because of his popularity with the Unionist rank~and-file. 80 
Churchill later wrote that the military never gave him "any practical or 
useful advice" on the subject of Ireland, 81 and for the Cabinet's considera-
tion, Churchill gave his own estimate of the prerequisites necessary for a 
military victory over the I. R. A.: Approximately 100,000 additional 
78 Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall .of Lloyd George, 82-83. 
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soldiers, thousands of armored vehicles, sweeping powers of search and 
seizure for the military, and the extensive use of blockhouses and barbed 
wire which had proven to be effective against the Boers in South Africa 
two decades earlier. 82 Thus, if the Cabinet decided to seek a military 
victory by following Wilson's proposals or the more modest plan outlined 
by Churchill, there would be greatly increased military expenditures at a 
time when the economic situation was deteriorating and public support for 
the war was declining. Furthermore, such a massive build-up of military 
forces in Ireland would strain Britain's military posture in other parts 
of the world uriless the Government adopted the policy of conscription to 
meet the needs of the Irish war, which was; of course, unthinkable• 
The course of events in Ireland had troubled many thoughtful people, 
including the King, who, as in the prewar years, sought a peaceful .solution 
. to the Iri'sh malaise. George V was ''outraged" by the atrocities which had· 
beencoinmitted by the "Black and Tans" and the 11Auxies 11 iri the n~e of·the 
Crown and was very disturbed by conflicting reports over the conduct of the 
war.· Greenwood, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, was giving the King 
optimistic reports which related that "everywhere the move is upward towards. 
improvement" (November 1920); and, in the spring of 1921, Greenwood told 
theKing that "the Republican movement is crumbling, owing to the gallant 
police and military." The Lord Lieutenant; however, told the King that the 
situation in Ireland was "shocking and lamentable," and the monarch was 
further informed by General Macready that the I. R. A. could be defeated 
but only by meth?ds so hars.h and punitive that the "conscience of the 
Brit.ish people" would be r~volted. Stamfordham expressed the King.' s concern 
; 
' '. 
'. 
· 
82 rbid. ,·, 304-305. 
in a letter to Greenwood, in which he asked: 
• if this policy of reprisals is to be continued and, 
if so, to where will it lead Ireland and us all? It seems 
to His Majesty that in punishing the guilty we are inflict-
ing punishment no less severe upon the innocent. 
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By the spring of 1921, George V was firmly convinced that a policy of 
conciliation was preferable to continuing the bJoodshed and misery. 83 
Lloyd George, too, was extremely perplexed about the war. The 
Prime Minister told a visiting delegation of ecclesiastical officials who 
were critical of the war that as long as the Irish insisted on a republic, 
"the present evils must go on. 1184 When a highly respected Irish Unionist, 
the Earl of Midleton, told the Prime Minister that the war was not being 
Won, Lloyd George could only repeat assurances from his military advisers 
that Ireland would be peaceful enough for the scheduled elections to be 
held in May (under the provisions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act). 85 . 
By April even the ebullient Greenwood was telling Lloyd ·George that the 
prospect~ for an early end to the war were not as bright as he had thought. 86 
The situation in Ireland was so critical that the Cabinet considered post-
poning the May election because of possible I. R. A. disruptions or, worse 
yet, another massive Sinn Fein victory at the polls. The Cabinet members 
decided to hold the election, fearing that a postponement would discredit 
the Government and negate the provisions· of the Ireland Act. The idea for 
a truce was debated but rejected. According to Thomas Jones, the assistant 
· 
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secretary to the Cabinet, Balfour was the most adamant member against 
conciliation, and Jones wrote that Lloyd George was afraid that he would 
seem weak if he proposed negotiations. 87 
Secret efforts were being undertaken by various individuals in the 
spring of 1921 to break the Irish deadlock. One of these individuals was 
Lord Derby, the foremost figure in Lancashire Unionist politics, who 
visited de Valera in April to ascertain the Irish leader's views on a 
compromise settlement. De Valera later told Randolph Churchill in an 
interview that he told Derby that the British must recognize Ireland as 
an independent republic. Derby said that it would be impossible for the 
British Government to make such a concession, but de Valera was adamant; 
. 88 
.the next day, Derby gave his pessimistic report to Lloyd George. Fearing 
that the British would attempt to divide the Irish through the tactics of 
a."peace offensive," de Valera was furious when he learned that the Cardinal 
89 
· of Armagh had told Derby that ·the· Irish might accept Dominion Home Rule. · 
In May, a Dublin Castle official named Alfred Cope arranged a meeting between 
de. Valera and the Ulster leader, Sir James Craig, in Dublin. Craig was 
escor.ted by I.. R. A. soldiers to meet de Valera--an act of considerable 
courage by Craig, since there was no one whom Sinn Fein would rather have 
seen removed from the scene-:--but no progress was made in the meeting. 
There is general agreement that the discussion was a rather one-sided affair, 
as de Valera dwelled on the moral basis .of British rule in .Ireland an.d,, in 
the words of Craig's biographer; was "harping on the grievances of Ireland 
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for the last 700 years instead of coming down to practical present day 
d . . . ,,90 iscussion. 
De Valera knew that the I. R. A. could not defeat the British, that 
the only course was to outlast them until public opinion in Britain sickened 
of the war of attrition. He felt that the Irish could get the best terms 
91 from the British by showing a united front and by playing hard to get. 
For the British Government, the number of options in Ireland was rapidly 
decreasing. The Chief Secretary, Greenwood, was vehemently opposed to any 
truce because it would, he felt, serve no purpose other than giving the 
I. R. A. a desperately needed respite from Crown pressure, and Lloyd George 
feared losing face if the offer of a truce was rejected by the Irish. 92 
Although he was still leaning towards the position of Greenwood and the 
military, Lloyd George gave an interview in May to a New York Herald 
correspondent in which he said that he would be willing to meet the Irish 
. 93 
without any advance conditions or promises •. 
The question of whether to seek a military or negotiated settlement 
in Ireland dominated Cabinet discussion throughout the spring of. 1921 until 
a crucial meeting of the Cabinet in the middle of May finally tipped the 
balance in favor of negotiations. Lloyd George had finally decided in 
favor of. the hard.;..line solution advocated by Greenwood and the military, 
and ·he assumed as a matter of course that he could rely on "the age-long 
90Ibid.~ 122-12~; St. John Ervine, Craigavon, Ulsterman (London, 
.. ~9i49)' 411-. - \ 
91L~~~ford, and O'Neil{, E~o'n::d·~ Valer~, ·lll-118. 
_, " ' ~ I · t .:·J.; . ,, ' ~ ': .;, I '.J. 92Middlem~~, ea:·: 'wiii ~~h~ll 'n1fary·; .III: 63 ff· . 
93 . Macardle, The Irish Republic, 450-451. 
165 
94 loyalties of the Conservative Party." However, when Lloyd George 
presented the Cabinet with his proposal for a military victory, he was 
"startled" to discover that several leading members of the Cabinet rejected 
a purely military solution, saying that any military offensive must be 
accompanied by a political offensive. 95 In his memoirs, Churchill was 
infuriatingly vague as to the identity of the men--besides himself--who 
refuted Lloyd George, but subsequent research by other historians revealed 
that there were three Cabinet members who fought against the military 
policy whi~h the rest of the Cabinet was inclined to support: Churchill, 
Birkenhead, and Austen Chamberlain. 96 These three men stated that a new 
military offensive should not be undertaken without an "offer of the widest 
possible measure of self""'. government to Southern Ireland11 ; their theory 
was that if Sinn Fein rejected a generous offer for a negotiated se~tle-
ment, the onus for contin~ing the war would be placed on the Irish leaders. 
They suspected--correctly, as it turned out--that the Irish people were 
sick of conflict, and Sinn Fein would lose much popular support by insisting 
on protracted warfare. Furthermore, sympathy for the Irish cause would be 
greatly lessened in America and the Dominions, and most importantly, public 
opinion in Britain would support a major escalation of the war only if the 
Government had a reasonable case to present. 97 
When they were asked if their offer of self-government would allow 
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an Irish Parliament to "levy a tariff against British goods," a curt 
question was given in reply: "How can this petty matter be weighed 
against the grievous action we are preparing?1198 Churchill later wrote 
that, as a result of this Cabinet discussion, Lloyd George realized that 
"a policy of unmitigated repression in Ireland would not command whole-
hearted support even among the Conservatives. 1199 According to the foremost 
authority on the Irish settlement, Lord Pakenham, the opposition of 
Churchill, Birkenhead, and Chamberlain to a military solution irrevocably 
turned Lloy'd George away from the policy advocated by Greenwood and Sir 
H W'l 100 enry 1 son. 
The problem for the Government now was to find a propitious moment 
to offer.negotiations, the logical decision being to await the results of 
the elections on May 24. These elections were for membership to the Dublin 
and Belfast Parliaments; and, as expected, Craig's party won a landslide 
victory in Ulster, but Sinn Fein made a farce of the election in the South 
. "' by treating it as an election to the Dail. The result was a repetition of 
the 1918 election as Sinn Fein candidates swept every seat in southern 
Ireland except for Dublin University, whose four M. P.s made up the House 
of Commons in the Dublin Parliament. lOl The day following the election, 
the I. R. A. launched its largest attack--the aforementioned battle in which 
the Dublin Customs House was destroyed. In these circumstances, any offer 
from the British Government would have appeared as negotiating from weakness. 
,{ 
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Nothing could have displayed the Government's bleak attitude more than a 
pessimistic speech which Birkenhead made in the Lords on June 21 to defeat 
a motion for a negotiated settlement in Ireland. The topic under discussion 
was fiscal autonomy for Ireland; and, espousing the official Government line, 
Birkenhead not only denounced the idea of fiscal autonomy but went on to say 
that the Government would never concede the existence of an independent 
Irish republic. If the Irish persisted in fighting for- such a ludicrous 
goal, he warned them of the consequences: 
.• ·. should we be forced to the melancholy conclusion that 
by force and by force alone can these mischiefs be extirpated, 
it is a conclusion which, however sorrowfully, we shall accept, 
and upo?o~hich we shall not hesitate logically and completely 
to act. . 
. ' 
At this juncture i~ the conflict, the initiati~e was taken by the 
Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Christian Smuts, who, in June, was in 
London to attend an Imperial conference. Smuts told Lloyd George that 
Britain's Irish policy was "a negation of all the principles of government 
which we have professed as the basis of Empire" and pointed out the cost 
to Britain. in both financial and moral terms. 103 Smuts impressed upon the 
Prime Minister and the King that the latter's scheduled appearance in 
Belfast for the opening of the Ulster Parliamen.t was a tremendous opportun-
ity to express a new direction in policy. Smuts drafted a speech for the 
King in which George V was to offer self-rule to Ireland on the same basis 
as the Dom~nions and, although stipulating that Ulster would not be coerced, 
the monarch was to hold out the prospect of a settlement in which all dif-
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from the King's speech, but the tone of goodwill remained. George V and 
Queen Mary visited Belfast on June 22--the day after Birkenhead's speech--
to officiate at the opening of the new Parliament and new government for 
Northern Ireland, of which Craig was the Prime Minister. In his dedication 
speech, the King spoke not only to Ulster but to the whole of Ireland when 
he urged an end to the warfare and a settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means, and he called on all Irishmen "to stretch out the hand of forebear-
d . l" . "105 ance an conci iation. 
The King's address made a profound impression throughout the world, 
for even the most ardent Sinn Fein republican did not doubt the personal 
sincerity and integrity of George V. As the King's biographer wrote, the 
106 
speech"inaugurated a new and wiser stage in the whole disordered story." 
The leaders of the D~il, however, might well have been pardoned if they had 
wondered which statement reflected Britain 1 s. pol icy towards Ireland: 
Birkenhead 1.s speech in the Lords on June 21 or the King's· address in Belfast 
on June 22. Their question was soon to be answered because, on June 24, 
Lloyd George invited de Valera--who had been captured by Crown forces on 
107 June .22 and released the following day --and Craig to London for a 
discussion of the Irish situation.. Taking advantage of the improved atmos-
phere created by the Belfast speech, Lloyd George said that 11 the King's 
appeal for reconciliation in Ireland should not have been made in vain" 
and express-ed the hope that the conference could be "in the spirit of 
108 
conciliation for which His Majesty appealed." Lloyd George's invitation 
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to the two Irish leaders, like the King's speech, had an electrifying 
effect throughout the world, and it placed the Sinn Fein leaders in a 
difficult position because they were wary of a conference with the British 
but, if they refused to attend the conference, their seemingly unreasonable 
stance would cause them to lose a great deal of sympathy. There was the 
additional factor of the weariness of the Irish people, who were willing 
to accept a generous offer of self-government; if most Irishmen had been 
given a choice of continued warfare or a negotiated settlement, they would 
h h 'h 1 h 1 . 1 109 ave c osen t e atter course overw e ming y. 
Despite his uncompromising speech in the Lords on June 21, Birkenhead 
played a leading role in the Government's new policy towards Ireland. Thomas 
Jones recorded that when Lloyd George had proposed sending the invitation to 
Craig and de Valera, Birkenhead and Churchill had been the Prime Minister's 
strongest supporters within the Cabinet. They maintained that if the Irish 
were amenable to all of the British proposals except for the taxation and 
fiscal questions, ther~ was certainly no reason to continue the blood~hed 
and destruction. When several Cabinet members expressed skepticism about 
the value of meeting the .Sinn Fein leaders, Birkenhead replied that it would 
be useful to hear the other side's position before taking any drastic mili-
t . 110 ary action. 
On June 28, Craig accepted Lloyd George's invitation, but on the 
same day, de Valera said that Britain's refusal to recognize Ireland's 
unity and right of self-determination made any conference useless. However, 
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de Valera held out a slight olive branch when he said that he would respond 
"more fully" after consulting his colleagues. At the same time, de Valera 
invited Ulster and southern Unionist leaders, such as Craig and Lord Midleton, 
to confer with him before he made his decision. Craig and de Valera then 
became engaged in a psychological fencing match: If Craig went to Dublin 
with the other Unionists to confer with de Valera, he would be implicitly 
recognizing de Valera as Ireland's leader and spokesman; if de Valera met 
Lloyd George and Craig in London, he would be acknowledging Craig as his 
111 
equal. Craig refused to meet de Valera, but Midleton did go to Dublin 
and was convinced that de Valera would confer with Lloyd George if the 
British agreed to a truce while the conference lasted. Midleton journeyed 
112. to London and persuaded Lloyd George to give his written consent to a truce. 
De Valera still balked at a meeting. He invited Smuts to Dublin 
for a discussion on June JO, and on July S, Smuts arrived in Dublin as 
"Mr. Smith" for his secret meeting with the Irish. Smuts met de Valera 
and several other Sinn Fein leaders, including Arthur Griffith. Smuts stressed 
that he came as .a disinterested party, not as a British agent, and that he 
fully understood the Irish position. He told the Irish that the British 
people wanted an end to the war, that the King wanted peace, and that the 
Belfast speech had been a true indication of the King's feelings. De Valera 
said that no one doubted the sincerity of the King, only that of the Cabinet 
and, especfally, of Lloyd George. Smuts stated to de Valera that, if he 
did not 'go to London, it would be "the greatest mistake of his life," for 
.. he and :sinn Fe.~n: wo~ld l<;Hle ~li s~p~thy .and unde~st~ndini i~ the Do~·ii"iions 
' " ,j 
and in the United States. be Valera then ~entioned the two major obstacles 
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from the Irish point of view: The partition of Ireland and Ireland's status 
as a republic. Smuts replied that the 1920 Ireland Act had made partition a 
bogus issue; Ulster, which had always blocked an Irish settlement, was 
removed from consideration, and Sinn Fein should thus concentrate on secur-
ing self-rule for Catholic Ireland. As for the second obstacle, Smuts advised· 
the Irish to accept Dominion status. He vouched for British generosity from 
first-hand experience and said that South Africa had prospered much more as 
a British Dominion than as an independen~ republic: "As a friend, I cannot 
advise too strongly against a Republic." .smuts felt that de Valera would 
accept Dominion status and--significantly, in view of later events--thought 
113 that Arthur Griffith, in particular, had accepted his arguments. When 
Smuts reported the discussion to the Government leaders on July 6, he 
described the Sinn Fein leaders as "small men, rather like sporadic leaders 
. . 114 
thrown, up in a labour strike•" 
On that same day, a Cabinet meeting was held to discuss the proposed 
conference, and once again, Chur.chill and Birkenhead took the lead in support 
of negotiations. Churchill emphasized the failure of reprisals and force in 
Ireland, and when the question of protocol arose as to whether the Government 
should talk to de Valera without Craig, Birkenhead stated that the British 
should talk to de Valera with ot without Craig. The Cabinet would have 
preferred a "gentlemanly understanding" rather than a formal truce, but 
Lloyd George's. agreement with Lord Midleton, which had been conveyed to de 
V . 1 . 1 115 alera, rendered that fee ing irre evant. On July 8, 1921, de Valera 
113 Hancock, Smuts, II, 56-58; Longford and 0'Neill 1 Eamon de Valera, 
l30-13L : 
114Middlem~s, ea.·, Whitehall Diary; III, 83. 
' 115
rbid., 84. 
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publicly agreed to the truce and conference, and a ceasefire went into 
. 116 
effect in Ireland three days later. 
1161ongford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 131-132. 
VI 
THE ANGLO-IRISH SETTLEMENT 
(1) 
News of the truce in Ireland burst upon the world with the effect 
of a thunderbolt: "There had been nothing quite like it since the Arntis-
. " h. . 1 tice, one 1stor1an wrote. Especially in Ireland, people "were carried 
away on a wild tide of.exultation and hope" by the ceasefire and the impend-
. 2 
ing conference between Lloyd George and de Valera. 
On the surface, the truce was a victory for the Irish because the 
ceasef'ire document recognized the belligerent status of the I. R. A .• , with 
its references to "Irish officers and men, 11 "lines of communication," and 
the like. 3 A contemporary writer pointed out another factor of signifi-
cance in the truce: ''It was for the first time definitely established 
that force could wrest from the British Empire concessions that years of 
peaceful advocacy had failed to win. 114 Despite this seeming victory, the 
I. R. A. was in a very poor state by July 1921. The war of attrition had 
depleted its ranks--unit operations and ambushes had been curtailed--while 
•·. . · · · 
1n. C.· Soinervelf, ~ Reign of Kin&·, Ge~rge the ·Fifth: An English 
Chror{icle (L6ndein; 1935), 275..:.276~ T · ' . 
2 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 477. 
3
street, Ireland in 1921, 142-143. 
4Ibid., 144. 
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British troops were being reinforced and were relentlessly increasing 
pressure on the I. R. A. That the British were perfecting their methods 
of dealing with the Irish underground was dramatically illustrated by the 
capture of de Valera on June 22. 5 
The negotiations between the British and the Irish were undertaken 
in a spirit of mutual hostility. Th~ Irish did not trust Lloyd George. 
De Valera had been warned by Lord Midleton, a Unionist, to have witnesses 
when he conferred with the Prime Minister whom, Midleton said, could not 
be relied upon to honor any promise that he mig~t make. 6 . On the British 
side, many Unionists were astounded and then enraged by the Government's 
decision to deal with terrorists. Sir Henry Wilson, reflecting the view-
point. of the Tory right-wing, privately referred to the truce as "pure 
cowardice" and the negotiations as an "abject surrender. 117 
It has been contended that the British were close to achieving 
military victory, and, had the Government continued to apply force instead 
of seeking a negotiated settlement, the I,; R. A. might have been compelled 
to surrender. Leopold Amery, Sir Hamar Greenwood's brother-in-law, wrote 
in his memoirs that Greenwood had been told by Michael Collins that "You 
had us dead beat. We could not have lasted another three weeks. When we 
were told of the offer of a truce we were astounded. We thought you must 
8 have gone mad." This view has been substantiated by the opinion of an 
5 Ibid., 147. 
6Longford and O'Neill, Eamoh'.de Va.lera, 131. 
7 . 
Call~ell, Sir Henry Wilson, _II, 297, 300. 
~. ' '' ~. ;, :· ·' ; 8 ·I 
. L. s. Amery, ~Political Life, Vol. II: ~and Peace, 1914-.1929 
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Irish historian who wrote that the British ''were nearer to success than 
. 9 
they knew but they did not know, and they were outbluffed and outlasted." 
However, as Smuts told Lloyd George, the cost of continuing the war would 
have been terrible, in both financial and moral terms. As it was, the 
Government undertook negotiations with Sinn Fein and, over the vehement 
opposition of the military, attempted to conciliate the Irish by releasing 
I . h . h h d b . d b . 1 lO ris prisoners w o a een convicte y court-martia • 
De Valera arrived in London on July 12 with a party that included 
Arthur Griffith and committed republicans like Erskine Childers and Austin 
Stack. The first meeting between Lloyd George and de Valera took place on 
July 14 at Ten Downing Street. De Valera, who was introduced as "the 
representative of the Irish Repubfic," was described by Thomas Jones as 
. 11 
"guarded and formal." He presented Lloyd George with a document in 
Gaelic accompanied by an English translation. Lloyd George, noticing the 
document's title of "Saorstat Eireann," asked the meaning of the word 
Saorstat. When he was told that it meant "free state," Lloyd George inquired 
as to the Gaelic word for "republic." After de Valera replied that he was 
not sure, the Prime Minister said, "Must we not admit that the Celts never 
were Republicans and have no native word for such an idea?" A painful 
silence attended his remarks. Lloyd George's attempt to establish a 
Celtic camaraderie with the ascetic de Valera was a dismal failure. Like-
,,. 
wise, he tried to awe the Dail President with the might and majesty of the 
British Empire by inviting him into the Cabinet room where a huge map was 
hanging with Britain's possessions colored in r~d. Instead of impres~ing 
9 0 1 Hegarty, !::_ Histor.l of Ireland Under the Union, 740-741. 
10 Call well, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 301. 
11Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diari, III, 89. 
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de Valera, this exhibition merely confirmed his ideas of "British 
. 1112 
rapacity. 
The two men met again on July 15 and July 18. Lloyd George solved 
the problem of Irish protocol by meeting de Valera and Craig separately, 
but he could not dispel the mistrust. De Valera thought Lloyd George was 
using Ulster as a pretext to force Sinn Fein into making concessions, 
while Craig thought Lloyd George was using Sinn Fein as a pretext to force 
. 13 
concessions from Ulster. After one of his meetings with Lloyd George, 
Craig issued a statement that Ulster would always remain part of the United 
Kingdom. Thinking that Lloyd George was making a separate deal with Craig, 
de Valera wrote a furious letter to the British Prime Minister,- threatening 
to end the conference if Craig's statement represented the British Govern-
ment's position. Lloyd George replied that Craig had expressed his 
' 14 individual views, not any agreement with the Government. De· Valera made 
clear that he would only go so far as to grant local autonomy to Ulster if 
- 15 
Ulster agreed to merge with the rest of Ireland. 
On the evening of July 20, after consulting the Cabinet, Lloyd 
George gave de Valera the Government's formal recommendations for an Irish 
settlement: Ireland was to be given almost full Dominion status, with 
control over taxation and finance, internal order and national defense 
(although with a limitation placed on the Irish army); the British navy 
would continue to patrol the Irish coast; Ireland would provide facilities 
. j : 
:· ,·, ;; , .. :,'.,·,:.;/ ... ::/.:;._~ ·>;'., :",· .. <. _;i~:;:.· •:?:.L~·.;<, / .(_ ·,· ·~.' .. 1 ·.~ 12 Ibid.; Wins~ori C1:mrchill,"the.Aftermath, '312-3i3; Beaverbrook, 
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v:tl"era, 133-134.- -
13Longfor,d and 0 1 Neill, Eamon de Valera, 132; Stevenson, Lloyd 
Qeorge: A Diary, ed. by Taylor, 229. 
14 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 135. 
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for Britain's naval and air forces; there would be free trade between 
Britain and Ireland; the Irish would pay their share of the United Kingdom's 
national debt; and the Dublin Parliament would recognize "the existing 
powers and privileges of the Government of Northern Ireland, which cannot 
16 be abrogated except by their own consent." The following morning, de 
Valera rejected the British offer. In the acrimonious exchange which 
followed, Lloyd George threatened to resume the war. and to release the 
British proposals to the public, which was a direct violation of the mutual 
pledge by the British and Irish not to publish any material unless both 
17 
sides agreed. Lloyd George recalled that de Valera turned "perfectly 
. 18 
white," became agitated, .. and coldly remarked that he would give him a 
. . . , . 19 
"considered reply" after he had consulted the Dail cabinet. 
Although Lloyd George indicated to Beaverbrook that the Irish were 
merely haggling for better terms and that all difficulties could be worked 
. . 20 
out, . he was more pessimistic in his corre~pondence with George V~ Lloyd 
George told the King that he saw little hope for an agreement but that 
public opinion would be on Britain's side "throughout the Empire and even 
in the United States when our proposals are published." He did say, 
however, that the truce would continue pending de Valera's reply from 
Ireland. 21 Before returning to South Africa, Smuts attempted to persuade 
16Great Britain, Correspondence Relating!£_ Proposals of H. M. 
Government for an Irish Settlement (London, 1921), 2-3. 
17 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 136-137. 
18 Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 88-89. 
19 . Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 1,37~ 
20 t Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 89. 
21N. 1 ico son, George the Fifth, 357. 
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de Valera to accept the British offer. In a letter written on August 4, 
Smuts said that Ireland was travelling the "same painful road" which 
South Africa had travelled earlier, and he reminded de Valera that a 
"wise man, while fighting for the ideal to the uttermost, learns also 
to bow to the inevitable." In urging de Valera to accept Dominion status, 
Smuts said, "I do not ask you to give up your ideal, but only to realize 
it in the only way which seems to me at present practicable. 1122 In order 
to place the maximum amount of pressure on the D~il, the British Government 
bl • h d S I 1 f ld ' 23 pu is e muts etter or wor consumption. 
On August 10, 1921, de Valera, after conferring with his cabinet, 
formally rejected the offer because it denied Ireland's unity and right of 
self-determination and because Dominion status could not. be the same for 
Ireland as for Canada, on account of Ireland's proximity to Britain. As 
for the matter of contributing to the payment of Britain's national debt, 
the Irish were willing to accept the verdict ofa tribunal composed of a 
British member, an Irish member, and a member from another country 
(preferably the United States); de Valera reiterated the Sinn Fein doctrine 
that there could be no agreement other than an "amicable but absolute 
. 24 
separation." Three days later, Lloyd George expressed his regret at 
the Irish decision, saying that the British proposals "present to the 
25 Irish people an opportunity such as never dawned in their history before." 
22 ' Hancock, Smuts, II, 59-60. 
'f 
23Macardle, The Id.sh ReE.ublic,' 488. 
24
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25 Ibid., 5. 
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Even George V, whose level of tolerance was unusually high, was exas-
/ perated by de Valera's intransigence, terming the Dail leader's reply a 
"hopeless document, written by a dreamer & visionary with nothing practical 
about it. 11 However, the King urged Lloyd George to continue the truce and 
the efforts for a negotiated agreement, and he supported the Government's 
decision to publish the July 20 proposals in the hope that world opinion 
might pressure the D~il to compromise. 26 
The Irish rejection was followed by more than a month of corres-
pondence between de Valera and Lloyd George concerning the exact conditions 
necessary for a settlement and often involving the most picayune, academic 
questions. On August 30, de Valera offered to send representatives to 
another conference that was to be based on no conditions "save the facts 
. . 27 
themselves." Lloyd George, who was vacationing in Scotland, summoned 
his Cabinet members to Inverness immediately after receiving de Valera's 
note, and a Cabi!!etmeeting was held there on September 7 to discuss the 
Government's reply to de Valera. Lloyd George favored a conference.with 
conditions; he felt that the problem of Ulster and partition could be 
resolved only if Sinn Fein agreed to remain within the Empire. ChurC:hi 11, 
who was upset over I. R. A. violations of the truce, was not as conciliatory 
as he had been in the spring, but Lloyd George received support from 
Birkenhead and Austen Chamberlain. Thomas Jones recorded that Birkenhead 
urged the Cabinet to seek an agreement, saying that "I would run the risk" 
28 
of criticism and failure in order to "pluck a good settlement." 
' ~, . ,~ ' ..•. ·;J. 
~ ·. 
26Nicol.son; ,s;eorge .·~. F:i.fth,; ... 358:;-359~ 
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Later that same day, Lloyd George invited de Valera to meet him at 
29 Inverness on September 20. De Valera was disturbed by the British refusal 
to recognize the Dail as, in Lloyd George's words, the "representative of an 
independent and sovereign state, 1130 and his reply on September 12 sent the 
Prime Minister into an explosive rage with this declaration: 
Our nation has formally declared its independence and recognizes 
itself as a sovereign State. It is only as the representatives 
of that State and as its chosen guardians that we have any author-
ity or powers to act on behalf of our people. 31 
After receiving this message, Lloyd .George huffed and puffed about resuming 
the war, but with the King, as always, acting as a moderating influence, 32 
the Prime Minister continued his correspondence with the D'il President. 
During the rest of September, a total of fifteen letters and notes was 
exchanged between.the two men which frequently involved esoteric arguments 
over the status of Irish representatives to the proposed conference. Finally 
on September 29, the British Cabinet sent another invitation to de Valera, 
asking him to meet British officials in London on October 11 "with a view 
to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations 
known as the British Empire might best be reconciled with Irish aspirations. 1133 
Since this invitation was in accordance with his previously expressed desire 
of a conference "untrarrunelled by any conditions," de Valera, on September 30, 
. . . 34 
agreed to resume the negotiations. 
29
"Relations Between Great Britain and Ireland," International 
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30 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 142. 
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De Valera had proven to be a formidable opponent in diplomatic 
duelling, but he was finally pressured by war-weariness in Ireland to agree 
t d f t . . 35 o a new roun o nego iations. Leading members of the British Govern-
ment felt that de Valera had been forced into negotiations by moderates like 
Griffith. 36 Whether this was merely hindsight is difficult to determine, 
but, in his memoirs, Churchill caustically wrote that, except for the 
influence of moderate Irishmen, "Mr. de Valera would no doubt have gone on 
indefinitely fighting theoretical points without the slightest regard to 
37 the resultant misery and material ruin of his countrymen." 
(2) 
De Valera selected Arthur Griffith, the D:il 1 s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to lead the Irish delegation to London. Griffith 1 s fellow pleni~ 
potentiaries included Eamon Duggan, Robert Barton, Gavan Duffy (who had been 
one of the assistant defense lawyers at the.Casement trial), and, most 
surprisingly, Michael Collins, who was hardly regarded as an individual to 
be involved in delicate negotiations; accompanying the Irish delegation in 
the role of "adviser" .was Erskine Childers, the writer who had virtually 
38 become de Valera's alter ego. Collins was, of course, legendary as a 
military le.ader, and Childers was a well-known literary figure; but Griffith 
34· Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diary, III, 116, 117; Longford and 
O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 142-143. 
. . . 
35Fran~ Gallagher '.,.'l'he.Anglo~Iris~ Treaty, _ed. by T~o~as P. O,.JN~ill.:. 
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was the only member of the delegation who seemingly had the prestige and 
experience as a statesman to meet the British on anything approaching equal 
terms. It was agreed from the outset that the delegates were to inform 
Dublin of the progress of the negotiations and to submit the proposed treaty 
for the D~il's approval before signing it. In addition, the penipotentiaries 
took an outline of Irish demands--known as "Draft Treaty A11--upon which they 
were to insist, including Ireland's independent sovereignty and neutrality. 39 
However, as they prepared to match wits with the British, the Sinn 
Fein leaders were deeply divided. Within the military, personal animosity 
had deyeloped between Colli.ns and Cathal Brugha that was based largely on 
Brugha 1 s jealousy of Collins. As Minister of Defense, Brugha felt that he 
was the head of the I. R. A., but he realized that most of "the I. R. A. 
looked to.Collins for leadership. 4° Furthermore, Collins was reluctant to 
go to' London,· offering the excuse that he was a soldier not a diplomat but 
41 privately fearing a. plot against him in his absence. Collins' relations 
with de Valera had deteriorated somewhat in 1921 because de Valera suspected 
Collins of nurturing political ambitions, and de Valera feared that the I. R. 
A. and the Brotherhood wanted Collins as the D~il President. 42 De Valera's· 
choice of Griffith to lead the delegation was surprising in view of the 
fact that Griffith was known to have looked favorably upon the British offer 
39 Gallagher, The Anglo-Irish Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 77, 80-81. 
4oFiggis, Recollections of the Irish War, 240; Pakenham, Peace .£l. 
Ordeal, 94-96; Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 116. 
41 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 147-148; Pakenham, Peace .£l. 
Ordeal, 97. 
42 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 147-148. 
of July 20 and, hence, could not be expected to battle for republican 
status if the British made a generous offer of Dominion self-rule. 43 
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Erskine Childers, a devout republican, was attached to.the delegation for 
the purpose of bolstering republican sentiment among the delegates and of 
giving de Valera an agent in London whom he could trust absolutely. For 
this very reason, Childers was detested by Griffith and Collins as de 
44 Valera's "watchdog." 
The fact that de Valera did not go to London as the leader of the 
Irish delegation has puzzled historians. In the authorized biography of 
de Valera, several reasons were advanced. There were the sound tactical 
reasons that de Valera's presence in Dublin would require the Irish 
/ 
delegates to refer questions back to the Dail cabinet, and, if the talks 
failed, world opinion would likely place the blame on the British because 
the moderate Griffith, unlike de Valera, could not be accused of being an 
inflexible ideologue. De Valera also felt that he was needed in Ireland 
to influence Irish opinion and to soothe extremist elements in the D~il. 
However, another possible reason to which his biographers obliquely 
alluded was de Valera's suspicion that the negotiations might produce an 
unsatisfactory settlement, and, by remaining in Dublin, he would not be 
tarnished by a possible failure or "sell-out" in London. 45 De Valera 
emphasized to the delegates that if there was a breakdown in the negotia-
tions, he wanted the breakdown to come on the issue of Irish unity in 
'. ~ ) ' -: ... -:-· •. ~ ~-' :. i. \ :.· ·.;.' ~ •• 
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order that Ulster and, indirectly, Britain would be blamed. 
At a Cabinet meeting on October 6, the British selected their 
representatives to the conference: Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, 
184 
Birkenhead, Churchill, Greenwood, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans (Secretary 
) . ( 47 for War , and Sir Gordon Hewart Attorney-General). Lloyd George had 
arrayed powerful talent to meet--and overawe--the Irish, but the British 
were not quite as formidable as they appeared. Support for thewar had 
declined in Britain, and the Government was losing popularity due to the 
economic situation. Moreover, Lloyd George's personal prestige had 
plummeted drastically, and there were personal antagonisms among the dele-
gates; indeed, as has been mentioned, Birkenhead and Churchill had attempted 
to oust Lloyd George less than half a year before. 
The Irish and Britishrepresentatives gathered in an atmosphere of 
mistrust and recriminations. The violations of. the truce were a source of 
increasing concern. .The Irish continued to smuggle arms, and there were 
occasional attacks upon and even the kidnapping of various Crown officials~ 
In fact,. one observer stated that the "maintenance of law and order" in 
Ireland grew worse rather than better after the truce; although both sides 
committed acts of violence, this observer placed most of the blame on the 
I . h 48 ris • 
In this setting, the Irish delegates met their British counterparts 
at Ten Downing Street on October 11. At the outset, there loomed the triv-
ial but embarrassing question of whether there was to be any handshaking: 
~ ·, . 
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The Irish did not want to shake hands with Greenwood, the spokesman for 
the "Black and Tans" and "Auxies:' while the British were particularly 
reluctant to greet Collins, the leader of the "murder gang." Lloyd George 
deftly sidestepped this problem by greeting the Irish at the door, shaking 
their hands, and escorting them into the Cabinet room, where the British 
delegates were standing on the other side of the table. 49 Lloyd George 
opened the conference by stressing that while the British Government 
desired a peaceful settlement, "there were limitations beyond which he 
could not go"; he further declared that if the negotiations failed, the 
Irish would be at fault. 50 Griffith replied that Britain's traditional 
policy had been .to treat Ireland as a "conquered and subject country. If 
there is a change in the policy of subordinating Ireland to English interests, 
51 
then there appears to be a possibility of peace." . 
The conference remained on this level of accusations and defensive 
parrying for.the ftrst two weeks. The British were adamant on three basic 
questions: Ireland must remain within the British Empire, Irish officials. 
must swear an oath.of allegiance to the Crown, and the Irish must grant 
naval and air facilities for British security. 52 In addition, the British 
and Irish did not agree on the questions of the exclusion of Ulster and the 
tariff powers which the Dublin Parliament was to have. 53 An agreement was 
49 Pakenham, Peace .£l. Ordeal, .122. 
50Gallagher, The Anglo-Irish Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 81. 
51 Pakenham, Peace .£l. Ordeal, 144-145. 
52
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rendered even more difficult by the concept of "external association" with 
which de Valera saddled the Irish delegates. The D~il President had 
developed the idea while he was conducting his correspondence with Lloyd 
' 
George. "External association," as conceived by de Valera, meant that an 
independent Ireland would be loosely associated with the Empire but not 
part of it. 54 The British felt that the Irish were being obstructionist, 
and Greenwood, in particular, was vocal in his belief that the Irish were 
only interested in a respite to rebuild the I. R. A. before resuming the 
55 
war. 
On October 17, Lloyd George demanded that the Irish allow British 
naval vessels to patrol Irish waters and guard the Irish coast, with port 
facilities arid har.bor privileges in Ireland. This proposal was meant to be 
a test of the Irish delegates' faith and seriousness; if the Irish rejected 
h d . h . . 56 the demand, the Britis ·were prepare to termi.nate t e negotiations. 
However, at the next session, the Irish said that before they would answer 
the question of Ireland's defense, the British would have to define "Ireland." 
By throwing this question to the British, the Irish delegates were cleverly 
57 
shifting the discussion back to the issue of Ulster. The ultimate conces-
sion which the Irish would make on the Ulster issue was to allow Belfast 
local autonomy under Dublin 1 s supervision--"Home Rule within Home Rule. 1158 
54 
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At this juncture, the actions of de Valera nearly ended the nego-
tiations. On October 19, the Pope had written to George V, expressing his 
wishes that the conference would produce a pegceful end to the strife in 
Ireland. The King thanked the Pope for his concern and stated his desire 
that the negotiations would bring about a 11 permanent settlement of the 
troubles in Ireland and may initiate a new era of peace for my people. 11 
This seemingly innocuous and perfunctory exchange caused de Valera to 
declare his righteous indignation over the King's inference that the problem 
was in Ireland when, in de Valera 1 s view, it was in London; de Valera was 
also disturbed by George V's reference to "my people," an indication that 
the Irish were regarded as Crown subjects. De Valera consequently sent a 
letter to the Vatican which castigated the King's presumptuous attitude. 
59 This correspondence found its way into the press. ·At the meeting of the 
delegates on October 21, Lloyd George angrily accused the Irish of bad faith 
and cited de Valera's outburst and the numerous ceasefire violations. 
Alth6ugh Griffith was privately f~rious that ~e Valera had needlessly 
. / . jeopardized the negotiations, he stoically defended the Dail President 
against the onslaught of British criticism. 60 ·The meeting produced nothing 
but accusations and denials, charges and countercharges, and, hence, it was 
61 
agreed to adjourn for three days. This meeting of October 21 represented 
the low point in the negotiations. 
As Thomas Jones' diary shows, Lloyd George was the dominant figure 
on the British side, and except for Churchill's frequent intervention during 
.:! 
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defense discussions, acted virtually as the sole British representative in 
the negotiations. After the disastrous October 21 meeting, he was worried 
about the.progress of the peace talks; it was now apparent that the confer-
ence was dead-locked and that the sides were no closer to an agreement than 
they had been at the beginning. Beaverbrook recorded a conversation that he 
had with Bonar Law, Churchill, and Birkenhead on the evening of October 22, 
and the tone of that conversation was extremely pessimistic as they dis-
cussed the negotiations over their drinks. Law was completely opposed to 
any conference with the Irish, while Churchill was so thoroughly disgusted 
by the lack of progress in the negotiations that he wa:s willing to consider 
a military solution; only Birkenhead held out any hope for a settlement. 
Although skeptical, Birkenhead was not ready to dismiss the possibility that 
. 62 
a settlement might be reached. 
The prospect of a dead-locked conference alarmed Lloyd George, for 
if it failed to produce a settlement, there would remain only the alterna-
tives of resuming the war on an even larger scale, which would .be irrnnensely 
. . . . ' 
unpopular, or simply withdrawing from Ireland, which would damage Britain's 
·international prestige. In order to break the deadlock and remove the Irish 
albatross from his Government's neck, Lloyd George decided to alter his 
tactical approach. of trying to achieve a settlement singlehandedly: He 
decided to broaden the negotiating base by enlisting other individuals in 
the campaign for a settlement, and specifically, he wanted Birkenhead to 
play a' more active role in the discussions. Lloyd George had a ratiohal 
him as his most serious rival in the Cabinet. According to Beaverbrook, 
62 Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 99-100. 
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Lloyd George recognized Birkenhead as "a most formidable obstacle" if he 
decided to oppose the settlement, for he was "a man capable of rousing the 
63 bulk of the Tory Party against a projected settlement by a single speech.,, 
The Prime Minister told Thomas Jones that it was "essential for him to carry 
Birkenhead with him so far as possible, that he (Birkenhead) would control 
most of the Unionists as they regarded Chamberlain as a Liberal Unionist. 1164 
The result of Lloyd George's overtune to Birkenhead was afterwards 
described by Beaverbrook in his invaluable political study of this period. 
Birkenhead approached Beaverbrook on October 26 to ask for his support in 
the propaganda battle over the Irish negotiations. Beaverbrook, who owned 
the Daily Express, Sunday Express, and Evening Standard, was the only "press 
lord" whose influence seriously rivalled that of Northcliffe, and he was on 
extremely friendly terms with right-wing Tories such as Bonar.Law. Birkenhead 
explained that Lloyd George had asked for his cooperation in reaching an 
agreement with t.he Irish. He· told Beaver brook that he "was asked to put 
his whole future with the Tory Party to the hazard, and in partnership with 
a man who up till then had shown him little trust or confidence." 
Birkenhead informed Beaverbrook that he had agreed to work with 
Lloyd George to end the Irish conflict, subject to certain conditions. He 
demanded that Lloyd George's "court favourites"--Greenwood, Sir Eric Geddes, 
Sir Robert Horne--be excluded from all deliberation, influence, or respon-
sibility in regard to the Irish settlement. Birkenhead was of the convic-
tion that these private advisers, who did not understand the mood of the 
Tory backbenches,.: were misle:adt_ng the Pr-.ime 'Minister •. · Lloyd George ':greed 
t., ·:: 
li' ' ~ : . 
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to their exclusion--he also agreed to Birkenhead's insistence on bringing 
Churchill into the discussions, which created the "Inner Cabinet" of Lloyd 
George, Birkenhead, and Churchill for the hard bargaining with the Irish. 
In Birkenhead's opinion, this was the only way to undertake serious negotia-
tions, the original aggregate of delegates being too large and unwieldy to 
be effective. 65 
Beaverbrook consented to support the settlement but for his own 
reasons: His personal crusade was "Empire unity," and he felt that this 
closer political and economic cooperation could not be achieved until the 
Irish question was settled. 66 At any rate, Beaverbrook later wrote that 
the "Lloyd George-Birkenhead concordat" was the turning point in the 
negotiations. 67 
The task which faced the British "Inner Cabinet" was formidable. 
There'was the immediate problem of achieving a settlement which would 
I 
protect Britain's interests and yet be acceptable to the Dail. There was 
the .additional problem of maintaining the support of the Government's own 
followers who, Churchill wrote, "stirred with anger and distress. 116 8 
Birkenhead was indispensable in handling both of these problems. As 
Churchill was later to write: 
The attitude of Lord Birkenhead ... was ... of the utmost 
importance. H~ was prominently and peculiarly connected 
with the resistance to Home Rule. He had been in comrade-
ship with Sir Edward Carson; he had used to the full those 
65Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 101-102. 
66Ibid., 108. 
67Ibid., 102. 
68Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, 317. 
threats of civil war which had played their part in the 
1914 phase of the Irish conflict. There ~ E.2. ~ who 
would have gained greater personal advantage £y opposing 
the Irish Settlement; and none who would suffer ~ 
-r;;roach £y sustaining it. He now appeared, in the teeth 
alike of his past and future, ~ ~ ~ aggressive 
Conservative supporter. The Irish Free Staters have 
always felt that they owed him their gratitude--and they 
are right. 69 [Italics mine] 
(3) 
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In addition to securing Beaverbrook's support, Birkenhead attempted 
to bring Austen Chamberlain into the effort to achieve a settlement. In 
discussing the negotiations with Chamberlain, Birkenhead, as related after-
wards by Chamberlain, said: 
You and I bear 
are agreed, we 
of settlement. 
other stands. 
a great load of responsibility. .Unless we 
shall smash the. party and destroy any chance 
It is time we each knew exactly where th~ 
In recalling this conversation with Birkenhead, Chamberlain went on to write: 
And then he proceeded to explain his views with that clarity 
·and brevity which always distinguished him in council. I 
found that he had come to say to me what I had meant to say 
to him, and thenceforth we co-operated without a shade of 
difference throughout the long negotiations, the many con-
ferences, and the parliamentary struggle which followed. 70 
Chamberlain joined Birkenhead, Lloyd George, and Churchill in the "Inner 
Cabinet" and played a leading role .in the subsequently intensive negotia-
tions. 
The first test of the new tactical approach came when the negotia-
tions resumed on October 24. Lloyd George stated to the Irish that these 
. 
1
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the Irish agr~ed, selecting their two most famous delegates, Griffith 
and Collins, to deal with the British 11 lnner Cabinet." Irish historians 
have written that this was the moment when the cause of an independent 
.and united Irish republic was lost--if it ever could have been won. One 
such historian has expressed his belief that the British sensed disunity 
among the Irish delegates over de Valera's controversial message to the 
Pope, suspecting that Griffith and Collins, in particular, had disagreed 
with de Valera, and that the.British "felt they had a better chance of 
working with (one could almost say 1 on') Griffith and Collins if they 
71 
were separated from Gavan Duffy and Barton. 11 -
Griffith was excited by this new development, for he had been as 
depre.ssed as Lloyd George by the stalemate. Believing that· this. was an 
opportunity to reach a peaceful settlement, Griffith wrote to Dublin the 
same day, suggesting to de Valera that they yield on the.matter of alle-
giance to the Crown if the British met the other demands. De Valera 
·'' 
emphatically refused to grant such permission, and he instructed Griffith 
to turn the discussions back to the issue of Ulster in order that the Irish 
would have an excuse to end the conference if necessary. De Valera further 
instructed Griffith to tell the British that if 11war is the alternative we 
1 f .. 1172 can on y ace it. De Valera's letter enraged the Irish delegates, and 
each one signed a note of protest to Dublin, reminding de Valera that their 
powers derived from the Dail and not from one man, and warning him that they 
would resign en masse if he continued to second-guess and dictate to them; 
71 
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in fact, the delegates in London were barely able to persuade Collins not 
t . . d. 1 73 h o resign imme iate y. T is acerbic exchange laid the groundwork for 
future disagreements among the Irish leaders. 74 
There were, of course, numerous problems which remained to be 
settled between the British and the Irish, but there were three fundamental 
issues which had to be resolved before any understanding could be reached: 
The matter of allegiance to the Crown and Ireland's relationship with the 
Empire; the matter of Ulster's relationship with the rest of Ireland; and 
the matter of British defense facilities in Ireland, which would violate 
the neutral status that de Valera wanted. Agreement on these vital matters 
was the sine qua ~ for any settlement, but before the negotiators could 
come to terms on these matters, it was imperative that a mutual trust be 
established between the two sides. 
The ice was broken on the evening of October 30 when Griffith and 
Collins were entertained at Churchill's house by Churchill, Lloyd George, 
and Birkenhead. Griffith conferred privately with Lloyd George and gave 
the Prime Minister his personal assurance that he would be willing to 
compromise on the issue of allegiance to the Crown if Irish unity could be 
secured 75--this was a breakthrough of major proportions. Equally 
significant was the breakthrough in personal relations. While Lloyd George 
and Griffith were conferring, Collins was chatting with Churchill and 
Birkenhead over drinks and cigars: Collins developed a personal affinity 
.; ' 
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for the hitherto imperialist ogres, and, in turn, the two Britons found 
Collins 1 personality enormously attractive and were especially fascinated 
by his tales of encounters with British forces. Collins' most recent 
biographer has stated that a "very real friendship" grew between Collins 
and Birkenhead, whom Collins had ordered to be killed a year earlier, and 
that this meeting of October 30 changed Collins' outlook on the British 
delegates and turned him in the direction of seeking a settlement. 76 
The handsome, youthful Collins was the most famous of the Irish 
delegates and, with a certain roguish glamor attached to his legendary 
reputation, he "captivated" London, as Thomas Jones recalled, from Cabinet 
members to "the girls who pursued him for favours. 1177 Besides being the 
most.publicized member of the Irish delegation, Collins was the most 
important, due. to his influenc.e with the I. R. A. and his heroic standing 
among the Irish people •. In Austen Chamberlain's words, 11It was not the 
.least of Birkenhead 1 s services in the Conference that he did enter into 
Michael Collins' mi.nd, won his sympathy and secured his confidence." 
Chamberlain found the donnish Griffith more to his liking, but he said that· 
without the rapport between Birkenhead and Collins, "we might never have 
h d . . 1178 reac e agreement. Chamberlain's opinion was confirmed by Churchill, 
who wrote that while Griffith "seemed to rely especially upon Mr. Austen 
Chamberlai_n, so Michael Collins was deeply impressed by the personality 
of Lord Birkenhead. 1179 After one discussion with Birkenhead and Churchill 
' . :· 
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that lasted until the early morning hours, Collins was quoted as saying, 
"I trust them. . 80 I'm prepared to take their word. 11 Although he did not 
establish a close relationship with other Irish delegates that he did with 
Collins, Birkenhead won their grudging respect, though he had ·only recently 
"loomed in Irish Nationalists' imagination as a sinister, even satanic 
power. 11 During the conference, the Irish "continued to marvel at his 
unfailing aptitude for debating retort, for legal exegesis, for instant.an-
eous drafting. 1181 
The first major issue to be.settled as personal relations improved 
was the matter of British defense facilities in Ireland. Collins had 
expounded the Irish position of neutrality while Churchill argued for the 
British position. Collins contended that Irish neutrality was no danger 
to British security because the Irish armed forces would ensure that 
Ireland would never be dominated by any foreign power. Churchill's 
greatest interest was--and remained--military defense, and, adamantly 
opposed to Irish neutrality, he asserted.· that strategically located ports 
in Ireland must be made available for the use of'the British navy. 82 Both 
Collins and Churchill were forceful, expansive, and even truculent in 
presenting their views, and the effect of their respective arguments was 
similar to that of two battering rams colliding. 
According to Pakenham, it was Birkenhead who finally ended the 
impasse on the defense issue. In one of the early subconference meetings, 
Birkenhead shook the Irish out of their insistence on neutrality. Birkenhead 
80Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 90. 
81 Pakenham, Peace El_ Ordeal, 125-126. 
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said that other countries would recognize Ireland as a neutral nation 
only if Ireland was purely neutral--.i_-~., if absolutely no facilities of 
any kind were made available to the British for national security reasons. 
He said that the British could not and would not accept such a situation 
because Britain's security depended on its control of the seas around the 
British Isles, and he emphasized that Britain could not depend on guarantees 
of Irish goodwill because it was impossible to guarantee that an Irish 
government in the future would not make an alliance with a nation that was 
hostile to Britain. Moreover, Birkenhead pointed out that Irish security 
would be greatly enhanced if Ireland was identified with Britain because 
Ireland, as an independent country, would be more susceptible to interna-
tional bullying than if associated with Britain, for any such bullying wo.uld · 
then be construed ·as an attack on the British Empire; hence, if Ireland. 
granted military facilities to the British and was thereby associated 
with Britain, the Irish would not have to worry about security and, thus, 
would not be forced to pay high taxes f_or·defense. Therefore, Birkenhead 
concluded, the only logical solution was to determine the minimum level of 
military facilities that would be necessary for British security. There 
was a long silence from both the British and Irish delegates when Birkenhead· 
finished speaking, as no one on either side was able to say anything which 
could add to or refute his remarks. After this discussion, the two sides 
b d f h ld . f b th . t. 83 egan working out a e ense agreement t at wou satis y o par ies. 
The perennial problem of Ulster was more difficult to solve~ The 
Irish demanded that Ulster 'abandon :.~tis' Parliament ,aµd cabitiet which1 were::. 
' t ,: \ '~ • 'I ' ';·,: •'I ' • '• ',,' ;· .i. ;f ···• ·• ' .• • l ,' 
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granted und~r the Government of Ireland Act' in 1920; if any Ulster county 
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insisted on retaining local autonomy, it would be permitted.to have.a 
lilliputian assembly but with overall power of supervision transferred 
from Westminster to Dublin. 84 In a meeting of October 25, Griffith and 
Collins told Chamberlain that a major reason for their insistence on 
unity was that they could not, in good conscience, leave fellow Catholics 
in an autonomous Ulster to suffer Orange persecution. 85 However, Churchill 
told the Irish that Britain was morally bound to respect Ulster's rights 
under the 1920 Act, but the Government would nevertheless attempt to 
persuade Ulster's leaders to accept local autonomy under Dublin's super-
. . 86 
vision. 
Both sides were handicapped in dealing with the Ulster issue by 
the. unyielding views of two men who were not in London~ Thomas Jones 
succinctly described the dilemma as follows: "'Not an inch· towards unity, 1 
said Craig in Belfast; 'not an inch from unity,; said de. Valera in Dublin. 1187 
Birkenhead favored an all-Ireland Parliament in Dublin with safeguards for 
. 88 . . 
the Ulster Protestants, but he.felt that the only feasible solution was 
to give Ulster the options of remaining a six-county unit within the United 
Kingdom, or allowing each of Ulster's six counties, plus three adjacent 
counties, to vote on the question of joirting either the Dublin or Belfast 
P 1 . 89 ar iament. The British had to bear in mind that they could not apply 
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much pressure to Ulster because of Bonar Law. Although he had remained 
in the background since his illness earlier in the year, Law let it be 
known that he would not tolerate any attempt to coerce Ulster into join-
ing an Irish Parliament nor any effort to deprive Ulster of its territory. 
Thus, the British delegates had to tread warily lest an angry Law lead a 
revolt of Unionist backbenchers against the Government. 90 
Although apprehensive about Law 1 s possible intervention, Lloyd 
George began to use his wiles on Craig to secure his support for a settle-
ment. In the first week of November, Craig came to London to confer with 
the Prime Minister, but he refused to consider local autonomy under Dublin's 
supervision. 91 The Ulster leader proved to be so completely unyielding 
. that, after the meeting, Thomas Jones found Lloyd George in a state of 
h d d . 92 ex austion an epression. Before returning to Belfast, Craig prudently 
tried· to bolster support for Ulster's position by telling Curzon that he 
93 feared a betrayal by Lloyd George ·. and by pouring out his complaints to 
Ulster's most powerful ally, Law, who assured Craig that he would bring 
94 down the Government before he would allow Ulster to be coerced. Craig's 
biographer wrote that Craig found Churchill to be sympathetic to Ulster's 
plight, 95 and, although Churchill may have been trying merely to ameliorate 
Craig, he did have private reservations about the shape which the impending 
9
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k . . 96 h agreement was ta 1ng. Because of is past record, Birkenhead could be 
expected by Craig to defend Ulster's interest. 
Lloyd George, however, did not abandon his effort to persuade 
Craig to accept a compromise. On November 10, he wrote to the Ulster 
leader outlining the Government's proposals. If Ulster accepted an all-
Ireland Parliament, Lloyd George promised Craig that Ulster would be able 
to keep its Parliament in Belfast and have considerable local autonomy, 
with the power to appoint all officials within the territory of northern 
Ireland and to collect all revenue within that territory; furthermore, the 
British Government would guarantee that the Catholic Church would not have 
a privileged position in Ireland and that Ulster would be protected from 
excessive taxation by Dublin~ However, if Ulster chose to remain part of 
the United Kingdom, it would share the burdens of defense and taxation 
with the rest of the Kingdom, and Belfast would be forced.to submit to the 
decision of a boundary commission that would be empowered to determine the 
· · 1 f u·1 97 exact terr1tor1a status o . ster. . Lloyd George was convinced that the 
threat of higher taxation would cause Ulster to enter an all-Ireland 
Parliament. He felt that he understood the Presbyterian mentality: "They 
have their hand [sic] on their hearts all the time, but if it comes to 
98 touching their pockets they quickly slap their hands in them. 11 In dealing 
with Craig, though, Lloyd George was like a snake charmer trying to tame a 
block of granite. Craig's reply to the British proposals was as uncompro-
mising as ever. Craig said that he regarded the 1920 Act as the 11final 
-... ' \,I '~ 
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settlement," and he declared that Ulster would willingly bear its share 
of defense and taxation burdens. Regarding the proposed boundary commis-
sion, Craig stated that the territory of Ulster, which was defined in the 
1920 Act as the six northern counties, "must remain inviolate"; and he 
reminded Lloyd George that the 1920 Act established a council of Ireland 
to deal with the future unification of Ireland. To counter any suggestion 
that he was unreasonable, Craig proposed that Ulster and southern Ireland 
be established as two separate Dominions, a proposal which Lloyd George 
99 
rejected on November 14. 
The idea of a boundary commission for Ulster was the brainchild of 
Thomas Jones, who put the idea to Griffi.th and Collins on November 8. lOO 
This idea was.originally designed as a tactical maneuver to demonstrate for 
world opinion how unreasonable Ulster was and, thus, .to apply pressure upon 
C . 101 rai.g.· When Ulster refused to budge, the British seriously considered the 
boundary commission as a possible means of balancing the incompatible posi-
tions of Irish unity and Ulster's exclusion. .Griffith urged the British to 
continue prodding Ulster and told them that Craig was just bluffing, but 
Jones, who often acted as an intermediary between Lloyd George and Griffith, 
suggested to the Irish that they consider the boundary commission as an 
11 1 d. p 1. . 102 alternative to an a -Ire an ar iament. 
On November 12, after Craig's categorical refusals, Lloyd George 
directly confronted Griffith with the offer of a boundary commission. Lloyd 
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George explained that a Unionist convention was scheduled to meet in 
Liverpool five days hence and that its outcome was crucial for the Govern-
ment and for the success of the conference. In order to secure a favorable 
vote from the convention, the Government had to be able to show some sign 
of progress in the negotiations, some sign from the Irish that they were 
willing to compromise. He wanted Griffith's acceptance of the boundary 
commission in the event that Ulster could not be cajoled into entering the 
Irish. Parliament. Griffith agreed, and Jones shortly thereafter presented 
him with a written document containing the agreement which he had verbally 
made with Lloyd George; at Jones' request, Griffith initialled the document 
as an indication of his acceptance. Griffith gave the verbal and written 
assurance on his own authority, without consulting his colleagues. Griffith 
thought he was only helping the Government to win its vote of confidence in 
Liverpool, but Lloyd George interpreted Griffith's assurance as a pledge not 
to break off the negotiations on the issue of Ulster. Furthermore, the wily 
Lloyd George felt that Griffith's acceptance of the boundary commission 
released him from an earlier pledge to the Irish that he would resign as 
Prime Minister if he could not secure Ulster's participation in an Irish 
P 1 . 103 ar iament. 
There can be little doubt that the Irish delegates received the 
distinct impression from the British that the boundary commission would 
take away so much territory from Ulster that ,Belfast wou~d find its posi-
tion untenable and be forced to join the Irish Parliament. As one of the 
Irish delegates, Robert Barton, later recalled: 
103 Ibid., 164; Pakenham, Peace Ex. Ordeal, 209, 216-217. 
Arthur Griffith, after the conversations which he and 
Michael Collins used to have with Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. 
Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Birkenhead, used to return 
to our house in Hans Place and, standing in front of the 
fireplace, over and over again declared: 11 If they do 
not come in they will lose half their territory and they 
can't stay out." Not once but many times he reiterated 
this. 104 
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This belief by the Irish was further illustrated by a conversation which 
I 
took place in January 1922, at the time of the bitter debates in the Dail 
over the agreement. When he was informally asked about Ulster and parti-
tion, Collins said that he had been assured by Birkenhead and Churchill 
that if Ulster refused to join the rest of Ireland, the boundary commission 
would leave Ulster with only four counties.and that London would see to if 
that the Belfast government would be unable to function as a small, isolated 
entity. 105 The subsequent failure of the boundary commission to fulfill 
this expectation ·left a bad taste in many Irish mouths, but belief in the 
commission caused th.e Irish delegates in London to overlook .the partition 
issue and sign the agreement. 
The question of allegiance to·the Crown and Ireland's relationship 
to the Empire was equally as touchy as the Ulster issue. Griffith was ·more 
concerned about Irish unity than about repµblicanism and, as mentioned 
earlier, had been willing to accept the British offer of Dominion status in 
July. However, de Valera in Dublin was very concerned about Ireland 1.s exact 
relationship with Britain and had come to regard his theory of "external 
association" as theological dogma. De Valera was willing for Ireland to 
be associated with the Empire, but any arrangement which implied Irish 
allegiance ,to Britain was· but ·6.f. the:. qb~'~tio~ ;:. simi lii.rly;; "he would recpgniie 
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the King as "the head of the association of states" but not as the head 
106 
of Ireland. . 
Aside from republican extremists, there were many Irishmen who 
opposed allegiance to the Crown on the grounds that Irish Unionists and 
loyalists would have the status of a privileged minority. There was also 
the argument that Ireland's proximity to Britain negated the possibility 
of achieving the independence of Dominions like Canada and Australia. 107 
Griffith and the other delegates felt obligated to argue for "external 
association," but an important step towards compromise was taken on 
November 2 when Griffith and Collins met Lloyd George and Birkenhead at 
Downing Street and agreed to accept "free partnership with the other States 
108 
associated within the British Commonwealth." After this meeting, 
Birkenhead persuaded Griffith and Collins to· abandon their position that 
Ireland could not be associated with the British Crown if Irish unity was 
109 denied "in form or fact." 
An agreement on this point seemed to be assured until the Irish 
startled the British on November 22 by submitting a draft which the British 
regarded as entirely unsatisfactory on the question of Ireland's relation-
ship to Britain. Lloyd George, supported by Birkenhead and Chamberlain, 
who were present when the draft arrived, threatened to end the negotiations. 
and the ceasefire if the Irish did not modify their position.llO Thomas 
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Jones scurried to the Irish delegates to inform them of the Prime Minister's 
reply. Jones found them to be more plaintive than defiant; they were upset 
that the British were asking them to make all the sacrifices rather than 
Ulster and expressed their reluctance to commit themselves publicly to any 
points of agreement before Craig. Finally, they requested a meeting with 
111 Lloyd George and Birkenhead to iron out an agreement on this matter. 
The British discovered that the main bone of contention was the oath 
of allegiance to the Crown that was to be incorporated in the treaty, and there-
112 fore, they were very meticulous as to the exact wording of the oath. On 
November 24, Birkenhead and Attorney-General Hewart met Griffith, Collins, 
Gavan Duffy, and an Irish legal scholar named Chartres, to discuss the 
constitutional aspects of Ireland's association with the Empire. There were 
protracted legalistic arguments between Birkenhead and Chartres as to the 
extent of Crown influence in Ireland. Birkenhead contended that the Crown 
would be.merely symbolic, as it was in the Dominions, and Chartres countered 
that it was a repugnant symbol to the Irish. The wrangling continued until 
.Birkenhead, in effect, told Chartres to shut up until he finished. The 
British proposal, as explained by Birkenhead, was to grant Ireland full 
Dominion status--usin·g Canada as a model--wi th the guarantee of no 
interference in. Irish internal affairs. However, Birkenhead stressed that 
the Irish must recognize titular Crown sovereignty; it was true that the 
Crown was just a symbol, .Birkenhead s.;i.id, but it was an important symbol to 
the. British because it signified a common bond between Britain and her 
Dominions. The Irish offered to make a yearly contribution to the King's 
civil list in lieu of the oath of allegiance to the Crown, but Birkenhead 
111 Ibid., 171-172. 
112 b. d ~-, 172. 
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refused to accept the offer. Griffith eventually stated his willingness 
to accept the Crown as a symbol, and he and Birkenhead agreed that the 
I • .h ld b d llf II h h bl• llJ ris government wou e terme a ree state rat er t an a repu ic. 
The matter was further clarified four days later when Lloyd George 
invited Griffith to the Prime Minister's country residence, Chequers, for 
a discussion with Birkenhead and himself. At Chequers, Griffith was asked 
to draft any proposal that he desired which would give the Crown the same 
status in Ireland that it enjoyed in Canada. Griffith enthusiastically 
accepted the task, and his contributions were favorably received by the 
Britons except for Birkenhead's veto of his suggestion that the Crown 
representative in Ireland be elected by the Irish people--Birkenhead insisted 
that the Crown representative be appointed by London. On this night of 
November 28-29, an. oath of allegiance was devised, and it was very similar 
to the oath which appeared in the final draft. 114 The following day, Lloyd 
George and Birkenhead returned to London to consult Chamberlain and 
Churchill, and the four men agreed that the Irish government was .to be a 
free state with Dominion status, with its own Parliament, and within the 
E . 115 rnpire. · 
In addition to reaching an agreement with the Irish, the Cabinet 
had the significant problem of placating its own supporters in Parliament. 
Th'e bulk of the Government's support came from the Unionists, and as Leopold. 
Amery wrote, "the negotiations had created grave disquiet in the Unionist 
113 . Ibid., 174-1.75; Pakenham, Peace·~ Ordeal, 241-244; Gallagher, 
~Anglo-I~ Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 128; Younger, Ireland's Civil':War, 
.179-180. . . 
•.' 
114 '' Younger, Ireland's Civil' War, 181-182; Gallagher, The Anglo-
Irish Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 135-13~ 
115Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diary, III, 177.-178. 
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ranks. 11116 The Ulster Unionists and their supporters suspected a betrayal 
by the Government, while the Unionist "die-hards" opposed any concessions 
at all to Sinn Fein. At the outset of their joint effort to secure a 
settlement, Birkenhead had warned Lloyd George that it might be impossible 
to coax the Tories into supporting an agreement with the Irish. 117 
Indeed, as early as August, during the lengthy Lloyd George-de 
Valera correspondence, Birkenhead had been forced to crush an incipient 
revolt in the Lords. The Marquis of Salisbury had demanded to know why 
I. R. A. prisoners had been released by the Government--even though it was 
part of the July truce arrangement--and there was hardly any doubt that 
Salisbury's demand was a veiled attack upon the Government for continuing 
. . ll8 the· ceasefire. Birkenhead rebuked Salisbury for his negative attitude, 
accusing him of advocating a war "indefinite in duration." Birkenhead 
stated that the British Government could destroy the. Irish rebellion by 
armed force alone, but he asked: 
. within what period of time? What military adviser was 
bold enough to inform us with the least approach to precision 
.of the time that would be required, the resources in men that 
would be necessary, and the expenditures in money that would 
be involved? ••. The butchery of the police and the forces of 
the Crown would have continued. Day after day that toll would 
have grown, and side by side the measures taken upon our side 
. • . would have added to the long legacy of bitterness and 
unhappiness which afflicts that stricken country. . . • ll 9 
After the negotiations resumed in earnest in October, the restive-
ness of the Unionists increased. On October 31, a Unionist M. P. introduced 
a censure motion against the Government for carrying on negotiations with 
116 Amery, £!Y. Political Life, II, 231. 
117Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd Geor~e, 108. 
118Parlfamentary Debates, Lo~ds, 1921, 5th Series, XLVI, 356-357. 
119Ibid., 359-360. 
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th I .. h . 120 e ris terrorists. He was followed by other Unionists who denounced 
the Government for meeting the "murder gang," until Lloyd George rose to 
defend his Government's actions. This was not the Lloyd George whose 
flabby, lackluster speeches had recently been a cause for derision in the 
Commons; on this occasion, Lloyd George summoned the great powers which 
had dazzled the House for so many years. He said that he would regard this 
motion as a vote of confidence in his ministry and that if the vote was 
adverse, he would resign. Facing down his detractors, he invited the 
dissidents to form their own ministry and deal with the Irish problem 
themselves. In the vote on the censure motion, the Government won a massive 
439 43 . t 121 - vie ory. 
Yet,· after. the dismal conference with Craig, Lloyd George was 
considering the possibility of resigning because he knew that if he tried 
to coerce Craig, the Unionists would turn him out of office. Thus, he 
seriously contemplated advising the King to send for Bonar Law to form a 
U . . . . 122 nionist ministry. Although it is doubtful that Lloyd George actually 
would have resigned--he loved power too much--Churchill told him that the 
Government must stay in office until the Irish question was settled or 
123 
until they were turned out by the Commons. 
The Government had the advantage of being supported by the over-
whelming majority of the British people in its quest for peace. Beaverbrook 1 s 
press support was important in maintaining public approval and the Government 
120Parliamentary Debktes, Commons, 1921, 5th Series, CXLVH, 1367. 
121 Ibid., 1420, 1479-1484. 
122 Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, 113. 
123 . Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, 318-319. 
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received an unexpected boon from Northcliffe early in November. Northcliffe, 
who was on a world tour at this time and was unaware of the "Lloyd George-
Birkenhead concordat,tt cabled his offices in London, ordering that the 
popular Daily Mail was to be placed at the disposal of Lord Birkenhead, 
whose views on the Irish question were to be given wide coverage and 
editorial support. Northcliffe's publications, particularly The Times and 
Daily Mail, had done much to turn public opinion against the wretched war. 
in Ireland, but such was his pathological hatred for Lloyd George that he 
was now willing to oppose any settlement which the Prime Minister advocated. 
On the basis of Birkenhead's .prewar involvement with the Orange cause, 
Northcliffe evidently expected the Lord Chancellor to resign and lead a 
Unionist revolt. against Lloyd George; hence, he was allowing Birkenhead 
to use the Daily Mail as an anti-Lloyd George forum. Birkenhead, 
unscrupulously perhaps, took advantage of the offer·to put forth.views 
which were favorable to a settlement with the Irish. 124 Lloyd George 
was so impressed bi Birkenhead's efforts that he told his mistress that 
"F. E. is fighting splendidly."125 
In calming the discontent among the Unionists by the use of his 
own prestige, Birkenhead was an invaluable ally to Lloyd George. Birkenhead 
was especially vigorous in thwarting the desire of Carson to campaign 
against the Government. Earlier in 1921,.the old fire-eater had accepted 
an appointment as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and had been created a life 
baron. According to Lloyd George, Carson found his new judicial post less 
exciting than cross-examining witnesses or haranguing crowds at political 
' . . 
rallies and was anxious to return to the limelight; furthermore, Lloyd . 
. ' I I ·, • 
. l 
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., 
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124 Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary, ed. by Taylor, 235. 
125 Ibid., 236. 
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George maintained that Carson resented Birkenhead's status as "the 
126 principal figure in the House of Lords." Indignant over the pressure 
that was being applied to Ulster, Carson was preparing to crusade against 
Lloyd George as he had against Asquith a decade earlier when he was 
dissuaded by Birkenhead. In a lengthy meeting which Thomas Jones described 
as "painful" and "stormy," Birkenhead convinced Carson to remain on the 
Bench and await the final agreement before making any fateful decision; 
127' he urged Carson to trust the Cabinet not to betray Ulster. 
Carson's official silence undoubtedly helped the Government survive 
its confrontation with the Unionist "die-hards". The conference of the 
National Union of Conservative Associations was scheduled to begin in 
Liverpool on November 17, and certain Unionists made it known that a 
motion would be introduced to withdraw Unionist support from the coalition 
Government. It was obvious that, after having failed to defeat the 
Government in the Commons on October 31, the "die-hards" were taking their 
case to the political rank-and-file. 128 Beaverbrook wrote that Orange 
sentiment at the convention was very strong and that most of the delegates 
at the convention were jaded with the coalition. 129 If the "die-hard" 
resolution passed, it would not, of course, bring down the Government as 
would a vote of no confidence by the Commons, but such a declaration on 
the grass.:..roots level would certainly have a sobering effect on Unionist 
M. P.s and might cause many to vote against any agreement with the I']'."ish. 
126 Ibid., 237-238. 
127Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diary, III, 166-167. 
, 
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Furthermore, such a resolution would place Unionists in the Cabinet and 
Government in an extremely precarious, if not impossible, position and, 
by so doing, seriously jeopardize the negotiations. 
Thus, the Government was very apprehensive about the forthcoming 
conference, and this apprehension had caused Lloyd George to demand 
Griffith's acceptance of the boundary commission on November 12. In fact, 
the Government attached so much importance to the conference that it 
suspended the negotiations until the resolution had been voted upon by the 
1 . 1 . 130 iverpoo convention. The man in the middle was Sir Archibald Salvidge, 
the Unionist "boss'' of Liverpool for nearly three decades. Salvidge was 
reluctant to hurt the Government because of his belief in coalition 
government and his affection for Birkenhead, but his entire career was 
based on support for the Union and the Orange cause, and he felt that it 
would be impossible, for him to renounce his lifelong views without anta-
gonizing his followers in Liverpool. In' a letter to Lloyd George, Salvidge 
said that he would have to uphold his traditional position if he was to 
retain Unio,nist leadership in Liverpool, and in an ominous statement to· 
the press, he declared that if "there is to be a break as between the 
G d Ul t L . 1 · 11 stand by Ulster. 11131 overnment an . s er, i verpoo wi 
Birkenhead.hurried incognito to Liverpool to talk to Salvidge.· On 
the evening of November 15, Salvidge and Birkenhead met in a hotel room in 
which Birkenhead had registered to avoid publicity. In his diary, Salvidge 
described the scene: 
As s'oon' as I enter~d 'the bedroom where he had been waiting 
like a caged lion, Birkenhead swung round and pointing a 
long finger in my direction said: "Give me twenty minutes. 
l302nd Earl of Birkenhead, !.· !·, 381. 
131 Salvidge,. Salvidge of Liverpool, 198-200. 
Do'n't interrupt me. Don't argue. Don't raise any point 
ti 11 I have finished." ... Obviously under the im-
pression that I was entirely hostile he put every ounce 
of his unsurpassed gifts as an advocate into the recital 
of the Irish negotiations. 
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Birkenhead said that no one had been more skeptical than he about the 
success of the negotiations, but he had come to believe that a genuine 
settlement could be reached and that the Irish delegates, especially 
Griffith and Collins, could be trusted to honor their pledges. He said 
that Ulster would be offered "Home Rule within Home Rule" but would not 
be coerced into accepting it; he told Salvidge that, in his opinion, it 
was to. Ulster 1 s advantage to accept because the 1920 Act had made the .old 
Unionist arguments obsolete and that the only difference between Ulster's 
position under the 1920 Act and the new agreement was that overall super-
vision would be passed from London to Dublin, with British guarantees 
that UlSter Protestants would not face discrimination. 
Birkenhead went on to say that the Government would not accept 
any agreement which did not include the supremacy of the Crown or Irish 
association with the Empire, or which failed to provide adequate safeguards 
for British security. He repeated that a genuine settlement was in sight 
and said that he "believed in the settlement more than he had ever believed 
in anything," but he warned that the chance for an agreement would be 
destroyed if the convention passed the censure resolution. Birkenhead 
then asked Salvidge to choose between defeating the resolution and allowing 
the extremists to "ruin what was undoubtedly the last chance to reconcile 
' . 
t:he' nationa.l'.ist aspi:i;atfonsl. c,>f Ireland with loy~lty to the Throne and the 
'. ~ .- •.. •. ,, • • • ' • \ c 
even more 
The only alternative to a settlement, 
-~ : ••• :_ .~·· ••• ; ; ' < ••• ~ :> . . y-· .. : ~-,.~;·~;'.~:· ":'.:~r<~: z;:· ' ' '. ·.~: 
bloody and terd:bie thari "!fe;fore. · 
Birkenhead said, was ~i1+, 
' ,.;~.: • !, > f ;. • ·::· ' ~:' < . ;II ' 
Empire." 
Finally receiving a chance to speak, Salvidge showed him a public 
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statement which he had just released to the newspapers. The statement had 
been written after much soul-searching, and it declared Salvidge's belief 
that the Unionist convention should not be used as a platform to attack the 
Government. Birkenhead was extremely pleased with the statement, and he and 
Salvidge then worked out a resolution that would counter the "die-hards" 
motion of censure by expressing support for the Irish negotiations. The 
convention must understand that the Government was doing "the right thing 
for all the interests concerned," Birkenhead said, and he emphasized that 
it was imperative for the Unionists in the Government to receive a "clear 
mandate" from the convention. ·Partially in jest, Birkenhead told Salvidge 
that even if the Irish settlement "finished us both," it would be "not a 
. 132 bad sort of finish." 
When the Unionist convention met on November 17, the "die-hard"· 
resolution to withdraw support from the Government.was introduced. However, 
Salvidge had used all his influence to defeat the resolution and, consequently, 
less than 70 of the 1800 convention delegates voted for the censure motion; 
Salvidge proceeded to introduce the resolution which he and Birkenhead had 
. 133 
devised, and it passed overwhelmingly. Salvidge was denounced as a 
"Judas," and the Morning Post, a right-wing Tory organ, condemned Salvidge 
h U . . 134 and Birkenhead as traitors to t e nionist cause. · Neverthele~s, due to 
the efforts of Birkenhead and Salvidge, the Government and the conference 
had surmounted a formidable obstacle. After the danger in Liverpool had 
passed, Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Griffith, and Collins put the final 
l3Zlbid., 202-204. 
133 Ibid., 213; The Times (London), November 18, 1921, 10. 
134salvidge, Salvidge .£!'._Liverpool, 214-215; Holt, Protest in Arms, 
269-270. 
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touche3 on the draft of the agreement. Birkenhead persuaded the Irish to 
accept the draft with little alteration because Ireland, as a Dominion, 
would be able to appeal to the Privy Council for justice if any of the 
provisions proved to be unworkable. 135 
In a speech at Tunbridge Wells on November 26, Birkenhead gave the 
public its first glimpse of the agreement. Birkenhead said that the British 
Government was attempting to reach an agreement that would satisfy British 
·security requirements while meeting Ireland's "historic claims," and he 
stated that an arrangement which would settle the relationship between 
Britain and Ireland "must come some day." He outlined the major points of 
agreement: Ireland would be granted the full substance of Dominion self-· 
rule; Ulster would be urged to enter the Irish Parliament with the rights 
and privileges that it had secured in the 1920 Act but would not be forced 
to enter against its will; and Ireland would remain a part of the Empire. 
Speaking of the leading Irish negotiators; Griffith and Collins, 
Birkenhead said, "I have not the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of 
both these gentlemen, and the genuineness of their desire to reach a 
solution of our difficulties if such is attainable." Anticipating the 
arguments of those who disavowed compromise and urged a military solution, 
Birkenhead said: 
.. ; . 
It is very easy to say we ought to raise an army and conquer 
Ireland. If the only means of obtaining peace in Ireland 
proved to be by force of arms ... no British Government 
·would shrink. But I would like to .ask: When that is attained 
and by what expenditure of blood aqd treasure I do not know,,. , 
how much nearer woul,d we .. be tQ having a contentec:l:.rreland? · · .. ' 
So hy ··every road ~ c~me, b~ck to 'tn~ ex1>°res~ion ot' the earnest~ 
hope that our efforti may not in tqis matter prove fruitless. 36 
135Middlemas, ed., Whitehall Diary, III, 168-169. 
l36The Times (London), November 28, 1921, 5. 
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Birkenhead's speech, which was a "trial balloon," was an attempt to secure 
public support for the agreement and, as such, received great coverage. 
The Irish delegates returned to Dublin on December 1 with the draft 
of the agreement. However, at the meeting of the D~il cabinet on December 3, 
the agreement received an unfavorable reception. De Valera said that the 
agreement was unacceptable because it failed to guarantee Irish unity, and 
its provision for allegiance to the Crown was contrary to the principle of 
Ireland as an independent republic and violated the sacrosanct theory of 
"external association." Two of the Irish plenipotentiaries, Barton and 
Duffy, were opposed to the agr.eement, while Griffith and Collins argued 
for approval of it. Griffith said that the agreement was not perfect by 
. . 
any means and that it was less than he. desired, but it. was the best agree-
ment that could be obtained under the circumstances, and he reminded the 
cabinet that.a compromise requires concessions from both sides and that the 
British had conceded much. ·He said that Irish unity could be. worked out 
through the boundary commission, and he disputed de Valera's assessment of 
the importance of the Crown issue: Griffith declared that the Irish people 
were not that concerned about allegiance to the Crown and maintained that 
it certainly was not an issue that was. worthy of any more bloodshed. Collins 
told the cabinet members that a rejection of the agreement would bring full-
scale resumption of the war, and he urged them to give serious consideration 
to what that would mean. 
Griffith and Collins were vociferously attacked by Erskine Childers 
and Cathal Brugha, and Brugha sneered at<GriJfi th ,and Collins that .the 
• ,t . ' : t . ', . .· ~ 
British Government had "selected its men." When a vote was. taken on .the 
. . ,,·:1 
'agreement' a, mktj oriiy decided to reject 't t.; 
\. 
In a ~ery controversial d~ci-
sion, Griffith agreed not to sign the agreement as it stood without submitting 
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it to the D~il, but he stated that he would not break off the negotiations 
solely on the issue of allegiance to the Crown. De Valera understood 
Griffith to mean that, under no circumstances, would he sign an agreement 
without referring the document back to the Dail, and, thus, de Valera did 
not feel compelled to add any delegates to the original group or change 
the composition of the Irish delegation. 137 
While the plenipotentiaries were returning to London, de Valera 
made several speeches that called upon Ireland to sacrifice, to pay 11 the 
full price of our freedom, 11 and "to struggle for its freedom until it has 
h h 1 f . t ,, 138 got t e w o e o i • Understandably, British newspapers were filled 
with gloomy predictions of the collapse of the conference and the irrnninence 
of war. On the evening of December 4, the Irish returned to Downing Street 
with the Dail cabinet 1 s modifications of the agreement. The modifications 
were rejected by the British, especially those regarding Ireland's relation-
139 
ship to the Empire, and the session ended on a sour note. 
On the following morning, Collins returned to confer with Lloyd 
George. At this meeting, the Prime Minister assured Collins that the 
boundary corrnnission would bring Ulster into the Irish Parliament and ensure 
I h . 140 ris unity. That afternoon, Griffith, Collins, and Barton met Lloyd· 
George, Birkenhead, Churchill, and Chamberlain. The Irish said that before 
they agreed to anything, they wanted a pledge from Craig that Ulster would 
137Gallagher, The Anglo-Irish Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 138-142; 
Macardle, The Irish Republic, 579-580; Holt, Protest 2:E_~, 270-271; 
Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 160-162. 
138 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 163. 
l~9Mowat, .:Britain Between the pars, 91-92. 
140Gallagher, The Anglo-Irish Treaty, ed. by O'Neill, 150-151; 
Macardle, The Irish Republic, 583. 
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not block the unification of Ireland, but Lloyd George cut them off by 
saying that Craig would give no such pledge and that the only recourse was 
the boundary commission. Whereupon Chamberlain reminded them that the 
British delegates had put their careers on the line and said that the Irish 
should demonstrate more goodwill. 141 
It was, however, Lloyd .George, the ''Welsh wizard," who dominated this 
meeting. He dangled the prospect of complete fiscal autonomy for Ireland 
before the Irish representatives, and, displaying his intuitive, psychologi-
cal genius, Lloyd George struck at Griffith's sense of honor by accusing him 
of breaking his October 30 pledge not to end the conference on the issue of 
the Crown. Griffith denied that he would end the negotiations for that 
. . 142 
reason, asserting, 11 1 said I would not let you down on that, and. I won't." 
Lloyd George then produced Griffith's written assurance of November 12, 
agreeing to accept the boundary commission if Ulster refused to join the 
. 143 
.Irish Par.liarnent. · Before Griffith or his colleagues. could recover, 
Lloyd George, as. Churchill recalled, "stated. bluntly that we could concede 
no more and debate.no further,". and he told them that unless they signed 
the agreement now, Britain would resume the war and would seek a total 
military victory--this was in Churchill's words, 144 "a face to face ultimatum. 11 
The Irish were too stunned and exhausted to realize that Lloyd George 
was probably bluffing, ·albeit magnificently, and Griffith, "speaking in his 
soft voice and with his modest manner," replied: "I will give you the answer 
., 
'' 
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of the Irish Delegates at nine to-night; but Mr. Prime Minister, I 
personally will sign this agreement and will recommend it to my countrymen." 
The incredulous Lloyd George asked, "Do I understand, Mr. Griffith, that 
though everyone else refuses you will nevertheless agree to sign?" After 
Griffith replied in the affirmative, the delegates left; according to 
Churchill, Collins "rose looking as if he was going to shoot someone, 
preferably himself. In all my life I have never seen so much passion and 
ff . . . 11145 su ering in restraint. 
Forced to ponder Lloyd George's threat of war 11within three days," 
the Irish delegates.went through an agonizing debate among themselves, 
trying.to determine the best course to follow. Griffith was torn between 
his assurances to the .British and his personal desire to sign the agreement 
on the one hand, and his awareness of the views of the Dail.cabinet on the 
other hand. However, Griffith felt that an entirely new situation had 
arisen because no one in Dublin had expected this immedi.ate ul timattim from 
the British. Griffith contended that the agreement should be signed because 
this was the best settlement that could be reached, and he said that he 
would not ask any more Irishmen. to lay down their lives merely to satisfy 
. 146 
abstract theories. 
Collins and Duggan supported Griffith, but Barton and Duffy thought 
that the agreement should be rejected. It was Collins who swung the two 
dissenters around to acceptance of the agreement. Collins was still a 
republican at heart, but he agreed with Griffith that Dominion status was 
the bept t.hat 'could be acl\i.~ved at the; Preser,it .time and t~at it would;be' · 
'!, 
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futile to try for the impossible ideal of a republic. Furthermore, Collins 
was convinced that Dominion self-rule would lead inevitably to greater 
147 freedom. In addition, Collins had consulted I. R. A. commanders in 
Dublin and had been urged by them to accept a settlement; thus, he frankly 
told the other delegates that the I. R. A. could not withstand an all-out 
military offensive by the British. If the British conquered Ireland by 
military force, the Irish could expect to receive far worse terms than those 
they were now pondering. Collins' blunt, forceful argument drove Barton 
and Duffy into acceptance of the agreement--if the mastermind of the I. R. A. 
'd h h I . hf d ·1· d f h ld th · b 1?148 sa1 t at t e ris ace mi itary e eat, w at cou ey say 1n re utta 
The discussion among the Irish was extremely lengthy. The British 
had dined and returned to Downing Street before nine o'clock, the time when 
the Irish were expected to arrive with their answer. The British expected 
no one but Griffith to sign the agreement, and, as Churchill wrote, "what 
validity would his solitary signature possess? As for ourselves, we had 
149 
already ruptured the loyalties of our friends and supporters." Perhaps 
due to a sense of fatalism about the settlement, the British delegates--Lloyd 
George, Birkenhead, Churchill, and Chamberlain--were in an inexplicably 
light-hearted mood. Chamberlain afterwards related that "the room rang 
· 150 
with laughter" and.that "our talk was of the merriest." 
They waited until after midnight for the Irish. Finally, Griffith, 
147 
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Collins, and Barton arrived to announce their decision. Griffith said, 
"Mr. Prime Minister, the Delegation is willing to sign the agreements but 
there are a few points of drafting which perhaps it would be convenient if 
I mentioned at once." The points of contention to which Griffith referred 
were only "technicalities and verbal corrections," and Churchill recalled 
that the British were so relieved at having reached an agreement that they 
listened to th.ese minor complaints "with overstrained interest. 11151 Lloyd 
George, Churchill, and Chamberlain left the Cabinet room for a short time 
while Birkenhead remained with the three Irishmen to correct the technical 
problems of the agreement; Birkenhead and the Irish delegates carefully 
rewrote the oath of allegiance to respect Irish sensibilities. 152 
The agreement established twenty-six counties of Ireland as the 
Irish Free State, which would have Dominion status and would be part of 
"the Community of Nations known as the British Empire," having the same 
relationship to Britain as did Canada. The oath of allegiance for members 
of the Free State Parliament stressed allegiance to "the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State" and provided only a mild pledge of loyalty to the 
Grown and the "British Commonwealth of Nations." The office of the Lord 
.Lieutenant was abolished, the new agent of the Crown being modelled on the 
Governor-General of Canada. Canada was also the model for the Irish 
Parliamentary system with an executive that was to be responsible to the 
Free State Parliament. Ireland was to provide certain naval and air 
facilities for British use and was to assume its share of the public debt 
",·'. 
. of the United Kingdom; in addit~on, limitations w~re;;pl~~ed ()n the Irish 
.•. 
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defense establishment--Ireland cOuld have. a defense force which bore the 
same proportion to its population as the British defense force bore to 
Britain's population. Ulster was allowed the choice of entering the Free 
State or remaining with the United Kingdom, but if Belfast chose the latter 
course, Ulster would be subject to the ruling of three-man boundary com-
mission, which would be composed of one delegate each from the Free State 
and Ulster and presided over by a British official, and which would be 
empowered to adjust the border nso far as may be compatible with economic 
and geographic conditions~" There would be no established religion in 
Ireland, nor would there be any discrimination on the basis of religion • 
. This agreement would go into effect exactly one year from the date of the 
signing. 153 As a result of the agreement, southern Ireland would lose its 
representation in Westminster, but the Free State would have. complete fiscal 
autonomy and control over internal administration and justice. Moreover, 
since the British granted greater· economic freedom to Ireland and altered 
the oath of allegiance to emphasize allegiance to the Free State, Griffith 
I 
could claim that it was not the same agreement that the Dail cabinet had 
rejected. 
At 2: 10 a.m., on December 6, 1921, the "Articles of Agreement" were 
signed by Griffith, Collins, and Barton for the Irish, and Lloyd George, 
Birkenhead, Churchill, and Chamberlain for the British; 154 the other members 
of the respective delegations signed shortly th~reafter. After the agreement 
was signed, Birkenhead said, "I may have signed my political death-warrant." 
With great prescience, Collins replied, "I may have signed my actual death-
~ 153 . Macardle, The Irish Republic, 953-958. 
154Keith Middlemas, ed., Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary, I (London, 
1969); 183. 
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warrant." Churchill wrote that when "the Irishmen rose to leave, the 
British Ministers upon a strong impulse walked round and for the first time 
156 
shook hands." Birkenhead then stepped outside the Prime Minister's 
residence and told the newspaper correspondents gathered there that a settle-
157 
ment had been reached between the British and Irish delegates. 
(4) 
The King was so elated by news of the settlement that he invited the 
British delegates to Buckingham Palace on the morning of December 6 in order 
to extend his personal congratulations and have his photograph taken with 
th 158 em. With only a few hours sleep, Birkenhead and Chamberlain travelled 
to Birmingham, the heart-land of Tory chauvinism, to drum up support for .the 
settlement: Birkenhead spoke to the Birmingham Conservative Club, and 
Chamberlain, with the potency of his name, addressed the Birmingham Unionist 
A . . 159 ssociation. · 
Their efforts were well-advised because even though the settlement 
had an immensely favorable reception throughout the world and especially in 
the Dominions, the reception was not so favorable in some quarters of the 
Unionist Party. Leopold Amery nOted among the "die-hard" Unionists a 
"general consternation when the actual terms of the.Treaty were announced, 
and deep resentment against Chamberlain and Birkenhead for surrendering to 
155
winston Churchill, Great Contemporaries, 152. 
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157M~wat~ Britai~ .Between the Wars, 93. 
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winston Churchill, The Aftermath, 323. 
159Th T" e 1mes (London), December 7, 1921, Supplement, ii. 
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the can1paign of murder." As a "die-hard" himself, Amery wrote that he felt 
160 
a "sense of shame and indignation" over the settlement. Bonar Law 
grudgingly supported the agreement but was very critical of the Government 
for pressuring Ulster through the boundary commission: "When I say that I 
am in favour of this agreement I do not pretend to like it. 11161 In Belfast, 
Craig declared that Ulster would not surrender any territory in any of the 
· · 
162 d h. d h G f b . Ul d 'd six counties, an e accuse t e overnment o etraying ster an sai 
that he trusted Ulster's friends in the Imperial Parliament to rectify the 
163 Government 1 s grave error. 
One of Ulster's friends in Westminster was prepared to do just that. 
Carson hadheen disgusted by the Government's willingness to negotiate with 
murderers and terrorists, and he was particularly outraged over the Govern-
ment's intention to raise the level of taxation in Ulster, a proposal which 
he regarded as economic blackmail. 164 Iri a speech in the Lords on December 14, 
Carson condemned the Articles of Agreement as a dishonorable .surrender and 
betrayal, and he castiga.ted the Government for sponsoring such a travesty. 
Carson attacked Austen Chamberlain for defiling the memory of his.· great 
father, and, turning to the Woolsack, he accused Birkenhead of deceiving 
him, of being disloyal to Unionist principles, and of using Ulster to further 
his own career: 
160 Amery, !!l. Political Life, II, 231. 
161Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 434-435. 
162E . C . : rvine, · ra1gavon, 'l 
163 . ( ) The Spectator, CXXVII December 17, 1921 , 809. 
164~y,de: Carson, 460, 466. 
. . . of all the men in my experience that I think are the 
most loathsome it is those who will sell their friends for 
the purpose of conciliating their enemies, and perhaps, still 
worse, the men who climb up a ladder into power of which even 
I may have been part of a humble rung, and then, when they 
have got into power, kick the ladder away without any concern 
for the pain, or injury, or mischief, or damage that they do 
to those who have helped them to gain power. 165 
Throughout Carson's attack, Birkenhead, his son wrote, sat "with eyes 
223 
closed and hands clasped. He sat so still that he appeared _to be asleep. 
166 He made no note for reply." 
Carson's speech was an indication of the bitter hostility with which 
some Unionists regarded the settlement. There was, nevertheless, a feeling 
among many Unionists who dis like_d the agreement that something had to be 
done to end the Irish malaise and that it was too late to back out of the 
proposed agreement,· especially in light of public weariness with the Irish 
war; furthermore, the Government would resign if the Articles of Agreement 
were repudiated by Parliament, leaving the headache of Ireland in all prob-
ability to a Unionist ministry. Intense lobbying by Government officials 
and the utilization of rigid party discipline, plus the almost total support 
of the Labour and LiberalM. P.s, brought the Government a 401-58 victory 
16 7 
when the Commons voted on December 16. 
However, the pressure of party discipline would not be as effective 
in the Lords because the peers did not have to seek re-election or rely upon 
party campaign funds. The matter of predicting the outcome of the Lords' 
decision was, therefore, more difficult. :Birkenhead was scheduled to. d~li~-e~ 
165Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1921, 5th Series, XLVIII, 36-53. 
1662nd Earl of Birkenhead, I·!·, 389. 
167Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1921, 5th Series, CXLIX, 359-364. 
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the major address for the Government before the Lords voted on December 16. 
Immediately before Birkenhead's speech, the settlement had been attacked 
by Lord Salisbury, who had echoed the sentiments of the earlier remarks by 
168 the Duke of Northumberland and the Marquis of Londonderry. The benches 
and galleries of the Lords were packed when Birkenhead rose to speak; most 
of the Cabinet had gathered around the steps of the throne to hear his 
169 
speech. His reply to Carson was awaited with great excitement because 
these two brilliant advocates had always been on the same side in the past, 
and now that they were on opposing sides, many wondered who would be bested. 
Birkenhead opened his speech with a sarcastic reference to the self-
righteousness of Liberal peers such as Lord Morley, who had claimed that the 
settlement was a victory for their principles; this was a shrewd tactical 
. ploy by Birkenhead, for he knew that the Liberals would vote for the agree-
ment anyway, and he cunningly tried to influence wavering Unionists by 
showing that he shared their disdain for soft~headed idealists. He then 
stated that .the British people favored a peaceful settlement in Ireland, 
f h 1 . f t . 170 even i t e sett ement was an imper_ec compromise. Touching on the 
problem of Ulster, Birkenhead expressed his_ regret that Carson had "pro-
scribed me from a friendship which had many memories for me, and which I 
deeply value, 11 but he.went on to say that Ulster's rights were not jeopardized. 
He said that Ulster was protected by the 1920 Act and denied that taxation 
was being used to coerce Ulster into the Free State. Although he knew' that 
Lloyd George had intended taxation to be a threat to Craig, Birkenhead made 
. ,~ ~ 
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168Ibid., Lords, 1921, 5th Series, XLVIII, 185-196. 
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it appear perfectly reasonable: "Is it a form of moral coercion that if 
Ulster elects to remain within the United Kingdom she should pay the same 
I T h I ? 11171 ncome . ax t at you or pay. Referring to Salisbury, Birkenhead 
stated that the Government's main problem was convincing "the mediaevalists 
among us that the world had really undergone some very considerable modifi-
cations in the last few years" and that "we are dealing with a moment in 
which alternatives, and alternatives only, count. We must do something. 
W . . dl d h . It 1 72 e cannot remain i e an apat etic. 
Birkenhead attacked Salisbury and Carsori for offering only negative 
criticism: They "have not thought it necessary to make. any single suggestion 
f d 1 . h h l' . f h . ' . ,,173 or . ea ing wit t e actua ities o t e situation. Alluding to Carson's 
December 14 address, Birkenhead said that "as a constructive effort of state-
craft, it would have been immature upon the lips of a hysterical schoolgirl." 
His remarks about.Carson brought an outburst of laughter and applause, for 
even those who were opposed to the settlement had been appalled by the vul-
174 gari ty of Carson 1 s speech. Stung, Carson retorte.d that he had accepted 
the 1920 Act at Birkenhead's behest, and Birkenhead replied that the new 
ag~eement gave the same guarantees to Ulster as the 1920 Act except for the 
boundary commission, which was necessary to settle the long-standing border 
' 175 
·.dispute between northern and southern Ireland. Birkenhead was then 
subjected to a series of interruptions from Carson that amounted to little 
1711bid., 200. 
1721bid., 204. 
l 73Ibig~ 
' 
. ·, 
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174Ibid. 
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more than heckling until he silenced Carson by asking with icy condescen-
sion, ''Would the noble and learned Lord desire me to give way to him? It 
is customary in this House for only one speaker to address the House at a 
t . 11176 1me. 
Arguing that the only alternative to a negotiated settlement was 
total war, Birkenhead said: 
... of those who criticize us most bitterly to-day I would ask 
this plain question--is your alternative any other than this, 
that we shall now resume the war, that we shall take and break 
this people, as we can with our military strength take an~ break 
them? And when we have done that, how shall we be any .better off? 
Shall we be any nearer a settlement. than when Lord Salisbury, 
if he becomes Prime Minister to-morrow, has raised the Army, has 
carried fire and sword into every village in Ireland. . . • When 
all that has been achieved shall we be any nearer an Irish settle-
ment? There is no one listening to me now who does not know that 
at the conclusion of that war, with memor.ies a thousand times more 
bitterly inflamed, you would then ... have to enter into negotia-
tions with these people, to define. the conditions under which they 
and we will live our lives in these islands.177 
Birkenhead concluded his address by urging the peers to.vote ''not confidently, 
but still hoping that we shall see in the future an Ireland whic~ will at lait, 
. 178 
after centuries, be reconciled with this country." The Times reported that 
the Lord Chancellor had given a "powerful speech" that was "cogent in argu-
ment, rich in feeling, powerful in pleading"--"it made a deep impression . 
upon the peers. 11179 The House of Lords ratified the Articles of Agreement 
. . 180 by a margin of 166 to 47. · 
176Ibid., 208. 
·
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The passage of the Articles of Agreement was an outstanding triumph 
for the coalition Government, and it is clear that Birkenhead was the key 
figure in securing Unionist approval for the settlement. One historian has 
written: "Without the strong and unflinching support of Lord Birkenhead, 
the Tories, who baulked enough as it was over the negotiations and the treaty, 
181 
would have hamstrung any settlement. 11 
. ) ~ 
· .... :·;-. 
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EPILOGUE 
(1) 
The Articles of Agreement had a mixed reception in Ireland. When 
de Valera received the news that a settlement had been reached in London, 
his immediate thought was that the British had agreed to the D.S:il cabinet's 
demands. His mood changed rapidly, however, when he read the text of the 
London settlement. As far as de Valera WB;S concerned, the terms of th.e 
.agreement which had been signed were identical to those which the D£il 
cabinet .had rejected on December 3. De Valera wanted to dismiss Griffith, 
Collins, and Barton from the cabinet, but a protest from the Minister of 
Local Government, William Cosgrave, stopped him. Cosgrave had voted with 
the cabinet majority on December 3, but, ominously for de Valera, he now 
insisted that the plenipotentiaries should be given a chance to defend their 
. 1 
actions. 
The meeting of the D~il cabinet after the return of the plenipoten-
tiaries was tense and rancorous. De Valera made the same objections to the 
signed agreement that he had made to the earlier draft, but Griffith staunchly 
) 
defended it. When the cabinet voted, the agreemen:t was upheld by one 'vote, 
2 the deciding vote being cast by Cosgrave. However, de Valera refused to 
. 
recommend the agreement to the D~il, and the bitter divisions in the cabinet; 
.. ' 
·'. I 
1 . . 
Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 166-168. 
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came into the open as the Dail considered ratification of the agreement. 
De Valera urged the D~il to reject the agreement and submit new conditions 
to the British that would be more consistent with the principles of Sinn 
Fein, 3 while Griffith and Collins used their influence to secure ratifica-
tion. In response to the republicans' argument that this generation of 
Irishmen should sacrifice for the benefit of generations to come, Griffith 
called for a peaceful settlement and asked, "Is there to be no living Irish 
nation? 114 Griffith had won considerable loyalty in his years as the leader 
of Sinn Fein, and Collins' enormous prestige brought the support of the 
Brotherhood for the settlement; both of these factors weighed heavily with 
I 
the members of the Dail. Furthermore, the Irish press and the Catholic 
Church .lent their. overwhelming support to the agreement, and a number.of 
Dail members felt pressure from their constituencies to bring a peaceful 
.. 5 
end to the "troubles." 
De Valera resigned the Presidency of the Dail in order to campaign 
. 6 , 
more fully against the agreement, but when the Dail voted on January 7, 1922, 
. 7 
the agreement' was ratified by a vote of 64 to 57. The narrow margin of 
victory indicated the strong feelings which remained for republicanism_. 
When· Griffith wa:s elected President of· the D~il, de Valera, in protest, led 
8 
a walk-out of his supporters. As the British pulled out of Ireland, Griffith's 
3 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 608-609, 635 •. 
4 
. Younger, Ireland's Civil~' 220. 
5 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 174-175. 
6 Ibid., 177-178. 
7 Macardle, The Irish Republic, 640-641. 
8 Longford and O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, 181-182. 
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provisional government increasingly assumed the legitimate functions of 
I 
the state. In June, an election to the new Dail was held on the basis of 
the Articles of Agreement and the recently drafted constitution of the Irish 
Free State. Griffith's supporters won more than 72 percent of the seats, 
and the Free State constitution subsequently received the approval of the 
British Government. 9 
Efforts to reach a compromise between the republicans and Free Staters 
failed, and in June 1922, less than two weeks after the election, the forces 
of the Free State government attacked and crushed the republican troops 
which had occupied the Four Courts in Dublin. This was the beginning of the 
civil war between de Valera's republicans and the Free State forces of 
Griffith and Collins. This fratricidal war was, if possible, even more 
intensely bitter and terrible than the "troubles." The Irish civil war 
was marked by assassinations, executions, small-seal~ and large-scale gun 
battle~, and, of course, misery for the long-suffering Irish people. 
From the .outset~ the Free State government had the advantage over the 
republicans. It had the support of most Irishmen, including the Church, and 
Collins had carried the Brotherhood and the ablest I. R. A. leaders into the 
_Free State camp. The Free State had the additional advantage of being 
supplied with arms and ammunition by the British, and, inexorably, the Free 
State forces put down the uprising, but not before a grim toll had been taken. 
Two of the most fanatical republicans, Erskine Childers and Cathal Brugha, 
were killed by the Free Staters, but the Free State did not go unscathed. In 
. ~ugJ~ t' Arthtir Gri ffi t~l. ~~o ··hil~ i)'ptRed and \VOrried hims~ 1£ beyond. ·the. po in.~ 
., . . . .. . :~·. , ·. ; ,· ..... 
'.,df endurance_, die~ of ~e~rt.fa~lur~. :~~ri days after 
' . :.- ;. !. ,,..:·.- ~. ' . ' ' ;,;: ·>7 '' i':: . 
(. ~ \ . ~ 
Michae 1 Collins' charmed life came to an e'nd when h~ 
9Ibid., 189-190. 
Griffith's de~th,~ 
)"~ 
was 'caught in a 
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republican ambush. With Griffith and Collins dead, the leadership of the 
Free State fell to William Cosgrave. 
The civil war continued until May 1923 when de Valera told his 
followers to end hostilities against the Free State. Fearing execution, 
de Valera remained in hiding until he was captured in August. Although he 
deserves respect for the strength of his convictions, de Valera must bear 
the ultimate moral responsibility for the horror and agony of the civil war. 
He was incarcerated until July 1924 when he was released as part of the 
government's policy of general amnesty for all who took part in the civil war. 
Cosgrave, as Prime Minister of the Irish Free State until 1932, faced 
the difficult .task of healing the wounds of the people and rebuilding the 
country. He also attempted to deal with the problem of partition. Neither 
London nor Belfast had taken the initiative in solving the question of Irish 
unity or even the territorial status of Ulster; therefore, in 1924-25, 
Cosgrave pressed the matter of the boundary commission to.determine the. exact 
border between Ulster and the Free State. Ulster, however, would have 
nothing to do with the commission, and the Conservative Government of Stanley 
Baldwin did not show an abundance of zeal for the project. By that time, 
Craig's position in Ulster was impregnable, and moreover, the British no 
longer felt a sense of urgency in dealing with the problem·. After the ordeal 
of the 1itroubles" and the civil war, the moderate Cosgrave certainly was not 
willing to resort to violence to settle the border issue. ,So, in Decem9er 
1925, an arrangement was made whereby the Free State was absolved of its 
obligation to contribute to the United Kingdom's national debt in return 
for its recognition of the separate status of the six counties of Ulster. 
By mutual con~ent, the ~oribund bou)dary coqnnission was mercifully put out 
f . . -'10 o its misery •. 
10 __ 
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Through gerrymandering, intimidation, and voting restrictions 
designed for Catholics, the Protestants maintained a firm grip on the 
Belfast Parliament, and Craig was the undisputed master of Ulster political 
life until his death in 1940. One historian has suggested that the Conserva-
tives had a vested interest in keeping Ulster within the United Kingdom 
because virtually the entire Protestant population of Ulster, including 
the working class, supported the Tories, and thus, the Conservatives could 
count on a solid bloc of Ulster M. P.s in l:Jestminster. 11 It is difficult 
to speculate as to how Lloyd George's coalition would have dealt with the 
boundary commission if it had been given the opportunity. The civil war, 
of course, postponed any attempt to deal with the question of partition, and, 
by the time that the civil war was over, the coalition Government had fallen. 
In 1925, when the Tory,Government killed the boundary commission, neither 
Birkenhead, Churchill, or Chamberlain, who were members of Baldwin's Cabinet, 
nor Lloyd George, who was on the opposition benches, offered any public 
criticism. 
In the Free State, de Valera formed his own political party, Fianna 
F~il ( 11\farriors of Destiny"), which was aggressively nationalistic. At 
first, de Valera boycotted the Free State D&il, but he decided that the only 
way to secure power. was to gain control of the Free State Parliament. 
Swallowing their distaste for the oath of allegiance to the British Crown, 
de Val~ra's Fianna F~il members took their seats in the D~il after the 1927 
I 
election. By 1932, Fianna Fail controlled the Dail, and de Valera became 
• ' , • > : '' 
. Prime Minister' of the Irish' Free State~". De. Valera, who. remained' in ··office· ·" 
. ·" ' ' ' " ~ ' ,· 
until 1948, systematically cut Ireland's ties to Britain: A program of 
economic nationalism and self-sufficiency was begun, the oath of allegiance 
11 Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, 160. 
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was abolished, and the Governor-General was reduced to the status of a 
cipher. In 1936, de Valera promulgated his External Relations bill, by 
which a new constitution was devised. Under the new constitution, the Crown 
and the Governor-General were removed, and the office of an elected President 
was established as the head of state, but governmental administration was to 
be in the hands of the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who were selected 
from and responsible to the D'il. The King was recognized as the head of 
the British Commonwealth, to which Ireland would still belong, but not as 
the King of Ireland. 
As a result of negotiations with Neville Chamberlain in 1938, de 
Valera ended Britain's use of military facilities in Ireland, which the British 
had insisted upon in 1921, and precluded British use of Irish.ports and 
facilities even in time of war. During the Second World War, de Valera 
remained scrupulously neutral--to the outrage not only of London, but of 
Washington as well. De Valera was defeated in the 1948 election, but the 
new government, led by John Costello, took a step from which even de Valera 
had shrunk: In 1949, the Republic of Eire was created and Irish association 
in the British Commonwealth of Nations was terminated. 
Twenty-six .counties of Ireland had finally become an independent 
and neutral republic, though the six northern counties of Ulster remained in 
the United Kingdom. In the 1950 1 s, Eamon de Valera was re'-elected Prime 
Minister and, in 1959, became President of the Republic of Eire. As of this 
writing, that remarkable and apparently ageless man is still Eire's President. 
(2) 
After Parliament ratified the Ar.ticles of Agreement i,n December l 92t, ·. • 
the coalition !Government ,fotin?:lated :theiilrish Free State bi 11, which imp le-
, < 1 :· ; :· ' ·. I . ~ ·• . ' 
~ 
~ented the provisions of the settlement. Birkenhead had the responsibility 
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of steering the bill through the Lords, and, because the Free State had 
Dominion status, Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, was responsible for 
the Commons. Unionists in the Commons and Lords were no more enthusiastic 
about the bill than they had been about the Articles of Agreement, but, 
reluctantly, they supported it; and, on March 31, 1922, the Irish Free 
12 State Act received the Royal Assent. 
The Government leaders regarded the Irish settlement with a certain 
degree of satisfaction, but the Unionist backbenchers did not, even those 
who voted with the Government: In Churchill's words, "most of the majority 
. bl d 11 h . . t f . 11 13 were misera e an a t e minori y were urious. Indeed, Amery later 
wrote that after the Articles of Agreement and the Irish Free State bill 
had been passed, many Unionist M. P.s began calling themselves "Conservatives" 
once again, for the label of· "Unionist" was an anachronism "now that they felt 
14 
that the Union had been abandoned." The Government's prestige dropped even 
lower when the c.ivil war began in Ireland, and the "die-hards,, were seemingly 
justified in their assertions that the Irish were savages who were incapable 
of self-rule. At the end of June, the Conservatives exploded in anger at 
the Government over an event for which it was not responsible. Sir Henry 
Wilson, an idol of the Tory right-wing, had resigned from the Army and been 
elected to Parliament from an Ulster constituency; soon after his election, 
however, Wilson was shot to death on the steps of his London home by two 
Irish gunmen. Many Tories felt that the Go~ernment was morally responsible 
15 for Wilson's death because of its policy of "shaking hands with murder." 
12Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1922, St~ Series, CLII, 1792. 
13
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In a speech to the Commons on the very day of Wilson's interment, Bonar Law, 
choked with emotion, expressed his regret at having given his tacit support 
to the Irish settlement. 16 
As the popularity of the Government waned among the Tories, so too 
did the popularity of its members. Law's biographer wrote that Law was under 
increasing pressure in 1922 to return to active politics and that the feeling 
·against .Birkenhead and Chamberlain "grew ever more bitter in the ranks of the · 
17 Tory Party." Beaverbrook, as early as February 1922, noted that Birkenhead's 
standing in the Party had declined drastically sirice the previous fall when. 
his political prospects had seemed so bright. 18 Birkenhead 1 s awareness of 
his situation may have been the cause of a regretable incident that took 
place in August. Conservatives who held lower-level positions in the Govern-
ment r~quested a meeting with the senior Conservative Cabinet ministers.to 
discuss the withdrawal of support from the coalition or, at the very least, 
t.he formulation of a Conservative policy that was distinct from Lloyd George's. 
At t.his meeting, the junior ministers had hardly begun to present their case 
when; according to Amery, Birkenhead suddenly tongue-lashed them "in the 
most astonishingly arrogant and offensive manner. 11 He.upbraided them for 
their lack of loyalty, for their stupidity and "impertinence" in calling 
.such a meeting when they knew that the Tory leadership was connnitted to the 
coalition. They had been informed of their leaders' views, Birkenhead stated, 
and there was nothing more to be said. In a more reflective mood, Birkenhead 
might have recalled his own less than deferential attitude as a young M. P. 
16Parliamentar:y Debates, Commons; 1922, 5th Series, GLV, 1744. 
17 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 436. 
18 Beaver brook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd Geoq~e, 137. 
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towards Balfour and Lansdowne, but, after this outburst, Amery wrote in 
his diary: "Whatever chances F. E. may have had of the Unionist leadership 
~f the future, they are not likely to have survived this unfortunate perfor-
19 
nance. 11 
These enmities came to a head in the fall of 1922 when Lloyd George, 
supported by the Cabinet, sent an ultimatum to the Turkish nationalist leader, 
~ustapha Kemal, threatening war with the British Empire if his armies advanced 
towards the British garrison at Chanak, which was guarding the Straits and the 
Jassage to Constantinople. Kemal held his troops back, but all of the Dominions 
~xcept for New Zealand flatly refused to take part in such a venture--especially 
ln view of ·the fact that London had .not consulted them before committing them to 
:.he possibility of war. Moreover, the Government gravely miscalculated public 
)pinion if it thought that the British people were will{ng to go to war less 
:.han·four years after the Armistice in order to preserve the territorial status 
)f the unpopular regime in Greece. 
The coalition succeeded in stopping the forward thrust of Kemal 1 s 
:orces, but, in so doing, it aroused the Commons to a fever pitch. This 
idventurous policy in Asia Minor confirmed the opinions of most disgruntled 
~ories that the Cabinet was composed of an arrogant elite, and the backbench 
·evolt which had been feared for so long was finally at hand. Conservative 
1. P.s clamored for Bonar Law to resume his leadership of the Party, while 
~ory Cabinet ministers tried to calm the discontent. Law was very reluctant 
:o leave his semi-retirement because of his frail health, but he feared the 
~nservatives would split into hostile factions if the present trend continued. 20 
A meeting of Tory M. P.s was scheduled for October 19 at the Carlton 
'· 
19 Amery, !1z_ Political Life, II, 233-234. 
20 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 451. 
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Club to discuss future participation in the coalition. Despite the disaffec-
tion of the majority of M. P.s and a number of very prominent peers--including 
21 Birkenhead's Lancashire ally, Lord Derby --the backbench revolt would have 
had no viable leader if Law had declined to lead it, for the Tory Cabinet 
members were apparently holding firm to the coalition. On the day before the 
Carlton Club meeting, Sir Archibald Salvidge visited Law's home in the hope of 
persuading him to remain neutral. However, Law informed Salvidge that he would 
support the revolt, and he added that Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, had 
defected to the insurgents. The combination of Law and a Cabinet minister of 
Curzon 1 s prestige leading the dissidents was the death knell of the coalition. 
As Salvidge rose to leave, Law said to him: 
Tell Austen and F. E. to be moderate. Do you think I or Curzon 
imagine we can rule the country with the sort of people that 
will be left to make up a Cabinet after the break to-morrow? I 22 
must have Austen and F. E. back at the first possible opportunity. 
When the M. P.s assembled at the Carlton Club the next day, Chamberlain, 
Birkenhead, and Balfour were present to defend the Government. The most force-
ful speaker against a continuation of the coalition was the President of the 
Board of Trade, a heretofore obscure individual named Stanley Baldwin. Baldwin 
sai_d that Lloyd George was "a great dynamic force, 11 which was "a very terrible 
thing," and he warned that Lloyd George would shatter the Conservative Party 
23 just as surely as he had destroyed the Liberal Party. Chamberlain got a 
:old reception from the M. P.s, but Birkenhead was jeered and insulted, with 
shouts of "traitor!" and "Judas!" thrown at him from the backbenchers with 
11hom he had previous,ly be~n ·extraordinarily popular. The vote producea:a 
' ',. 
21 Randolph Churchill, Lord Derby, 453-454. 
22
salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, 237-238. 
23 The Times (London), October 20, 1922, 8-9, 12. 
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187 to 87 decisio~ to withdraw Conservative support from the coalition and 
run a distinctly Conservative slate in the election which was sure to come; 
the "cabin boys," in Birkenhead's phrase, had taken over the ship. Law was 
h t b th C t . 1 d d th Ll d G · · · d 24 c osen o e e onserva ive ea er, an e oy eorge ministry resigne • 
Salvidge found Birkenhead in a cheerful, expansive mood the next day. 
Realizing the temper of the country, Birkenhead advised Salvidge to support 
Bonar Law and the entire Conservative ticket lest he compromise his position 
in Liverpool. Birkenhead said that he would not support Law but would follow 
an independent course; however, he stressed, in Salvidge 1 s words, that "my 
friendship for him must not deter me from maintaining the traditions of 
Liverpool Conservatism. 1125 In the ensuing election, the Conservatives won a 
decisive victory, while the Liberals were split into Asquith and Lloyd George 
factions, and Labour ensured its position as the party of the Left by 
26 increasing its representation to 142 seats. Birkenhead, Chamberlain, and 
Balfour refused Law's invitation to join the Cabinet, and Law was forced to 
delve· into the rank-and-file to fill Government positions. Curzon remained 
Foreign Secretary, and Baldwin was given the Exchequer, but the rest of the 
Cabinet was so undistinguished and benighted that one historian has compared 
it to the celebrated 11Who? Who?" ministry of 1852. 27 
Birkenhead remained out of office for two years, writing articles 
and books to compensate for the income he had lost by becoming a peer and 
forfeiting his right to practice at the Bar. He and his elder daughter took 
24
rbid.; Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool,: 241; :Bulmer-Thomas, The 
Growth of the British Party Sys~em, I, 265~ 
-;-5-,-. , ... ·' .. '•, .· ,cJ "•; :< '·,, .: ; 
. Sal vfdge; · Sal vi;Q.ge\ or hi Ver.pool,· 2:41. 
26 Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 144. 
27 
· Taylor, English History, 1914"'."1945, 195. 
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a leisurely and extended tour of North America in 1923. During that time, 
the political situation in Britain changed enormously. In May 1923, Law 
discovered that he had cancer of the throat, and "the unknown Prime Minister" 
retired permanently, dying half a year later. Law was succeeded as Prime 
Minister and Conservative leader by Stanley Baldwin--an excellent example 
of "the sort of people" to whom Law had referred in his talk with Salvidge 
in October 1922. Behind his facade of a placid, pipe-smoking, country squire, 
however,_Baldwin concealed the mind of the most cunning, flexible, and ruth-
less politician to occupy Ten Downing Street in modern British history. 
Baldwin's. contributions to Britain as a statesman have been judged correctly 
as being sadly deficient, but, as a party manager and leader who could win 
elections, he dominated British politics as had no one since the halcyon 
days of Sir Robert Walpole in the eighteenth century. 
·In January 1924, Labour, with Liberal support~ formed a minority 
Government after an exceedingly close election.. At the end of October, the 
Labour Government was beaten on a censure motion, and.Prime Minister Ramsay 
.MacDonald called for a new election. The issue of socialism, plus Baldwin 1 s 
uncanny ability to satisfy everyone on all sides of the tariff issue, reunited 
the Tories and produced a massive Conservative victory. Baldwin's new· 
ministry embraced all Tory elements and healed the wounds of the 1921-22 
controversies: Austen Chamberlain was made Foreign Secretary; Churchill, 
who returned to the Tory camp after an absence of two decades, was given 
the Exchequer; Curzon was Lord Privy Seal; Balfour became Lord President of 
the Counc11; Leopold Amery took the Colonial Office; and Austen Chamberlain's 
younger half-brother, Neville, became Minister of Health, a post in which he 
estab~ished his reputation. Baldwin offered the Woolsack to Birkenhead, but, 
i 
consid.ering his more than three years as Attorney-General and nearly four 
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years as Lord Chancellor, Birkenhead felt that he had accomplished all that 
he could in the legal sphere and, thus, declined; he was then offered the 
28 post of Secretary of State for India and accepted. 
Birkenhead's years at the India Office were the least distinguished 
of his career. With his background and temperament, Birkenhead was not the 
man to understand or sympathize with the militant Asian nationalism that was 
expressed by Gandhi and the Indian Congress. However, it is to his credit 
that he sponsored the famous Simon Commission, which recommended that the 
British Government institute a policy of granting "full responsible govern-
ment" to India and utilize the federal system of government as the most 
efficacious for the Indians. 29 The most dramatic event of the second Baldwin 
ministrywas the General Strike of May 1926, which was the culmination of 
Britain's postwar labor tensions. An· old Labour antagonist, Philip Snowden, 
paid tribute to Birkenhead as the only Cabinet member who attempted to avert 
the crisis through Government mediation between labor and management: 
It was not til Lord Birkenhead came on the scene that the issues 
were focu~ed in a definite proposal. No one could read these 
.•documents without feeling a great admiration for the acumen of 
Lord Birkenhead and his capacity for getting to the root of a 
problem. If his advice had been accepted by the Government as 
it was by the Trade Union Council, no strike would have taken 
place.JO 
Although he developed a cynical admiration for Baldwin's political 
skills, Birkenhead became increasingly disgusted with Baldwin's intellectual 
laziness, his temporizing, his refusal to deal with a problem until events 
had reached the point of no return. Indeed, Baldwin's bland mediocrity 
. ,.. 
282nd Earl of Birkenhead, F. E., 504. 
29 Ibid., 511-514. 
JOPhilip, Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, II (London, 1934), 
732- 733. 
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seemed to have an anesthetizing effect on most of the Cabinet, and, as with 
Birkenhead, these years were the least distinguished .in Churchill's career. 
Describing Birkenhead at this time, Amery wrote that much "of the old fire, 
as well as the old arrogance, had gone out of him. But his intervention in 
general Cabinet business . . . was marked by prudent and sober judgement and 
always carried weight. 11 31 
By 1928, Birkenhead was, in his son's words, "sick of office and 
politics." He realized that he would never become Prime Minister or Conserva-
tive leader and that the rest of his political career would be spent in a 
subordinate capacity to Baldwin, to whom he referred privately as "the. little 
half-wit. 11 In October 1928, Birkenhead resigned from the Cabinet and went 
to work in the City· as the chairman of the Greater London and Counties Trust. 32 
He felt a pressing need to provide for his family because his extravagant 
mode of living had not left much money in reserve. Thus, he.threw himself 
into his new business career with the same energy that he had once spent on 
politics, even travelling to New York to confer with Wall Street financiers. 
Although he sometimes appeared in the House of Lords and made an occasional 
speech, his active role in politics was over. 
In the spring of 1930, Birkenhead's exertions and excesses finally 
took their toll on his once magnificant constitution. He suffered a stroke 
that caused massive internal hemorrhaging and made him a semi-invalid. The 
agony of this vital man was short-lived because he was stricken in August 
with bronchial pneumonia, which was complicated by cirrhosis of the liver. 
He lapsed into a coma for more than a month and succumbed on September 30, 
1930. 33 He was fifty-eight years old. 
) :i . ' :' t·;· . $, 
31Amery, k!Y Political Lif~, ·It; 298. 
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(3) 
Any assessment of Birkenhead must emphasize the fact that his career 
was one of continuous success and advancement until 1921. He had the Unionist 
leadership and, possibly, Ten Downing Street within his sights. After 1921, 
his career reached a plateau and ground to a halt. It is true that Birkenhead 
held important Cabinet positions, but his chances for becoming either Tory 
leader or Prime Minister had vanished. 
The reason for this dramatic reversal of fortune was Birkenhead's 
role in the Irish settlement, which was, Churchill wrote, "unforgivable by 
34 
the most tenacious elements in the Conservative Party. 11 Churchill asserted 
that the Tories in Parliament voted for the agreement because they had no· 
alternative to offer and because they realized that some settlement in Ireland 
was inevitable, but the Tories' resentment of .Birkenhead for forcing them to 
face reality was immense: 11 It must needs be that offences come, but woe to 
. . 35 
that man by whom the offence cometh." Birkenhead 1 s career was irrepar.ably 
damaged by his involvement in the settlement because those "tenacious elements 
in the Conservative Party;' to which Churchill referred were the very elements 
with which Birkenhead had been associated and upon which his political future 
depended. These Tory elements--the "die-hard" Unionists, the Orange supporters, 
the rank-and;..file backbenchers--which had, as Amery wrote, regarded Birkenhead 
as "our outstanding gladiator" now found Birkenhead championing a policy that 
was completely alien to their. philosophy and' indeed, comp~lling th~m to 
abandon their cherished beliefs. 
33 Ibid., 547 ff; Camp, The Glittering Prizes, 203. 
34
winston Churchill, The Aftermath, 322. 
35 Ibid. 
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When he had been venomously attacked by Carson during the Lords' 
debates over the settlement, Birkenhead must have realized that he had 
fallen into disrepute with the Ulster-Orange wing of the Unionist Party, 
and, in his defense of the agreement, Birkenhead offended a number of influ-
ential peers, especially Salisbury and Londonderry. However, many Unionists 
would not have been so surprised at Birkenhead's conduct in 1921 had they 
been aware of his secretive efforts before 1914 to secure a settlement of 
the Irish question. Lansdowne had certainly been cognizant of Birkenhead's 
intentions in 1913 when he suggested to Bonar Law that he be expelled from 
the Unionist front bench and "shadow" cabinet; Law was undoubtedly aware of 
his subaltern 1 s activities, but such was .Law's affection for Birkenhead that 
he never reproached him. In fact,. the 1921 settlement was remarkably similar 
to the solution which Birkenhead had striven to reach in the 1912-14 period. 
During that period, Birkenhead and Churchill had worked furtively for a policy 
that would grant self-rule to Ireland, with Ulster being given the option of 
"contracting in" or "contracting out." Thus, in this respect, Birkenhead 
was entirely consistent in his approach to the Irish question. 
Another aspect of Birkenhead's political career was his Jekyll and 
Hyde image~ To the general public, Birkenhead was a swashbuckling, arrogant, 
and caustic spokesman for the most extreme Tory opinions, but, in personal 
dealings, he was the most rational and, even, moderate of men. Leopold 
Amery, whose memoirs reflected a love-hate attitude towards Birkenhead, wrote 
that Birkenhead's "sober judg~ment in private was always a contrast with the 
; bl. . 1136 Uambdyancy of.his 'p~ ic orat~ry. Yet, because of h.is l?ublic image of 
' . •, \.· ! .' '· ..: ... '. ~ 
hard-bitten toughness, Birkenhead was extremely effective. in negotiating 
!·,·i.,: :_\;~:~( . -~·. .~~- ~' :, : ··.:- ?.:· - '": 
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sessions, for his gestures towards compromise were regarded as being highly 
significant by those with whom he was dealing. 
In his personal life, Birkenhead was, by no means, a saint. His 
fondness for brandy was notorious, and, using his looks and charm, he estab-
lished a well-deserved reputation as a womanizer. Despite his sexual 
peccadilloes, Birkenhead retained the devotion of his family, as his son's 
biography confirms. Birkenhead remains something of an enigma to historians 
because, as stated above, he left very few personal papers which could shed 
light on his thoughts or the factors which motivated him. His intelligence, 
talent, and ambition were obvious, but, perversely, Birkenhead was capable 
of venting his sarcasm and temper to such an extent that Beaverbrook stated 
3~ that Birkenhead's."chief enemy has always been his own biting and witty tongue." 
However, during the Irish negotiations in 1921, Birkenhead displayed 
that rarest commodity among politicians--moral courage. If he had resigned 
from the Government and led a Unionist revolt against the Irish settlement, 
Birkenhead would have solidified his claim to future Tory leadership and would 
certainly have been supported by the ailing and weary Bonar Law. If he had 
been as unscrupulously ambitious as he has often been portrayed, Birkenhead 
would have thought of his political future rather than the Irish problem; 
instead, he altruistically worked for the settlement and thereby destroyed 
his career. Even more than Lloyd George, Birkenhead was responsible for the 
success of the Irish negotiations and settlement. In .the opinion of 
Beaverb,rook, who had an inside knowledge of the events and personalities: 
·The moment the arrangement with Birkenhead and Churchill 
came into effect an entirely new situation arose. Within 
six weeks a settlement was reached and an Irish Treaty 
signed. How did Lloyd George manage it? ~the interven-
tion of Birkenhead, who undertook the task of bringing the 
'' 
37Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and The War, 1914-1916 (New York, 
1928), 204. -- --
Conservative Party round to accepting the Settlement, and 
carrying Churchill with him.38 [Italics mine] 
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Of course, people living in 1973 are acutely aware that the Irish 
question is still present, but the 1921 settlement laid the basis for nearly 
half a century of peace in Ireland, and that is certainly an accomplishment 
that should not be treated lightly. Nor should we treat lightly the personal 
sacrifice of Lord Birkenhead, whom Lloyd George privately described as "the 
most brilliant Conservative figure of modern times. 1139 The compliment which 
Birkenhead would have appreciated more, though, came from his friendly 
adversary, Michael Collins, who wrote to a friend in Ireland in the pre-dawn 
hours of December 6, 1921., immediately after signing the Articles of Agreement: 
"I believe Birkenhead may have said an end to his political life. With him 
it has been my honour to work .1140 
:\1·,~··.'·t' ,:·;- ~:.\ .,·,· ~:', ~' 38Beaver·b~ook, ,The Decline a.rid[ Fali ot' Ll·~'yd':'Ge~rge, 105. 
39salvidge:, Salvidge of Liverpool, 240. 
40Taylor, Michael Collins, 189. 
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APPENDIX A 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
Addison, Christopher (1869-1951)--Liberal (until 1921), Labour. Doctor of 
Medicine. M. P., 1910. Minister of Munitions (1916-17), Minister of 
Reconstruction (1917-19), President of the Local Government Board and 
Minister of Health (1919-21), Minister without Portfolio (1921), Min-
ister of Agriculture (1930-31), Government leader in the Lords (1945-
51), Secretary for Commonwealth Relations (1945-47), Lord Privy Seal 
(1947-51). Created baron (1937), viscount (1945). 
Amery, Leopold S. (1873-1955)--Conservative. Served on the editorial staff 
of The Times (1899-1909). M. P., 1910. Assistant Secreiary to the 
War Cabinet (1917), Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1919-
21), Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (1921-22), First Lord of 
the Admiralty (1922-24), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1924-29) 
and the Dominions (1925-29), Secretary of State for India and Burma 
(1940-45). Appointed Companion of Honour (1945). 
Asquith, Herbert Henry (1852-1928)--Liberal. Lawyer. M. P., 1886. Home 
Secretary (1892-95), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1905-08), Liberal 
Party leader (1908-26), Prime Minister (1908-16). Created Earl of 
Oxford and Asquith (1925). 
Baldwin, Stanley (1867-1947)--Cons~r~ative. M. P., 1908. Financial Secre-
tary to the Treasury (1917-21),·President of the Board of Trade (1921-
22), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1922-23), Conservative Party leader 
(1923-37), Prime Minister (1923-24, 1924-29, 1935-17), Lord President 
of the Council (1931-35). Created earl (1937). 
Balfour, Arthur James (1848-1930)--Conservative. M. P., 1874. President 
of the Local Government Board (1885-86), Secretary for Scotland (1886-
8 7), Chief Secretary for Ireland (1887-91), First Lord of the Treasury 
(1891-92), Conservative leader in the Cormnons (1891-1902), Unionist 
Party leader (1902-11), Prime Minister (1902-05), First Lord of the 
Admiralty (1915-16), Foreign Secretary (1916-19), Lord President of the 
Council (1919-22, 1925-29). Author of such philosophical works as A 
Defence of Philosophic Doubt, The Foundations of Belief, and Theism and 
Humanism. Created earl (1922). 
Beaverbrook, William Maxwell Aitken, 1st Baron (1879-1964)--Conservative. 
Canadian businessman and millionaire. M. P., 1910-17. Minister of 
Information (1918), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1~18),. 
member of the War Cabinet (1940~~2), Minister of Aircraft Productiori 
(1940-41), Minister of Supply (1941-42), Lord Privy Seal (1943-45). 
Historian; owner of the Daily Express, Sunda~ Express, and Evening 
Standard. Knighted (1911); created baronet 1916), baron (1917). 
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Birkenhead, Frederick Edwin Smith, 1st Earl (1872-1930)--Conservative. 
Lawyer. M. P., 1906. Director of the Press Bureau (1914), Solicitor-
General (1915), Attorney-General (1915-19), Lord Chancellor (1919-22), 
Secretary of State for India (1924-28). Knighted (1915); created 
baronet (1917), baron (1919), viscount (1921), earl (1922). 
Birrell, Augustine (1850-1933)--Liberal. Essayist. M. P., 1889. President 
of the Board of Education (1905-07), Chief Secretary for Ireland (1907-
16). 
Brugha, Cathal (1874-1922)--0riginal name, Charles Burgess. D(il Minister of 
Defence (1919-22); killed in the civil war. 
Carson, Edward H. (1854-1935)--Conservative. Lawyer. M. P., 1892. 
Solicitor-General for Ireland (1892), Solicitor-General (1900-05), 
chairman of the Ulster Unionist Council (1911-20), Attorney-General 
(1915), First Lord of the Admiralty (1916-17), member of the War Cabinet 
(1917-18), Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (1921-29). Knighted (1900); 
created life baron (1921). 
Casement, Roger (1864-1916)--Served in the British consular service in Africa 
and Latin America until his retirement in 1912. Knighted (1911); 
executed for treason because of his .role in the Irish uprising in 1916. 
Chamberlain, Austen (1863-1937)--Liberal Unionist Cuntil 1922), Conservative. 
M. P., 1892. Civil Lord of the Admiralty (1895-1900), Financial Se.ere-
. tary to the Treasury (1900-02), Postmaster-G.eneral (1902-03), Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (1903-05), Secretary of State for India (1915-17)~ 
member of the War Cabinet (1918), Minister without Portfolio (1918-19), 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1919-21), Unionist Party leader (1921-22), 
Lord Privy Seal and. leader of the Commons (1921-22), Foreign Secretary 
(1924-29), First Lord of the Admiralty (l931). Knighted (1925); 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize (1925) for his part in formulating 
the Locarno Pact. 
Chamberlain, Joseph (1836-1914)--Liberal 
Lord Mayor of Birmingham (1873-75). 
Board of Trade (1880-85), President 
Secretary of State for the Colonies 
Neville Chamberlain. 
(until 1886), Liberal Unionist. 
M. P., 1876. President of the 
of the Local Government Board (1886), 
(1895-1903). Father of Austen and 
Chamberlain, Neville (1869-1940)--Conservative. Lord Mayor of Birmingham 
(1915-16); Director of National Service (1917). M. P., 1918. Postmaster-
. General (1922-23), Minister of Health (1923), Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(1923-24), Minister of Health (1924-29),(1931), Chancellor of the 
.··.Exchequer (1931~37), .conservatiy~ Par,t~. l~adel' (1937,:.go), Prime :~~nist~r 
(1937-40), Lord Presr-dent of the Cou~c,il .(1940). · ·· 
Childers, Erskine (1870-1922)--Served with the British Army in the Boer War 
and was a committee clerk in the House of Commons. 'Author of The Riddle 
of the Sands. D~il Director of Propaganda (1921-22); killed in the civil 
war. 
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Churchill, Winston S. 0874-1965)--Conservative (until 1904), Liberal 
(until 1922), Conservative. M. P., 1900. Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies (1905-08), President of the Board of Trade (1908-10), 
Home Secretary (1910-11), First Lord of the Admiralty (1911-15), 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1915), Minister of Munitions 
Cl 917-18), Secretary of State for War (1919-21), Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and Air (1921-22), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-
29), First Lord of the Admiralty (1939-40), Prime Minister and Minister 
of Defence (1940-45), Conservative Party leader (1940-55), Prime Minister· 
(1951-55). Historian; recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature (1953). 
Knighted (1953). 
Collins, Michael (1890-1922)--Leader of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and 
director of intelligence and organization for the Irish Republican Army. 
D.iil Minister of Finance (1919-22), chairman of the Irish provisional 
government (1922), President of Da'.il Eireann (1922); killed in the civil 
war. 
Cosgrave, William T. (1880-1965)--Dail Minister of Local Gove.rnment (1919-22), 
chairman of the Irish provisional government (1922), President of Dail 
~ireann (1922), Prime Minister of the Irish Free State (1922-32), leader 
of Fine Gae.1 party·until 1944. 
Craig, James (1871-1940)--Conservative. M. P., 1906. Treasurer of the Royal 
Household (1916-19), Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions 
(1919-20), Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (1920...:21), chairman of 
the Ulster Unionist Council (1920-21), Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 
(1921-40). Creat~d baronet (1918), Viscount Craigavon (1927)~ 
Crewe, Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Marquis (1858-1945)--Liberal. Lord Lieutenant 
· of Ireland (1892-95), Lord President of the Council (1905-08), Liberal· 
leader in the Lords (1908-16), Lord Privy Seal (1908, 1912~15), Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1908-10), Secretary of State for India (1910-
15), President of the Board of Education (1916), Ambassador to France 
(1922~28), Secretary of State for War (1931). Succeeded as Baron 
Houghton (1885); created Earl of Crewe (1895), marquis (1911). 
Curzon of Kedleston, George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquis (1859-1925)--Conservative. 
M. P., 1886-98. Under-Secretary of State for India (1891-92), Under-
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1895-98), Viceroy of India (1898-
1905), Lord Privy Seal (1915-16), member of the War Cabinet (1916-18), 
Government leader in the Lords (1916-24), Lord President of the Council 
(1916-19), Foreign Secretary (1919-24), Lord Privy Seal (1924-25). 
Created baron (1898), earl (1911), marquis (1921); as he had no male 
heir, the title of Marquis Curzon died with him. 
Derby, Edward Stanley, 17th Earl (1865-1948)--Conservative. M. P., 1892-i908, 
as Lord Stanley. Financial Secretary to the War· Office (1901-03), ' , 
Postmaster-General (1903-05), Secretary of State for War (1916-18), 
Ambassp.dor: to France', (19H~~2Q), f Secr~1iary of Stat:e for War Cl 922~24). 
Succeeded as :the ;Earl· of Derbi 0908); "king of Lancashire." 
,• ,; 
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De Valera,,,Eamon (b. 1882)--President of Sinn Fein (1917-22), President of 
'tail Eireann (1919-22), leader of Fianna Fail party (1926-59), Prime 
Minister of the Irish Free State (1932-37), Prime Minister of Ireland 
(1937-48), Prime Minister of the Republic of Eire (1951-54, 1957-59), 
President of the Republic of Eire (since 1959). 
Dillon, John (1851-1927)--Irish Nationalist. M. P., 1880. Leader of the 
Irish Nationalist Party (1918). 
Geddes, Eric (1875-1937)--Unionist. Director-General of Transportation 
(1916-17). M. P., 1917. First Lord of the Admiralty (1917-18), 
Minister without Portfolio (1919), Minister of Transportation (1919-
22). General manager of North Eastern Railway and chairman of Dunlop 
Rubber Co. Knighted (1916). . 
Greenwood, Hamar (1870-1948)--Liberal (until 1922), Conservative. M. P., 
1906. Private Secretary to Winston Churchill (1906-09), Under-Secretary 
of State for Home Affairs (1919), Chief Secretary for Ireland (1920-22). 
Created baronet (1915), baron (1929), viscount (1937). 
Grey, Edward (1862~1933)--Liberal. M. P., 1885. Under~Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs (1892-95), Foreign Secretary(l905-16). Succeeded 
as baronet (1882); created Viscount Grey of Fallodon (1916). 
' ' 
Griffith, Arthur ( 1872-1922)--Editor of .the United Irishman. President of 
Sinn Fein (1911-17), Vice-President of Dail Eireann (1919-21), D1fil 
Minister of Home Affairs (1919-21), Dail Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1921-22), President of tail fircann (1922)~ 
Haldane, Richard B. (1856.;..1928)--Liheral (until 1915), Labour. M. P., 1885. 
Secretary of State for War (1905-12), Lor.d Chancellor (1912-15, 1924). 
Created vis~ount (1911). 
Henderson, Arthur (1863-1935)--Labour. M. P., 1903. Labour Party leader 
(1914-22, 1931), President bf the Board of Education (1915-16), 
Po.stmaster-General (1916), member of the War Cabinet (1916-17), Home 
Secretary (1924),.Foreign Secretary (1929-31). 
Hewart, Gordon (18 70-1943 )--Liberal. M. P., 1913. Solicitor-General ( 1916-
19), Attorney-General (1919-22), Lord Chief Justice of England (1922-40). 
Knight~d (1916); created baron (1922), viscount (1940). 
Horne Robert S. (18-71-1940)--Unionist. M. P., 1918. Minister of Labour , ' (1919-20), President of the Board. of Trade (1920-21), Chancellor ofi 
the Exchequer (1921-22). Director of Lloyds Bank and chairman of Grea~ 
Western Railway Company. Knighted (1918); created viscoun~ (1937). 
' ,.- ;. 
Jones, Thomas (1870-1955)--Professor of economics. Worked with the Poor Law 
Commission (1906-09) and National Health Insurance Commission (1912-16). 
Served as the deputy secretary to the Cabinet (1916-30). Was later 
President of the University College of Wales. Biographer of Lloyd George. 
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:itchener, Horatio Herbert (1850-1916 )--Field Marshal of the British Army. 
Governor-General of the Easter Sudan (1886-88), victor at Omdurman and 
conqueror of the Sudan (1898); commander of British forces in Egypt 
(1892-99), in South Africa (1900-02), and in India (1902-09). British 
Consul-General in Egypt (1911-14), Secretary of State for War (1914-16). 
Knighted (1894); created baron (1898), viscount (1902), earl (1914) • 
. ansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquis (1845-1927)--Liberal (until 
1880), Liberal Unionist. Treasury Commissioner (1868-72), Under-
secretary of State for War (1872-74), Under-Secretary of State for India 
(1880), Governor-General of Canada (1883-88), Viceroy of India (1888-94), 
Secretary of State for War (1895-1900), Foreign Secretary (1900-05), 
Unionist leader in the Lords (1902-16). Minister without Portfolio 
(1915-16). Succeeded as marquis (1866). 
,aw, Andrew Bonar (1858-1923)--Conservative. M. P., 1900. Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Trade (1902-05), Unionist Party leader (1911-
21), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1915-16), Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and leader of the Commons (1916-19), Lord Privy Seal and 
leader of the Commons (1919-21), Conservative Party leader and Prime 
Minister (1922-23). 
,loyd George, David (1863-1%-5)--Liberal. M. P., 1890. President of the 
Board of Trade (1905-08), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-15), Minister 
of Munitions (1915-16), Secretary of State for War (1916), Prime l'!inister 
(1916-22), Liberal Party leader (1926-31). Created earl ( 1945). 
ondonderry, Charles Stewart Vane-Tempest-Stewart, -6th Marquis (1852-1915)--
Conservative. M. P., 1878-84, as Lord Castlereagh. Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland (1886-89), Postmaster-General (1900-02), President of the Board 
of Education (1902-03), Lord President of the Council (1903-05). 
Succeeded as marquis (1884). 
ondonderry, Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-Stewart, 7th Marquis (1878-1949)--
- Conservative. M. P., 1906-15, as Lord Castlereagh. Under-Secretary of 
State for Air (1920-21), Commissioner of Works (1928-29, 1931), Secretary 
of State for Air (1931-35), Lord Privy Seal and leader of the Lords (1935). 
Served as Minister of Education and leader of the Senate in the Government 
of Northern Ireland (1921-26). Succeeded as marquis (1915). 
ong, Walter (1854-1924)--Conservative. M. P., 1880. President of the Board 
of Agriculture (1895-1900), President of the Local Government Board 
(l 900-05), Chief Secretary for Ireland ( 1905), President of the Local 
Government Board (1915), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1916-17), 
First Lord of the Admiralty (1917-21). Created viscount (1921). 
oreburn, Robert Reid, 1st Earl ('1~4-6-19Z~)--Libe.ra11 • Lawyer. M.·. P., 1880. -
solicitor-General (1894), Attorney:..Gener:al- (1'894 ... _95), Lord"ch.incellor 
(1905-12). Served as arbitrator in the bo~ndary dispute between 
·venezuel.a-and 'Eritish·Guia:na. ;Kpight~d (189L;); createdbctron (1905),. 
earl (l9ll). , ' 
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MacDonald, James Ramsay (1866-1937)--Labour (until 1931), National Labour. 
Secretary of the Labour Representation Committee (1900-06). M. P., 1906. 
Secretary of the Labour Party (1906-12), Labour Party leader (1911-14, 
1922-31), Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary (1924), Prime Minister 
(1929-35), Lord President of the Council (1935-37). 
Midleton, St. John Broderick, 1st Earl (1856-1942)--Conservative. M. P., 
1880-1906. Financial Secretary to the War Office (1886-92), Under~ 
Secretary of State for War (1895-98), Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (1898-1900), Secretary of State for War (1900-03), 
Secretary of State for India (1903-05). Succeeded as viscount (1907); 
created earl (1920). 
Milner, Alfred, 1st Viscount (1854-1925)--Liberal Unionist. Served on the 
editorial staff of the Pall Mall Gazette (1881-86). Private Secretary 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1886-89), Under-Secretary of Finance 
in Egypt (1889-92), chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (1892-97), 
Governor of Cape Colony (1897-1901) and British High Commissioner in 
South Africa (1897-1905), member of the War Cabinet (1916-18), Secretary 
of State for War (1918), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1919-21). 
Autho.r of England in Egypt. Knighted (1895); created baron (1901), 
viscount (1902). 
Morley, John (1838-1923 )--Liberal. Editor of The Fortnightly Review and Pall 
Mall Gazette. M. P., 1883. Chief Secretary for Ireland (1886, 1892-95), 
Secretary of State for India (1905-10), Lord President of the Council 
(1910-14). Biographer of Gladstone and Cobden. Created viscount (1908). 
Northdiffe, Alfred Harmsworth, Viscount (1865-1922)--Purchased Evening News 
(1894); founded Daily Mail (1896) and Daily Mirror (1903); acquired The 
·Times (1908). Created baronet (1903), baron (1905), viscount (1917). 
Reading, Rufus Isaacs, 1st Marquis (1860-1935)--Liberal. M. P., 1904. 
Solicitor-General (1910), Attorney-General (1910-13), Lord Chief Justice 
of England (1913-21), Ambassador to the United States (1918-19), Viceroy 
of India (1921-26), Foreign Secretary (1931). Knighted (1911); created 
baron (1913), viscount (1916), earl (1917), marquis (1926) •. 
Redmond, John (1856-1918)--Irish Nationalist. M. P., 1881. Chairman of the 
Irish .Parliamentary Party (1891-1918) and Irish Nationalist Party 
(1900-18). 
Riddell, George A., Barop (1865-1934)--Businessman and proprietor of various 
publications including Country Life and News .£!. the World. Served as 
the press official for the British delegations at the Paris peace 
conference (1919) and Washington naval conference (1921). Knighted 
(1909); created baronet (1918), baro~ (1920). 
Salisbury, James Edward Gascoyne-Cecil, 4th Marquis ( 1861-194 7)--Conservati ve. 
M. P., 1885-92, 1893-1903, as Lord Cranborne. Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs (1900-03), Lord Privy Seal (1903-05), President of 
the Board of Trade (1905), Lord President of the Council (1922-24), Lord 
Privy Seal and leader of the Lords (1925-29). Served as leader of the 
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (1942-45). 
Succeeded as marquis (1903). 
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Salvidge, Archibald (1863-1928)--Conservative. Became leader of the Liver-
pool Workingmen's Conservative Association in 1892 and an alderman of 
Liverpool in 1898. Elected chairman of the National Union of Conserva-
tive and Unionist Associations in 1913 and served as chairman of the 
Liverpool Advisory Committee ort Recruiting (1914-16). Knighted (1916). 
Samuel, Herbert (1870-1963)--Liberal. M. P., 1902. Under-Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs (1905-09), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1909-
10), Postmaster-General (1910-14), President of the Local Government 
Board (1914-15), Postmaster-General (1915-16), Home Secretary (1916), 
Special Commissioner to Belgium (1919), British High Commissioner in 
Palestine (1920-25), Home Secretary (1931-32), Liberal Party leader 
(1931-35). President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy (1931-59). 
Knighted (1920); created viscount (1937). 
Seely, John E; B. (1868-1947)--Conservative (until 1904), Liberal. M. P., 
1900. Under-Secretary of State for the colonies (1908~11), Under-
secretary of State for War (1911-12), Secretary of State for War (1912-
14), Deputy Minister of Munitions (1918-19), Under-Secretary of State 
for Air (1919). Commander of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in France 
(1914-18); retired as a Major-General in the Army. Created Baron 
Mott.istone (1933). . 
Simon, John (1873~1954)--Liberal (until 1931), National Liberal. M. P., 1906 •. 
Solicitoi-General (1910-13)~ Attorney~General (1913-15), Home Secretary 
(1915-16), Foreign Secretary (1931-35), Home Secretary (1935-37), 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (193 7...;40), Lord Chancellor (1940-45). 
Knighted (1910); created viscount (1940). 
·s~uts, Jan Christian (1870-1950)--Boer general and Field Marshal of the 
British Army. South African Minister of Defence (1910-19), Minister of 
the Interior and Mines (1910-12), Minister of Finance (1912-13), member 
of the British War Cabinet . (1917-18), Prime ivlinister of South Africa 
(1919-24, 1939-48), Minister of Justice (1933-39). 
Snowden, Philip (1864-1937)--Labour (until 1931), National Labour. 
1906. Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924, 1929-31), Lord Privy 
(1931...;32)~ Created viscount (1931). · 
Stack, Austin (1880-1929)--Dcfil Minister of Home Affairs (1921-22). 
M •. P., 
Seal 
Stamfordham, Arthur Bigge, Baron (1849-1931)--Private Secretary to Queen 
Victoria (1895-1901), to the Duke of York (1901-10), to King George V 
(1910-31). Knighted (1895); created baron (1911). 
WHson\ Henr:y H, (1864-1922)-.,..Field Ma~shal, of the :British Army. Commandant 
of the Army Staff .9~1i;Jge' (19Q:i~io), ;:~irector:of,Miti't:ary Oper'.::i,t;ions 
(1910-14), Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1918-22). Conservative 
M. P., 1922; assassinated. Created C. B. (1908), baronet (1919) • 
. Worthington-Evans, Laming (1868-1931)--Conservative. M. P., 1910. Parlia-
mentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions (1916-18), Minister of 
Pensions (1919-20), Minister without Portfolio (1920-21), Secretary of 
State for War (1921-22), Postmaster-General (1923), Secretary of State 
for War (1924-29). Created baronet (1916). 
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maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as 
are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries. 
The foregoing provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at a Con-
ference of Representatives of the British and Irish Governments to be held 
at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the 
undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence. 
7. The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty's 
Imperial Forces: 
(a) ln time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are 
indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as 
may from time to time be agreed between the British Govern-
ment and the Government of the Irish Free State; and 
(b) In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power 
such harbour and other facilities as the British Government 
may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid. 
8. With a view to securing the observance of the principle of inter-
national limitation of armaments, if the Government of the Irish Free State 
establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments 
thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military estab-
lishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of 
Ireland bear,s to the population of Great Britain. 
9. The.ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely 
open to the ships of the other country on payment of the cus.tomary port and 
other dues. 
10. The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensa-
tion on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to 
·judges, officials, members of Police Forces and other Public Servants who are 
discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of Government 
effected in pursuance hereof. 
Provided that this agreement shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary 
Police Force or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish 
Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The 
British Government will assume responsibility for such compensation or 
pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted persons. 
11. Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of 
Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parlia-
ment and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisa9le as 
respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Irel'and Act, 
1920 shaU so far as they relate to Northern Ireland remain of full force 
. ' ' . . . . . .. 
·and effect, and no election shall b:e held for the return of members to serve 
in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern 
Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland in favour of the holding of such election before the end of 
the said month. 
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12. If before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented 
to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that 
effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State 
shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act, 1920 (including those relating to the Council of Ireland) 
shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force 
and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary 
modifications. 
Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission consisting 
of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free 
State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland and one who 
shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Government shall determine 
in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible 
with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for th.e purposes of the Government of 
Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland 
shall be such as may be determined by such Commission. 
13. For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the.powers of the 
Parliament of Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 
to elect members of the Council of Ireland shall after the Parliament of 
the .Irish Free State is constituted be exercised by that Par.liament. 
14. After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is 
mentioned in Article 12 hereof 'is presented, the Parliament and Government 
of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern Ireland 
the .powers confer~ed on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, but the 
Parliament and Government.of the Irish Free State.shall in Northern Ireland 
have in relation to matters in respect of which the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland has not power to make laws under the Act (including matters which 
under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the 
same powers as in the rest of Ireland, subject to such other provisions as 
may be agreed in manner hereinafter appearing. 
15. At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland 
and the provisional Government of Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted 
may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions subject to which the 
last foregoing. article is to operate in the event of no such address as is 
ther.ein mentioned being presented and those provisions may include: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland: 
Safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern 
Ireland: 
Safeguards with regard t:o import and export duties aff ec.ting the 
trade or industry ~of Nb,rthern' Ireland: 
. . , 
(d) Safeguards f~>r, ,~ifl'?~1i t~~~ .in _Nor.thern Ir~lcmd: 
' :\ i ·. •' ;,.:s :·;: \";'t·;·· ·' '. :! .'.':, < d "" ':, , '>'/ 
(e) The settlement of the financial relations between Northern ireland 
and the Irish Free State: 
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(f) The establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern 
Ireland and the relation of the Defence Forces of the Irish 
Free Stat~ and of Northern Ireland respectively: 
and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have 
effect as if they were included amongst the provisions subject to which 
the Powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State are 
to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof. 
16. Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament 
of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly 
to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or 
give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief 
or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend 
a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction 
at the school or make any discrimination as respects state aid between 
schools under the management of different religious denominations or divert 
from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its 
property except for public utility purposes and on payment of compensation. 
17. By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern 
Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the, date hereof and the 
constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State in accord-
ance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of 
members of Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since 
the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a 
provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps 
necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and machinery 
requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such 
provisional Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance 
of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond 
the expiration of twelve months from the date hereof. 
18. This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Govern-
ment for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting 
summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of 
Commons of Southern Ireland, and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary 
legislation. 
On behalf of the British 
Delegation. 
Signed 
D. Lloyd George. · 
Austen Chamberlain. 
Birkenhead. 
Winston S. Churchill. 
L. Worthington-Evans. 
Hamar Greenwood. 
Gordon Hewart. 
On behalf of the Irish 
Art 6 Grlobhtha (Arthur 
Mi~he'l 6 Coile,in. 
Riobard Bartun. 
Eudhmonn s. 6 Dugain. 
Delegation. 
Signed 
Griffith). 
Se6rsa Ghabh&in U{ Dhubhthaigh. 
• 
December 6th, 1921 
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Annex 
1. The following are the specific facilities required: 
Dockyard Port at Berehaven 
(a) Admiralty property and rights to be retained as at the rate hereof. 
Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance 
parties. 
Queenstown 
(b) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance 
parties. Certain mooring buoys to be retained for use of His 
Majesty's ships. 
Belfast Lough 
(c) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance 
parties. 
tough Swilly 
(d) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance 
parties. 
Aviation 
(e) Fa~ilities in the neighborhood of the above Ports for ~oastal defence 
by air. 
·ail Fuel Storage 
( f) Haul bowline 
Rathmullen 
To be offered for sale to commercial companies 
under guarantee that purchasers shall maintain 
a certain.minimum stock for Admiralty purposes. 
2. A Convention shall be made between the British Government and the 
Government of the Irish Free State to give effect to the following conditions: 
. , 
·'"•. 
(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or wireless stations 
for communications with places outside Ireland be established 
except by agreement with the British Government; that the 
existing cable landing rights and wireless concessions shall 
not be withdrawn ~xcept by agreement with the British Govern-
m,ent; .~n.d 1~~~t thf: .. Bri7i.fh Goy~rnment shal~ ,~e .ep7i7le.cI to . 
·land additional' ·submarine ·cablt:!$ or establish. addi tionali !J;; . , 
wir~less stations ·for cohununi~ahon with places outSide Ireland. 
f • I f ' 
(b)i That" f:ighth;\ise~; bud~~-,''·B~acoris, and any na~igational marks or 
navigational aids shall be maintained by the Government of the 
Irish Free State as at the date hereof anq shall not be removed 
or added to except by agreement with the British Government. 
'!") 
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